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Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the
Roles of the Jury
Nancy S. Marder*
Should any peremptory challenges be allowed now that peremptories are no lon-
ger permitted on the basis of race or gender? Professor Nancy Marder argues that the
answer should depend on whether peremptory challenges help or hinder the jury in the
performance of its various roles. One of the jury's roles is to make public value de-
cisions; peremptories are harmful to this function in that they exclude from the jury a
range of values and perspectives so that different communities may no longer believe
that the jury's verdict reflects their values. Another function of the jury is to render
accurate verdicts; peremptories may impede accuracy by systematically eliminating
jurors holding a range of views who might have challenged erroneous ideas. The jury
also must appear to be afair, andfairly constituted, decisionmaker, and yetperemptor-
ies compromise the jury's fairness by suggesting that the composition of the jury can
be manipulated. Finally, the jury plays a critical role in allowing citizens in a democ-
racy to participate in their own self-governance; peremptories deny access to this civic
duty and education.
There are, however, several justifications for peremptory challenges. One justifi-
cation is that peremptories give parties control over jury selection; another is that jury
selection should be left to the adversarial process rather than to the judge; and finally,
peremptories are part of our tradition, and there is reluctance to departfrom tradition.
What underlies the debate, however, are competing visions of the jury. One vision of
the jury is as a public institution; another is as a protector ofparties' rights. The Su-
preme Court has taken a view of the jury as a public institution in its Fourteenth
Amendment jury cases and as a protector ofparties' rights in its Sixth Amendment jury
cases. Professor Marder also argues for eliminating peremptories by revisiting the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. B.A. 1980, Yale
University; M. Phil. 1982, Cambridge University; J.D. 1987, Yale University. My research was sup-
ported by grants from the Conrad N. Hilton Endowed Fund for the Improvement of Justice at the
U.S.C. Law Center and from Yale's Postdoctoral Fellowship. I am particularly grateful for the
readings, comments, and guidance provided by Scott Altman, Erwin Chemerinsky, Richard Craswell,
Dennis Curtis, Alon Harel, Martin Levine, Edward McCaffery, Daniel Ortiz, Judith Resnik, Elyn Saks,
Michael Shapiro, Larry Simon, Matthew Spitzer, Charles Weisselberg, Catharine Wells, and the
U.S.C. Faculty Workshop since my arrival at U.S.C. and for conversations with Akhil Amar, Owen
Fiss, Joseph Goldstein, Burke Marshall, Vicki Schultz, and Reva Siegel during my time at Yale. I
have also benefited from correspondencewith Richard Lempert, Martha Minow, Steven Penrod, Neil
Vidmar, and Stephen Yeazell, and from conversations with judges, including Justice John Paul Stevens,
Judge William A. Norris, and Judge Leonard B. Sand (all of whom I was privileged to clerk for), as
well as with practitioners, including Assistant U.S. Attorneys Steven Fishbeim and Lewis Liman. I
have had research assistance from Tad Egawa and Kelly Fitzgerald, research support from the library
staffs at the U.S.C. and U.S. Supreme Court law libraries, and moral support, at every stage of the
project, from Jeremy David Eden.
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Sixh Amendment with insights about the jury as a public institution gained from the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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When any large and identifiable segment of the community is ex-
cluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room
qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the
range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not
necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as
a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the
jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected im-
portance in any case that may be presented.
-Peters v. Kitf




Justice Marshall's trenchant observation about the harm caused to the
jury by the systematic exclusion of groups of jurors from jury service,
though made over twenty years ago in Peters v. Kiff, a case pertaining to
racially segregated venire lists, remains both timely and telling today.
When a group is systematically excluded from jury service, the jury is
deprived of a range of experiences, backgrounds, and perspectives that
1. 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (Marshall, I., plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
2. 476 U.S. 79, 108 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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would enhance its deliberations. The loss to the jury arises not because
jurors, by virtue of their group identity, will vote a certain way, but rather
because jurors, by virtue of their various life experiences, bring to the jury
room different values and approaches to deliberations that are unpredictable
and, in Justice Marshall's words, even "unknowable." When groups in the
community are systematically excluded from jury service, whether by nar-
rowly drawn venire lists, automatic exemptions, or peremptory challenges,
the result is the same: a jury that no longer has the opportunity of re-
flecting the diversity of the community. This does not mean that every
petit jury must mirror the community, but only that no group should be
singled out for exclusion from the petit jury. Such exclusion affects not
only the functioning of the jury, but also the way in which different com-
munities perceive the jury and whether they are willing to embrace the
jury's verdict.3 Such exclusion also conveys a harmful lesson to those
who are excluded: It signals to them that they are not full members of the
community. Finally, the exclusion teaches a harmful lesson to those who
are included: It reinforces stereotypes regarding those who are full citizens
and those who are not.
Peremptory challenges no longer serve as a mask just for race-based
discrimination; other groups are systematically excluded through peremp-
tory challenges as well. Today, for example, there is a growing awareness
that lawyers are using their peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based
on gender.' Gender-based peremptories, as they are called, have been
permitted by a number of state and circuit courts.5 The Supreme Court
3. For a discussion of the different ways in which communities may respond to a jury verdict, see
infra text accompanying notes 73-82.
4. One indication of this growing awareness is the number of reported cases in the last few years
in which litigants have alleged that peremptories were exercised in a gender-based manner. For
example, a Westlaw search revealed that between 1980 and 1986, there were three state cases and no
federal cases raising the issue of gender-based peremptory challenges. In contrast, since 1987, there
have been 30 reported state cases and 5 reported federal appellate cases in which one party alleged that
the other side had exercised gender-based peremptories and the court addressed the issue. See infra
notes 17-25. In addition, since 1989, there have also been at least 10 reported state cases in which one
party raised the issue, but the court found reason not to reach it. See infra note 27.
5. E.g., United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Nichols,
937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1080 (1992); United States v. Hamilton,
850 F.2d 1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissedsub nom. Washingtonv. United States, 489 U.S.
1094 (1989), and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990); Knight v. State, No. CR-92-1840, 1994 WL
94515 (Ala. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 1994), withdrawn, 1994 WL 226684 (Ala. Crim. App. May 27,
1994); Bankhead v. State, 625 So. 2d 1141, 1142 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Ex parte
Bankhead, 625 So. 2d 1146 (Ala. 1993); Mims v. State, 591 So. 2d 120, 123 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991),
af'd, No. CR93-1661, 1994 WL 484373 (Ala. Crim. App. Sept. 9, 1994); Fisher v. State, 587 So.
2d 1027, 1030 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 587 So. 2d 1039 (Ala. 1991), and cert. denied, 503
U.S. 941 (1992); Daniels v. State, 581 So. 2d 536, 539 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 581 So.
2d 541 (Ala.), and cert. denied, 502 U.S. 914 (1991); Stariks v. State, 572 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1990); Dysart v. State, 581 So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 581
So. 2d 545 (Ala. 1991); Cleveland v. State, 865 S.W.2d 285, 293 (Ark. 1993), vacated and remanded,
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Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury
has recently addressed the question and has held that gender-based peremp-
tories, like race-based peremptories, are impermissible under the Equal
Protection Clause.6 Although the Court has answered the question
whether gender-based peremptories are permissible, it has left open the
question whether peremptories exercised against other groups are per-
missible. The newly recognized category of gender-based peremptories
should serve as a catalyst for rethinking whether any peremptory challenges
should be permitted.
One way to think about the question is to consider the various roles
we expect the jury to fulfill and to ask whether peremptories hinder or help
the jury to fulfill these roles. The jury plays an important role in making
public value decisions; jury verdicts often reflect the values of the com-
munity. Peremptories are harmful to this public value decisionmaking
function because they exclude from the jury a range of values and perspec-
tives, so that different communities may no longer believe that the jury's
verdict reflects their values. This skepticism may translate into an unwil-
lingness to accept the jury's verdict. Another function of the jury is to
render accurate verdicts; however, the use of discriminatory peremptories
may impede accuracy by systematically eliminating jurors with a range of
perspectives who might have challenged erroneous or mistaken ideas. The
jury must also appear to be a fair, and fairly constituted, decisionmaking
body. Peremptories compromise the fairness of the jury; they suggest that
jury composition can be manipulated and that discrimination has a place in
the judicial process. Finally, the jury plays a critical role in educating
citizens about the workings of the justice system. Jury duty and voting are
two instances in which citizens have an opportunity to participate directly
in their own governance. Peremptories deny access to a civic duty. They
teach those who are excluded that they are not fit to serve and are not full
citizens. They teach those who are permitted to serve that they have a
higher status than those who have been denied access.
There are, however, several justifications for retaining the peremptory
challenge. One argument is that if a party has some control over jury
selection, it will believe that it was tried by a fair jury and be willing to
accept the jury's verdict. Another argument is that by no longer perfor-
ming the task of selecting a jury, lawyers would be relinquishing one of
114 S. Ct. 1828 (1994); Martins v. City of Stamford, No. CV-85-0078-712-S, 1993 WL 21460, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 1993); Hannan v. Commonwealth, 774 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Ky. Ct. App.
1989); State v. Aubrey, 609 So. 2d 1183, 1186 (La. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 533 So. 2d
1060, 1063 (La. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 540 So. 2d 338 (La. 1989); Simon v. State, 633 So.
2d 407, 411 (Miss. 1993), vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 413 (1994); State v. Culver, 444
N.W.2d 662, 666 (Neb. 1989); State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I. 1987); see infra text
accompanying notes 23-27.
6. I.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
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their roles in the adversarial system, and the task of jury selection would
fall to a judge, whose biases and institutional concerns could not be easily
challenged or corrected. Finally, another justification for leaving peremp-
tories in place is that the peremptory is part of our jury tradition; it has
served us well in the past and is therefore worth preserving.
Underlying this debate about peremptory challenges are competing vi-
sions of the jury. One vision of the jury is that of a public institution.
According to this conception of the jury, jury duty should be available to
all citizens who are competent to serve. The jury, because it is a public
institution, should be accessible; stereotypical notions about group identity,
which often form the basis for peremptory challenges, should not be per-
mitted to bar access to the jury and, concomitantly, to performance of a
civic duty. Another, and competing, vision of the jury is that of an insti-
tution designed to protect a party's rights. According to this view, the
peremptory is a valued mechanism because it ensures that parties believe
that fair juries have tried their cases. Because a party is able to use
peremptories to remove any prospective juror about whom it has doubts,
the party is likely to be satisfied with the process and to see the jury as
fair.
Which of these competing visions should control? For me, the image
of the jury as a public institution should predominate. One reason that the
balance should shift toward the vision of the jury as a public institution is
that the community that can potentially serve on the jury has changed over
time. No longer is the jury drawn only from white male property owners.
Now the jury is open to all citizens, and if the jury is to reflect a
heterogeneous society such as ours, exclusion by peremptory-which is of-
ten based on stereotypes about group identity-should be unacceptable.
Another reason is that the struggle to serve on the jury-which some
groups such as African American men and all women have experienced-
has given additional meaning to jury service. In light of these past exclu-
sions, jury service is not limited to the actual tasks of deliberating and
judging; it also signifies the political acts of belonging to a community and
participating as a full and equal citizen.
The Supreme Court's Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment jury cases
manifest these two competing visions of the jury. In those cases decided
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court describes the jury as a public
institution, and treats peremptory challenges exercised on the basis of race
or gender as an affront to democratic ideals like equality and full citizen-
ship and as a threat to the integrity of the jury and the justice system.
Under the Sixth Amendment, the jury stands as a bulwark, protecting the
party from governmental overreaching and power.
One problem is that the vision of the jury as a public institution free
from all discrimination, a vision which is so eloquently described by the
1046 [Vol. 73:1041
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Supreme Court in the Fourteenth Amendment jury cases, has proven elu-
sive. Batson v. Kentucky7 is a compromise. As a result, the framework
it relies on to eliminate discrimination is one that reaches some forms of
discriminatory peremptories, such as those exercised on the basis of race
or gender, but may not reach others. Thus, discrimination is still permitted
during jury selection, and as long as it is permitted, the integrity of the
jury is under threat. One answer is to re-examine the Sixth Amendment
and to approach it with the view of the jury gleaned from the Fourteenth
Amendment. A rereading of the Sixth Amendment that recognizes peremp-
tories as interfering with the requirements of impartiality and judgment by
a fair cross section of the community may provide a means for eradicating
discrimination during jury selection by eliminating all peremptories.
It is not difficult to re-imagine the jury without the peremptory,
particularly if the peremptory is replaced by a slightly expanded for-cause
challenge. The jury can perform its proper roles only if jury selection is
open and if jurors with a broad range of perspectives are permitted to
serve. Although I believe that the selection process must be nondiscrimina-
tory and, therefore, that no prospective juror should be excluded based on
group identity, I do not go so far as to insist that the jury consist of a
proportional number of representatives of various groups.
My approach to peremptories is to look at them in the context of the
jury and to consider whether they hinder or help the jury in the perfor-
mance of its roles. I am driven by policy arguments, and I offer a legal
argument only in support of a position that I have reached for policy
reasons. I limit myself to juries in federal court and make no claims
regarding state courts. I also direct my argument to the judiciary; I do not
address the actions that other institutions, such as Congress, are free to
take. After giving a synopsis of the current state of the law on peremp-
tories in Part II, I describe in Part i the jury's several roles and explore
the ways in which peremptories hinder its performance of these roles. In
Part IV, I examine possible arguments for retaining the peremptory, and
in Part V, I describe the competing visions of the jury that underlie the
moves to eliminate or to preserve peremptories. In Part VI, I consider
how jury selection might proceed without the peremptory challenge.
Finally, in Part VII, I provide a legal basis for eliminating the peremptory.
Throughout this Article, I will be referring to the "jury" without
limiting the discussion to the jury in either the civil or the criminal system.
Although I recognize that I make my task more difficult by trying to de-
scribe the jury as an institution, rather than by focusing on the jury in one
setting or the other, I think there are compelling reasons for undertaking
7. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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such a challenge. First, it is more useful to think about the jury as one
institution because we demand no more or less of one than of the other.
We regard the right to a civil jury and to a criminal jury as fundamental.8
Even though impartiality is mentioned in the Constitution only with respect
to the criminal jury in the Sixth Amendment,9 few would argue that the
civil jury mentioned in the Seventh Amendment is meant to be partial.10
The demands that we make of the jury and the descriptions that we offer
of the institution span across civil and criminal boundaries.1 ' Second, the
civil and criminal juries share many features. The peremptory challenge,
for example, is part of both civil and criminal jury selection. 2 Even
Congress has adopted a unified approach to the jury; the procedures it sets
forth for jury service are applicable to both civil and criminal juries. 3
Third, a decision pertaining to either the civil or criminal jury is likely to
affect the other." And finally, as a historical matter, it is likely that the
8. Local 391, Chauffeurs v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 581 (1990) ("The right of jury trial in civil
cases at common law is a basic and fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence... [a]
right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen [that it] should be jealously guarded by the courts."
(quoting Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942))); Duncanv. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 149 (1968) ("[Wle believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American
scheme ofjustice ....").
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing the right to trial "by an impartial jury").
10. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 348-49 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("The essence of [the right to a jury triall lies in its insistence that a body of laymen... participate
along with the judge in the factfinding necessitated by a lawsuit. And that essence is as much a part
of the Seventh Amendment's guarantee in civil cases as it is of the Sixth Amendments guarantee in
criminal prosecutions."); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) ("The American tra-
dition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily
contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community." (emphasis added)
(citations omitted)).
11. Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel entitled their landmark work on the jury The American Jury,
see HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs Zmsm., THE AMERICAN JURY (1966), perhaps because "they spoke
to the jury as a unified institution." ROBERT M. CovER & OwEN M. Fiss, THE STRUCTURE OF
PROCEDURE, at v (1979).
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 47(b); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b); ION M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELE=-rON
PROCEDURES app. at 282-84 (1977); Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving 'Its Wonderjld
Power, "27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 550-51 (1975).
Furthermore, even though governed by separate rules of procedure, civil and criminal juries go
through the same stages-from the drawing of the venire, to the questioning of jurors during voir dire,
to the instructions by the judge, to the selection of the foreperson, and then to the deliberation by the
jurors.
13. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878 (1988).
14. Professor Mindez recognizes this point:
Although [Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991)] was a criminal case, the effect
of excluding minorities from juries-whether on account of their race or foreign language
proficiency-is the same on the excluded venirepersons, irrespective of whether the case
is criminal or civil, or the excluding party is the state, the accused, a civil plaintiff or de-
fendant.
Miguel A. Mindez, Hemandez: The Wrong Message at the Wrong Thne, 4 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
193, 200 n.3 (1992/1993).
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framers of the Bill of Rights had one conception of the role of the jury,
whether civil or criminal.15
II. Current State of the Law
Peremptory challenges are challenges allotted to both parties that allow
them to exclude prospective jurors during jury selection without having to
give any reason.16 Recently, the United States Supreme Court held in
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.17 that gender-based peremptories, which
are peremptory challenges exercised on the basis of gender, are impermis-
sible."
Before the Court stepped in, widespread conflict existed among the
lower courts. The Fourth Circuit had concluded that gender-based peremp-
tory challenges were permissible, 9 whereas the Ninth Circuit had held
that they violated the Equal Protection Clause because, like race-based
peremptories, they were "not based upon an individual's qualifications"
and did not serve any important governmental function.' The Seventh
Circuit had weighed in, albeit without much analysis, on the side of the
Fourth Circuit,2' and the Fifth Circuit had joined the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits in holding that Batson should not be extended to gender-based per-
emptory challenges.'
The split among state courts was far wider than the split among feder-
al appellate courts. The courts in eight states (Alabama, Arkansas, Con-
necticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Rhode Island)
had held that gender-based peremptories were permissible,' whereas the
15. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183 (1991)
("Spanningboth civil and criminal proceedings, the key role of the jury was to protect ordinary indivi-
duals against governmental overreaching.").
16. See infra note 321.
17. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
18. Id. at 1429-30.
19. United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed sub nom.
Washington v. United States, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989), and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990).
20. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1992).
21. United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1080
(1992).
22. United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1993).
23. E.g., Knight v. State, No. CR-92-1840, 1994 WL 94515 (Ala. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 1994),
withdrawn, 1994 WL 226684 (Ala. Crim. App. May 27, 1994); Bankheadv. State, 625 So. 2d 1141,
1142 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), rev'dsub nom. Exparte Bankhead, 625 So. 2d 1146 (Ala. 1993); Mims
v. State, 591 So. 2d 120, 123 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), a'd, No. CR 93-1661, 1994 WL 484373 (Ala.
Crim. App. Sept. 9, 1994); Fisher v. State, 587 So. 2d 1027, 1030 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
587 So. 2d 1039 (Ala. 1991), and cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941 (1992); Daniels v. State, 581 So. 2d 536,
539 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 581 So. 2d 541 (Ala.), and cert. denied, 502 U.S. 914
(1991); Dysart v. State, 581 So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 581 So. 2d 545
(Ala. 1991); Stariks v. State, 572 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); Cleveland v. State, 865
S.W.2d 285, 293 (Ark. 1993), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 1828 (1994); Martins v. City of
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courts in eleven states (Arizona, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, and
Washington) had held that they were impermissible.' Intermediate courts
in Missouri had gone both ways, and the issue had been brought to the
state supreme court.' In nine of the nineteen states to consider the issue,
the issue had been resolved by the highest court of the state.' Additional
state courts had faced the issue of gender-based peremptories but decided
such cases on other groundsY
Stamford, No. CV-85-0078-712-S, 1993 WIL 21460, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 1993); Hannan
v. Commonwealth, 774 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Aubrey, 609 So. 2d 1183,
1186 (La. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 533 So. 2d 1060, 1063 (La. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied,
540 So. 2d 338 (La. 1989); Simon v. State, 633 So. 2d 407, 411 (Miss. 1993), vacated and
remanded, 115 S. Ct. 413 (1994); State v. Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Neb. 1989); State v.
Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I. 1987).
24. E.g., State v. Anaya, 825 P.2d 961 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Di Donate v. Santini, 283 Cal.
Rptr. 751, 762 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849 (Haw. 1990); People v. Lann,
633 N.E.2d 938, 950-52 (Ml. App. Ct. 1994); Peoplev. Mitchell, 593 N.E.2d 882, 888 (IlM. App. Ct.
1992), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 614 N.E.2d 1213 (Ml1. 1993); Tyler v. State, 623 A.2d 648,
651 (Md. 1993); Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 568 N.E.2d 1148, 1150 (Mass. 1991); State v. Gilmore,
511 A.2d 1150, 1159 (NJ. 1986); State v. Gonzales, 808 P.2d 40, 49 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
806 P.2d 65 (N.M. 1991); People v. Blunt, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (App. Div. 1990); Peoplev. Irizarry,
536 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631 (Sup. Ct. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (App. Div. 1990);
City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739, 744 (N.D. 1993); State v. Burch, 830 P.2d 357, 361-62
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
Among these states, California, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New Mexico
decided the issue on state constitutional grounds.
25. The intermediate courts in Missouri were divided on the issue while J.E.B. was under con-
sideration. In State v. Clay, 779 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989), the court held that gender-based
peremptories are permissible because Batson applies only to race, and "women are not a cognizable
racial group." Id. at 676. The court in State v. Pullen, 811 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991),
reached the same conclusion only because it did not wish to depart from the holding of a sister court,
but the court acknowledged that logic would lead it to the opposite conclusion: "While we feel that,
logically, Batson should extend to gender based strikes, we are loathe to quickly disagree with our
sister district with such a paucity of precedent to rely on." Id. at 467. When the issue returned to that
court, it engaged in an extended discussion of the history of women on thejury and concluded, in light
of intervening developmentsin the case law, that at the very least, "independent state statutory and con-
stitutional grounds exist to preclude gender-based discrimination," State v. Pullen, Nos. 56820, 58075,
1992 WL 121791, at *9 (Mo. Ct. App. June 9, 1992); accordingly, the court transferred the case to
the Missouri Supreme Court for resolution of the apparent conflict between the state's intermediate
courts. Thejudges of the supreme court began to debate whether Batson should be extended to gender,
State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 941 (Mo.) (concurring opinions of Benton & Price, JI.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 636 (1992), but when the question was presented in State v. Pullen, 843 S.W.2d
360 (Mo. 1992) (en bane), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 200 (1993), the court decided to leave resolution
of the issue for another day. Id. at 364.
26. Cleveland, 865 S.W.2d at 285 (Arkansas); Di Donato, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 751 (California);
Levinson, 795 P.2d at 845 (Hawaii); yler, 623 A.2d at 648 (Maryland); Hyatt, 568 N.E.2d at 1148
(Massachusetts); Simon, 633 So. 2d at 407 (Mississippi); Culver, 444 N.W.2d at 662 (Nebraska); City
of Mandan, 501 N.W.2d at 739 (North Dakota); Oliviera, 534 A.2d at 867 (Rhode Island).
27. See, e.g., Baxter v. United States, 640 A.2d 714, 717 (D.C. 1994) (holding that the gender-
based peremptory issue was not preserved for appeal); Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 590
(D.C. 1991) (refusing to decide whether gender was an improper basis for peremptory clhallenges
1050
Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury
The Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the lower courts' widespread
conflict. In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.,2 the Court reasoned that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of
gender, just as it does on the basis of race, and, therefore, gender-based
peremptory challenges, like race-based challenges, violate the Fourteenth
Amendment." Thus, the Court extended Batson so that gender-based
peremptories are now subject to challenge. Justice Blackmun, writing for
the Court, explained that peremptories exercised on the basis of gender are
no less harmful than those exercised on the basis of race. Discrimination
based on either ground causes harm to the litigants, the community, and
the individual jurors "who are wrongfully excluded from participation in
the judicial process."' The "[d]iscriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges" has a deleterious effect on society because it "may create the im-
pression that the judicial system has acquiesced in suppressing full parti-
cipation by one gender or that the 'deck has been stacked' in favor of one
side."3' Discriminatory peremptories denigrate those whom they exclude
and convey a harmful message to those who witness such discrimination by
state actors in a state-sanctioned setting.3 2
Now that the Court has decided that gender-based peremptories violate
the Equal Protection Clause, the debate should shift to another level. The
question is no longer whether such peremptories are permissible or imper-
missible-they are impermissible. The question thatJ.E.B now brings in-
to stark relief is can we continue to justify any peremptories? Although the
Court was careful to try to limit its holding in J.E.B. and to say that the
because the record did not support the inference that the challenges were gender-motivated); Brown v.
State, 402 S.E.2d 725, 726 (Ga. 1991) (finding that the record did not support a claim of gender dis-
crimination during jury selection); State v. Steffes, 500 N.W.2d 608, 615 (N.D. 1993) (ruling that the
issue was not preserved because the defendant failed to challenge the state's use of peremptories at
trial); Commonwealth v. Correa, 620 A.2d 497, 502 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (declining to reach the
gender discrimination issue because the government did not exercise its peremptories in a discrimi-
natory manner), appeal denied, 639 A.2d 24 (Pa. 1993); Adams v. State, 862 S.W.2d 139, 146 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1993, writ ref'd) (finding that the appellant failed to preserve the issue by failing
to object to the state's exercise of peremptories on the basis of gender); Munson v. State, 774 S.W.2d
778, 779-80 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1989, no writ) (finding that the record supported the trial court's
conclusion that the prosecution's exercise of strikes was not racially motivated); State v. Harrison, 805
P.2d 769, 779 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) (holding that the gender-based
peremptory question was not raised in a timely manner); Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653,
655 (Utah 1989) (declining to address the peremptory issue because the appellant failed to present it
to the trial court in a timely manner); Elvers v. State, 478 N.W.2d 68, 70 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991)
(declining to consider an expansion of Batson to include gender because the appellant failed to make
a timely objection to the peremptory strikes).
28. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
29. Id. at 1421.
30. Id. at 1427.
31. Id.
32. See id. ("The community is harmed by the State's participation in the perpetuation of invidious
group stereotypes .... ).
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opinion "does not imply the elimination of all peremptory challenges,"33
we need to ask whether any peremptories should be permitted. The rea-
sons animating the Court's decision, such as the need to eliminate discri-
mination in the courtroom and to encourage respect for the jury and accep-
tance of its verdicts, suggest that the question whether to permit peremp-
tories should be examined from a "jury-centric" perspective. In other
words, whether peremptories harm or help the jury in the performance of
its roles should be the issue.
HI. Why Peremptories Harm the Jury in the Fulfillment of Its Roles
A. The Jury's Role in Articulating Public Values
1. FYnding Public Values in Jury Verdicts.-One critical role that the
jury plays is to decide cases that articulate public values. The jury is often
called upon to address value-laden issues, for which there may be no right
or wrong answers, but only answers that are more or less consistent with
societal norms at a given time. The jury strives, of course, to reach an-
swers that are consistent with the facts of the case, as well as with the
ideals of our society.
Alexis de Tocqueville might have had this role in mind when he analy-
zed the institution of the jury in Democracy in America.' He recognized
the dual capacity of the jury to serve both as a judicial and political
institution, but it was on the latter, rather than the former, that he focused:
To regard the jury simply as a judicial institution would be taking a
very narrow view of the matter, for great though its influence on the
outcome of lawsuits is, its influence on the fate of society itself is
much greater still. The jury is therefore above all a political institu-
tion, and it is from that point of view that it must always be
judged.35
De Tocqueville urged that the jury be viewed "as one form of the sover-
eignty of the people" because it is responsible for the execution of the
laws, just as the legislature is responsible for the creation of the laws.'
In de Tocquevile's view, it is when the jury operates in its civil, rather
than criminal, capacity that it assumes its most influential role.37 The
33. Id. at 1429.
34. 1 ALEM S DE TocQuEvuIL, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270-76 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George
Lawrence trans., Doubleday & Co. 1969) (13th ed. 1850).
35. Id. at 272.
36. Id. at 273. The jury's role as legislature was even more clear in de Tocqueville's day than
it is today because the jury decided both the facts and the law, rather than being instructed on the law
by the judge, as is the current practice. Shari S. Diamond, Instructions Frequently Baffle Jurors,
NAT'L LJ., June 6, 1994, at C1.
37. See 1 DE TOcQuVLLE, supra note 34, at 274. In de Tocqueville's view, the average citizen
does not come into contact with the criminal system in his day-to-day affairs; however, with civil
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jury, particularly the civil jury, is a powerful force in society; its influence
extends well beyond the individual case that is being decided:
Juries, especially civil juries, instill some of the habits of the ju-
dicial mind into every citizen, and just those habits are the very best
way of preparing people to be free.
It spreads respect for the courts' decisions and for the idea of
right throughout all classes.
Juries teach men equity in practice. Each man, when judging
his neighbor, thinks that he may be judged himself.
Juries teach each individual not to shirk responsibility for his
own acts, and without that manly characteristic no political virtue is
possible.
Juries invest each citizen with a sort of magisterial office; they
make all men feel that they have duties toward society and that they
take a share in its government.3
For de Tocqueville, the jury requires citizens to decide issues, the effects
of which they can see in their everyday lives. The jury allows citizens to
see that the cases they decide can have implications well beyond the two
parties before them.
Today's observers of the jury have not lost sight of de Tocqueville's
lessons. They recognize that the jury's decisions often articulate public
values that extend beyond the private, civil dispute at hand:
[Tihe jury brings broadly based community values to dispute resolu-
tion. Civil disputes are both private and public affairs. They are
private in the sense that they arise only out of circumstances unique
to the parties that bring them to the courts. But they are public
because the standards used to resolve disputes on public standards are
based on the community's sense of justice. Thus, the manner in
which civil disputes are resolved also provides continued guidance to
the rest of the society as to what is appropriate behavior. 9
And the jury, even in private disputes, is often called upon to weigh com-
peting public values:
We believe juries provide the best mechanism for bringing
broadly based community values to bear on the issues involved in
private disputes but doing so with their public function in mind. It
is in the courtroom that the community's sense of fairness, ofjustice,
matters, juries are "constantly attracting some attention; they then impinge on all interests and everyone
serves on them; in that way the system infiltrates into the business of life, thought follows the pattern
of its procedures, and it is hardly too much to say that the idea of justice becomes identified with it."
Id.
38. Id.
39. ABA/BROOKiNGS SYMPOSIuM, CHARTING A FUTURE FOR THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 9 (1992)
[hereinafter CHARTING A FUTURE].
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of right and wrong is expressed. It is here that the conflict between
the regulation of society and its impact on organizations and indivi-
duals gets adjusted and integrated, and where competing values are
balanced. 40
The jury's role in deciding cases, and thereby in articulating public
values, has its analogue in other areas of procedure as well. For example,
the casebook Procedure, by Professors Robert Cover, Owen Fiss, and
Judith Resnik,' challenges the traditional paradigm of civil litigation as
a private dispute between two individuals and introduces the alternative
"'Brown Paradigm' of group rights, judicial involvement in a polycentric
dispute, and ongoing transformation of the status quo."'42 This paradigm
recognizes that the nature of adjudication has undergone a shift. Many
cases no longer entail a dispute between two parties that can be resolved
by a passive judge who simply declares which party is right. Rather, the
issues raised by many lawsuits are more intricate, involving various inter-
related groups and interests and calling for more active management on the
part of the judge.'3 The resolution of issues does not entail a return to the
status quo, but rather a transformation of institutions so that they no longer
threaten constitutional values." Professor Fiss has argued that according
to this paradigm, which he labelled "structural reform,"' adjudication
should be viewed not as a process whose primary purpose is to resolve dis-
putes, but rather as one by which judges articulate "public values."'
40. Id.
41. RomHEr M. CovER Er AL., PROCEDuRE (1988).
42. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 YALE LJ. 945, 958 (1989) (reviewing COVER
Er AL., supra note 41).
43. See Abram Chayes, The Role ofthe Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1284, 1284-304 (1976) (elaborating on the substantial differences between the modem public law ju-
dicial role, in which the "t]he judge is the dominant figure in organizing and guiding the case," and
the traditional passive judicial role); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 386-
414 (1982) (observing that judges are playing a more active role in pretrial case management and ex-
pressing concern because such management is often initiated by the judge, is subject to few institutional
restraints, and is rarely exposed to public scrutiny).
44. This transformation of institutions has not been limited to the desegregation of schools; it has
also affected conditions in prisons and mental hospitals and procedures in welfare administration. This
shift in the nature of adjudication, moreover, continues to play a role in the treatment of mass tort suits,
such as Agent Orange and the "asbestos litigation." Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the
Aggregate: Representation and Fees 37-38 (April 8, 1995) (preliminary draft on file with author).
45. Owen M. Fiss, The Social and PoliticalFoundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUM. BmHAv.
121, 121 (1982) [hereinafter Fiss, Foundations of Adjudication].
46. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV L. REV. 1, 29 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss, The Forms of Justice] ("To my mind courts exist to give
meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes."); Fiss, Foundations ofAdjudication, supra note
45, at 121 (propounding that "[aidjudication is the process by which the values embodied in an
authoritative legislative text, such as the Constitution, are given concrete meaning and expression" and
that this process has always been one of the functions of the judiciary).
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Although not all of the authors of Procedure share this thesis,47 they do
seem to agree, at least according to one reviewer, that "'public rights' are
often involved in adjudication... [and that] courts have an obligation to
mold procedural requirements to meet public needs."'
What is missing from Fiss's account of the relation between public
values and the court is the role of the jury.49 Fiss does not mention the
jury at any point in his article The Forms of Justice. Rather, he identifies
the judge as the appropriate person to articulate aspirational public values
because the judge is independent and can engage in a special kind of dia-
logue.' This dialogue arises from the nature of the judicial process: the
judge must address issues as they are presented to him;5' he must listen
to all who come before him; he must respond; and finally, he must give
reasons for his decisions.5 2 The jury is also independent,53 and because
47. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. R-V. 4, 44 (1983) ("By posing the question as one involving a choice between
the judicial articulation of values... and nihilism, Fiss has made too easy the answer to his question
about the institutional virtue of the judiciary and of the political system of which the judiciary is a
part."); COVER ET AL., supra note 41, at 729-30 (expressing skepticism that the federal courts will
always articulate public values); Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1991, at 5, 63 (asserting that the paradigm does not consist solely of class action civil
rights litigation, but now includes non-civil rights cases such as mass torts).
48. Eskridge, supra note 42, at 960.
49. I am grateful that Professor Fiss did address the role of the jury in his first-year Procedure
course, in which I had the good fortune to be a student. His love of procedure inspired me to go into
teaching; his respect for judges and courts inspired me to clerk for several wonderful judges at every
level of the federal system; and his reservation about the jury sparked my interest in the subject,
shaping my research interests ever since that first year in law school.
50. See Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 46, at 13-14 (arguing that a judge should give meaning
to public values and should use the adjudication process as a vehicle for revealing or elaborating that
meaning); Fiss, Foundations of Adjudication, supra note 45, at 125 (suggesting that the distinctive
social function of the judiciary is to give concrete meaning and application to public values).
51. I use "him" and "he" intentionally because the vast number of federal judges are men. See,
e.g., NINTH CIRcurr GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, THE EF-Ecrs OF GENDER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
10 (1993), reprinted in 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 772 (1994) (concluding that "the world of the federal
courts is still predominantly male"). Only seven percent of federal appellatejudges and six percent of
federal district court judges are women. Id. at 12. One of the advantages, therefore, that the jury has
over the judge is that it is a far more representative body. Whereas federal judges tend to fit a certain
profile (white men over the age of 50), id. at 13, the jury potentially reflects a much more diverse
group. This profile of the federal judge mirrors that of many state judges as well. See, e.g., John
K.C. Mah, Diversity ofBench Takes the Stand in Simpson Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1994, at B5 (dis-
cussing statistics showing that, in California, "most judges are white"). According to the Commission
on the Future of the California Courts, 5% of the state's 1554 judges are African American, 5% are
Hispanic, 3% are Asian or Pacific Islanders, and 0.1% (a single judge) is Native American. Id.
52. Fiss, The Forms ofrustice, supra note 46, at 13; Fiss, Foundations ofAdjudication, supra note
45, at 125.
53. Although both judge and jury can be said to be "independent," each has constraints on its inde-
pendence. For example, the jury receives its instructions from the judge, and those instructions limit
its role. (Although in the case of jury nullification, the jury chooses to abandon that constraint. See
infra note 56.) In addition, throughout the trial it is left to the judge to make rulings on the law and
evidence and to direct a verdict if appropriate. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a) (providing for a judgment
1056 Texas Law Review [Vol. 73:1041
members of a jury come together for only one case, they are able to ap-
proach the issue with a fresh eye.' The jury also engages in a dialogue,
although it does not give reasons for its decisions, at least not to those
outside the jury room.5 But the jury, no less than the judge, is called
upon to make judgments as to public values. The jury, even more than the
judge, embodies the community and represents the conscience of the com-
munity.5' It makes judgments in many of the same areas as the judge,
from police brutality to prison conditions, and from sexual harassment to
rape. Although the jury clearly plays a different role than the judge-and
does not play the extended supervisory role that Fiss envisages the judge
playing in the case of structural reform-the jury's role is no less important
as a matter of law). As a result, the jury does not control the information it receives, cannot choose
the standard it will apply, and in some cases does not even have the opportunity to give its opinion.
The jury, however, is independent to the extent that its members are drawn from the citizenry and the
verdict it reaches does not have to be explained or justified; furthermore, the verdict cannot be altered
unless it is contrary to the law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (providing for a judgment after trial).
Federal judges are independent in the sense that they have life tenure and salary protection and
do not have to answer to any other branch of government. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. But they too
operate under constraints. For example, the administrative need for efficiency may influence judges
to encourage the settlement of cases before trial. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Jury Size and the
Peremptory Challenge, 22 LAw QUADRANGLE NOTES, Winter 1978, at 8, 10 (noting that judges pre-
occupied with bureaucratic efficiency have at times engaged in considerable "arm-twisting" to promote
out-of-court settlements). Also, when judges preside over the same types of cases again and again,
their responses may become predictable and formulaic. Finally, lower court federal judges are aware
that their decisions will be reviewed, and they may take steps to limit the chance that they will be
reversed by appellate judges.
54. Jurors' "very inexperience is an asset because it secures a fresh perception of each trial,
avoiding the stereotypes said to infect the judicial eye." KALVEN & ZEIsEL, supra note 11, at 8.
55. In recent years, there have been a number of instances in which jurors in high-profile cases
have been asked by members of the press and others to recount what occurred in the jury room after
a verdict has been reached. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, MenendezLawyer Enlists Sympathetic Jurors to
Defend Client, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1994, at A1O (noting that one lawyer arranged forjurors "to give
reporters striking accounts of their deliberations and of their support for her client'). Although some
jurors do provide lawyers and members of the press with such information, the legal system does not
provide a mechanism for explanations of jury decisionmaking. Such inquiries should raise some
concern because deliberations are supposed to take place in secret. See Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury
Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Postverdict Interviews, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 295, 297 (noting
that due to the media's postverdict inquiries, "there is a genuine risk that the authority of jury verdicts
will decline--and that the jury will be less able to perform its distinctive constitutional role of re-
straining an arbitrary government").
56. The most extreme example of thejury as conscience arises in cases ofjury nullification. See,
e.g., MORTim R. KADISH & SANFoRD H. KADISH, DISCtION To DIsomy 45-66 (1973) (noting
that a jury may sometimes depart from following the judges instructions and decide based on
considerations of fairness or common sense); Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 83
(1977) ("Unless the jury renders a verdict in which the community sense of justice is articulated, an
accused may not feel that he has been judged, but rather may feel he has been processed."); Alan
Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51, 79 ("A jury that is denied the nullification instruction is less apt to act
as the common-sense conscience of the community and may be apt to disrespect the system that delib-
erately withholds vital information necessary for its performance.').
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and no less integral to articulating public values than that of the judge.
While the jury does not explain its reasons, as the judge does, it must
nonetheless grapple with important value judgments, and from its deci-
sions, we, as a society, draw important lessons.
The joint involvement of both judge and jury in the important task of
articulating public values is evident in several trials that have captured
newspaper headlines. In one trial in federal district court, for example,
Professor Leonard Jeffries alleged that City University of New York
(CUNY) violated his right to free speech when, after he had delivered a
speech that was viewed as anti-Semitic, the university removed him as
chairman of the black studies department.' The jury decided that the col-
lege had dismissed Jeffries from his position as chairman as a result of the
speech and in violation of his right to due process.58 Judge Conboy, after
weighing Jeffries's right to free speech against the college's right to choose
its administrators and to control disruptions on campus, held that Jeffries's
right should prevail.59 The jury also determined that the Chancellor of
CUNY and five other officials were responsible for depriving Jeffries of
his right to free speech.' Finally, the jury had to decide whether Jeffries
should receive any monetary damages; it set the amount at $400,000.61
It remained for Judge Conboy to decide that Jeffries should be reinstated
as chairman.62  Although judge and jury had their separate
57. Maria Newman, CUNY Violated Speech Rights of Department Chief, Jury Says, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 1993, at Al.
58. Black Study Chairman's Firing Ruled Violation of His Rights, WASH. POST, May 12, 1993,
at A14.
59. Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 1244 (2d Cir. 1994); see infra note 65 (detailing the
subsequent history of Jeffrlies).
60. Maria Newman, Jury Faults CUNY Officials in Jeffries Lawsuit Decision, N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 1993, at B6.
61. Maria Newman, Jeffrles Wins $400,000 in Damages, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1993, at B1.
Jeffries had sought $25 million in punitive damages. The award was assessed against the former City
College President, who had recommended Jeifries's removal, against the City University Chancellor,
who had endorsed the recommendation, and against the four trustees who had publicly announced that
they wanted to take action against Jeffries because of the speech. Id. The other nine trustees were not
found liable. Id. One juror explained: "We decided, especially with regard to the First Amendment
violation, that punitive damages were in order to wake up the slumbering moral fiber of the CUNY ad-
ministration." Id. at B4.
The Second Circuit upheld the reinstatement of Jeffrles, but overturned the jury's award of
damages against CUNY. Jeffries, 21 F.3d at 1249-50.
62. Newman, supra note 60, at B6; Newman, supra note 61, at B1, B4. One op-ed writer urged
Judge Conboy not to reinstate Jeffries. The writer argued that Jeffries had simply invoked the talis-
manic phrase "free speech" to justify his racist doctrines, ill-deserved tenure, and 20-year reign as
chairman, and that his dismissal should have been decided by the "properly constituted academic
authorities" rather than by a "Federal judge and jury." Nathan Glazer, Academic Freedom? Academic
Farce, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1993, at A27. Judge Conboy, however, did reinstate Jeffries as chairman
of the black studies department at City College. Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066, 1098
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). The judge reasoned that the government-funded university had tried to remove
Jeffries for delivering an inflammatory speech; such a basis for removal violated Jeffries's First
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responsibilities, both participated in apas de deux, in which each played
a role in ascertaining how far the First Amendment extends to protect
speech that may be offensive.' Such a decision involves values; there is
no clear, bright-line rule. Thus, both judge and jury had to determine
where to draw the line in this case," knowing that whatever
accommodation they reached was subject to appellate review' and was
also likely to have implications for future cases.'
The jury, like the judge in Fiss's structural reform suit, is often asked
to resolve issues that go beyond simple dispute resolution. Public values
are necessarily called into play. For example, civil rights67 cases clearly
implicate such values; however, tort cases do as well.6" The jury defines
Amendment rights. Id. at 1071-72; see also Richard Bernstein, Judge Reinstates Jeffries as Head of
Black Studies for City College, N.Y. TImES, Aug. 5, 1993, at Al (reporting the strongly worded
decision of Judge Conboy, who decided to reinstate Jeffries to his chairmanship position). Judge
Conby noted that Jeffries could have been removed for "serious improprieties" in the way he ran the
department, but the university, having chosen not to act on those improprieties in the past, could not
now claim they were the basis for his removal. Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1097; see also Richard
Bernstein, Jeffries Reinstated, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993, § 4, at 2.
63. The press also perceived the decision as one that resulted from the collaborative efforts of both
jury and judge, even though each was performing its respective role. For example, an editorial in the
New York Thnes explained: "Judge and jury held that the demotion amounted to punishment for
exercising a constitutional right to speak and a denial of property without due process of law. Now
the jury is deciding which state officials are liable, and the judge must decide whether to order rein-
statement." Due Process forLeonard Jeffiries?, N.Y. TIMS, May 14, 1993, at A30 (emphasis added);
see also Patricia Cohen & William Douglas, Jeffries Wuns CCNYFight, NEWSDAY, May 12, 1993, at
4 ("[A] federal jury and judge decided that City College officials violated [Jeffries's] constitutional
rights ..... (emphasis added)).
64. Cf. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J 1293, 1311 (1993) ("[I]t is
wiser to argue and decide one case at a time ... than it is to attempt to craft absolute propositions of
law to answer a host of questions that have not yet been tested in adversary litigation.").
65. After the Second Circuit upheld Jeffries's reinstatement, Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238,
1249 (2d Cir. 1994), the Supreme Court granted, vacated, and remanded the case to the Second Cir-
cuit, Harleston v. Jeffries, 115 S. Ct. 502 (1994), so that the court could consider it in light of Waters
v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994). In Waters, a decision involving a public hospital's dismissal of
a nurse who had criticized its training program, a plurality of the Court held that the administrators'
"reasonable predictions" of disruption should have received more weight in balancing an employee's
rights against the employer's needs. Id. at 1887. Upon remand, the Second Circuit held that CUNY
acted within its rights in dismissing Jeffries from his position as chairman of the department. Jeffries
v. Harleston, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 7639 (Apr. 4, 1995); see also Richard P6rez-Pefia, In Reversal,
Court Upholds University in Jefflies Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1995, at Al.
66. An earlier case involving Michael Levin, a City Collegeprofessorwho had espoused the view
that blacks were inferior to whites, foreshadowed the case of Leonard Jeffries. In Levin's case, the
court held that City College violated Levin's constitutional rights by investigating him and by creating
alternative classes for those who were offended by his views. Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85, 88 (2d
Cir. 1992).
67. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides to those whose civil rights have allegedly been violated
an opportunity to have their cases heard by a jury rather than a judge. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(c) (Supp.
V 1993).
68. See Catharine P. Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2348, 2389 (1990) ("[M]any of the standards that tort law invokes
are, like negligence, simply appeals to the jury's own common sense judgment."); United States v.
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for the community the duties that its members owe to each other and the
standard of conduct to which a reasonable person is held. The reach of the
jury's decision extends beyond the individual parties before it and sends a
powerful message about issues that may be strongly held in our society.6
As the Rodney King cases made clear, the message the jury sends can have
reverberations in the community.' ° Although the jury's verdict does not
usually result in riots, .1 it may elicit a response from the community, par-
ticularly when the jury has reached a value judgment with which the larger
community disagrees.'
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, I., concurring and dissenting) ("The
drafters of legal rules cannot anticipate and take account of every case where a defendant's conduct is
'unlawful' but not blameworthy, any more than they can draw a bold line to mark the boundary
between an accident and negligence. It is the jury-as spokesman for the community's sense of
values-that must explore that subtle and elusive boundary.").
69. See, e.g., Oklahoma Rapist Gets 30,000 Years, UNITED PRES INT'L, Dec.23, 1994,available
in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File (noting that a judge carried out the jury's recommendation and
sentenced a convicted child rapist to 30,000 years in prison; the judge said, "the jurors obviously felt
that the Oklahoma criminal justice system was too lenient").
70. See generally Symposium, Los Angeles, April 29, 1992 and Beyond: The Law, Issues, and
Perspectives, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (1993); Colloquy: Racism in the Wake of the Los Angeles Riots,
70 DENy. U. L. Rtv. 187 (1993) (both exploring the legal issues brought to the fore by the Los
Angeles riots).
71. Some recent cases have involved explosive issues and have led to similarly explosive com-
munity responses. See, e.g., Marc Lacey & Shawn Hubler, Rioters Set Fires, Loot Stores; 4 Reported
Dead, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al (observing that, after the announcement of the verdict in the
King trial, "[n]o signs of law enforcementwere evidentfor hours as mobs dragged motorists from their
vehicles and beat them, hurled rocks and bottles at passing cars and looted a nearby liquor store");
Richard A. Serrano & Tracy Wilkinson, All 4 in King Beating Acquitted; Violence Follows Verdicts,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al (reporting that "the largest rioting to erupt in Los Angeles since the
Watts riots of 1965" followed the announcement of verdicts acquitting four L.A. police officers of
charges stemming from the videotaped beating of Rodney King); David Treadwell, Violence Erupts in
Atlanta as Other Cities Brace for Trouble, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at A9 ("Hundreds of black
youths went on a rampage through downtown Atlanta on Thursday, while in cities elsewhere officials
and police braced for possible violence as the verdicts in the Rodney G. King beating case appeared
to touch a raw nerve around the country."). As a result, some judges have become more attuned to
the composition of the jury. See, e.g., Larry Rohter, Mixed Jury Picked to Try Policeman, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1993, at A6 (-[A] Judge... said he intended to seat blacks on the jury 'to the max-
imum extent permitted by law' in order to diminish what he described as the 'alienation' of blacks from
the criminal justice system."). However, Judge W. Thomas Spencer's efforts to seat a racially mixed
jury in the case of William Lozano, a Spanish-speaking, Columbian-bom police officer who was being
retried for the deaths of two young African American men, raises questions aboutjury representative-
ness. Judge Spencer has taken jury selection one step further: Rather than avoiding the exclusion of
jurors belonging to certain groups, he has affirmatively attempted to create a certain mix of people on
thejury. See Larry Rohter, Lozano Case Tests How Racially Balanced a Jury Must Be, N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 1993, § 4, at 3 (debating the merits of Judge Spencer's decision to require a jury to reflect
the racial make-up of the community). For a discussion of proportional jury representation, or what
I call the quota method, and why I do not think it is the best solution for jury selection, see infra sub-
part VI(B).
72. Although the jury must reach judgments on issues involving public values, its role is not to
surmise what the larger community might expect the verdict to be. Rather, its task is to hear the
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There are different levels of community, and each may differ in its re-
sponse to a jury's verdict. Thus, it will not always be clear which com-
munity's values are being articulated. The term "community" can embrace
both the local area from which the jurors are drawn and in which the trial
takes place, as well as the larger, national community, which learns about
the case through the media. 3 Communities beyond the national commu-
nity may exist, and these communities may have different responses as
well. For example, on October 17, 1992, Rodney Peairs fatally shot
Yoshihiro Hattori, a Japanese high school exchange student who mistakenly
knocked on Peairs's door while searching for a Halloween party. Many
in the local community in Baton Rouge did not sense anything wrong with
the acquittal of Rodney Peairs, who claimed that he had felt threatened in
his own home.74 Meanwhile, the case received extensive coverage in Ja-
pan, where people reacted to the verdict with bewilderment and outrage.7'
For many Japanese, the trial called into question the American justice sys-
tem, particularly when the defense was permitted to use its peremptories
to exclude all who did not believe in the right to keep a gun at home.76
In this country, national reaction was intense; the case served as "nonstop
fodder for talk shows" and sparked a protest march by the Guardian
evidence and witnesses, to deliberate, and to reach a verdict that accords with its sense of values. The
public may disagree-sometimes vehemently-but if the process is seen as fair, then the verdict will
be accepted. For example, in Crown Heights, Hasidic Jews did not agree with the jury's acquittal of
Lemrick Nelson, Jr., but they responded, not by questioning the legal system, but by playing according
to its rules and filing a lawsuit against New York City. Alison Mitchell, Reliving Crown Heights
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1993, at El, B2. For further discussion of Crown Heights, see infra
text accompanying notes 80-82.
73. Even though I will be using "community" in the singular, I will be using it to represent these
different levels of community.
74. See, e.g., Acquittal in Doorstep Killing of Japanese Student, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1993, at
Al, All ("[T]here was evidencethat many in this city of about220,000 believed Mr. Peairs ... had
acted reasonably."); Gary Owen, A Right to Self-Defense, TIMS-PIcAYUNE (New Orleans), May 30,
1993, at B6 ("As an American citizen, it's my right to own a weapon and protect my property, family
and myself from harm."). As one professor from Tulane Law School in New Orleans explained:
"There's at least a community sense that using deadly force is not problematic. I mean guns are really
part of the milieu in Louisiana." Peter Applebome, Verdict in Death of Student Reverberates Across
Nation, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1993, at A14 (quoting Professor Katherine Federle).
75. See Grief Spans Sea as Gun Ends a Life Mistakenly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1992, at A16 ("In
Japan, the incident is creating shock waves .... mhe shooting has reinforced the image of America
as a society ridden with guns and shooting."). Japanese editorialists and television commentators inter-
preted the verdict as reinforcing the stereotype of America as a "nation of gunwielding paranoids, an
out-of-control society where .44 Magnum revolvers are as common as toaster ovens." David E.
Sanger, After Gunman's Acquittal, Japan Struggles to Understand America, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
1993, at Al. According to one account, " t]he verdict seemed to bolster Japan's growing conviction
that, despite government proclamations to the contrary, its own values are very different from
America's." Id. at A17.
76. Sanger, supra note 75, at A17.
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Angels in New York.7 For gun control advocates, the case reinforced
the need for tighter gun control laws.78 Of course, communities, even as
understood on these various levels, do not respond in monolithic ways.
For example, some members of Peairs's local community were appalled by
the verdict.7 9
A decision that angers one group in a community may appease anoth-
er. Crown Heights may be an extreme example of such tensions. A car
in the motorcade of the Lubavitcher Grand Rabbi accidentally struck and
killed Gavin Cato,, an African American child in Crown Heights. Violence
erupted, culminating in the murder of Yankel Rosenbaum, a rabbinical
scholar visiting from Australia. He was surrounded by a group of African
Americans yelling "Kill the Jew" and stabbed to death in retaliation.'
When Lemrick Nelson, Jr. was tried for the murder of Rosenbaum and ac-
quitted by a jury, the Hasidic community interpreted the verdict as evi-
dence of anti-Semitism. It responded by fMling suit in federal court alleging
that the Dinkins Administration had prevented the police from acting force-
fully to protect Jews and, instead, had allowed African American youths
"to vent their rage." 8 Although the two groups share the same physical
space, and on that level can be characterized as "a community," relations
have been marked by suspicion and animosity. Thus, while they are a
community on one level, they do not necessarily give the same interpre-
tation to shared events. In response to the jury's verdict, a group of
African Americans shouted, "Yay! Yay! ... It's about time! Wake up
New York!" while a group of Hasidic Jews chanted the African American
slogan: "No justice, no peace! "'
77. Applebome, supra note 74, at A14.
78. Id. An editorial in the New York T7hnes explained the verdict in light of our "gun crazy"
society: "Just think stupidity, intolerance, a warped interpretation of the 'right to bear arms' and a
refusal to learn anything from the deaths of several famous Americans, countless ordinary ones and,
now, Yoshihiro Hattori." Gun Crazy, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1993, at A22; see An Inevitable Death,
STAR TRIE. (Minneapolis/St. Paul), June 1, 1993, at 12A (arguing that there is only one way to avoid
a death such as Hattori's: "Get rid of the guns").
79. See, e.g., Chris Anderson, Forewarning, TIMES-PIcAYUNE (New Orleans), May 30, 1993,
at B6 (claiming that the lives of meter readers, mail carriers, and delivery persons were in danger in
light of Peairs's verdict); Janie B. Ellis, Bad Precedent, TIMES-PIcAYUNE (New Orleans), May 30,
1993, at B6 ("The Peairs verdict was inconceivable and will not sit well with a large portion of thinking
people."); Fear, Barbarism and Justice, TIMnS-PICAYUt (New Orleans), May 30, 1993, at B7
("[V]iolence is a kind of barbarism that is eroding the fabric of American civilization because it is
teaching Americans to be afraid in their own homes."); Donna Schaferkotter, Outraged by Verict on
Peairs, TIMaS-PIcAYU (New Orleans), May 30, 1993, at B6 ("I was sickened, appalled and literally
moved to tears when I heard of the verdict in the Rodney Peairs trial in Baton Rouge.").
80. Mitchell, supra note 72, at B1, B2.
81. Id. at B2.
82. Robert D. McFadden, Teen-AgerAcquitted in Slaying During '91 Crown Heights Melee, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1992, at Al, E2.
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Although such jury trials are few in number,8 their effect on public
discourse can be far reaching. For example, the O.J. Simpson case, in
which Simpson has been charged with the murder of his ex-wife and her
friend, has received extensive coverage and has drawn attention to issues
ranging from domestic abuse 5 to race 6 to the death penalty;' to
83. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 6 (1994) ("In the civil area, jury trials take place in
fewer than 1 percent of the cases disposed of in state courts and in only 2 percent of cases terminated
in federal courts. In criminal litigation, two-thirds of all cases are disposed of in state courts through
guilty pleas." (footnotes omitted)); JOHN BALDWIN & MIcHAEL MCCONvILLE, JURY TRIALS 1, n.1
(1979) ("Most defendants, both in England and in the United States, plead guilty and the vast majority
of cases are in any event disposed of in the lower courts without a jury."); JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES
AND PoLrTIcS 34 (1992) ("Only about 5 percent of all felony cases are resolved through jury trials
... ."); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A BriefHistory of the Criminal Jury in the United
States, 61 U. Cm. L. RPv. 867, 922 (1994) ("[O]ne statistic dominates any realistic discussion of
criminal justice in America today. Ninety-three percent of the defendants convicted of felonies in state
courts plead guilty.").
84. For example, a LEXIS search revealed that in the L.A. Times alone there were 300 articles
about OJ. Simpson from the time the murder was reported on June 14, 1994 until the time O.J.
Simpson was bound over for trial on July 9, 1994. Search of LEXIS, News Library, LAT File (Feb.
28, 1995). Coverage of OJ. Simpson in the L.A. Tunes reached a high on June 19, 1994, when there
were 20 articles on that day alone. Id. Of course, the coverage in one newspaper does not begin to
reflect the widespread coverage the case received. The story received national press coverage as well,
and the court proceedings were broadcast live by television networks and news radio stations.
85. See, e.g., Cynthia H. Craft, Budget to Benefit Women's Shelter, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 1994,
at B1 (noting that abused women's housing organizations benefited "from the notoriety of the OJ.
Simpson double-murder case"); Jane Gross, Simpson Case Galvanizes U.S. About Domestic Violence,
N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1994, at 6 ("As a trigger for social change, the Simpson case is being likened to
Anita F. Hill's Senate testimony .... To be sure, it is too early to say if the national spotlight will
remain fixed on the issue of domestic violence."); Carl Ingram, Spousal Abuse Is Targeted, L.A.
TIMES, July 6, 1994, at A3 ("Gov. Pete Wilson and the Legislature, spurred by the OJ. Simpson case,
are about to approve spending an unprecedented $30 million to assist battered women and intensify pro-
secution of spousal abusers."); Marc Lacey & Carla Rivera, Domestic Abuse Shelters Wdl Get $6.1
Million, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1994, at A24 ("The issue of domestic violencejumped to the top of the
national agenda after Simpson was arrested in the killings of Nicole Brown Simpson and her friend
Ronald Lyle Goldman earlier this month."); Lynn Smith, Calls to L.A. Domestic Abuse Hot Lines Soar,
L.A. TIME, June 24, 1994, at Al ("Both men and women are flooding domestic violence hot lines as
a result of the O.J. Simpson murder investigation.").
86. See, e.g., Richard Banks, It's His Celebrity, Not His Race, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1994, at B7
("Simpson has been treated more in accord with his class and celebrity status than his race."); Richard
L. Colvin, Half Say They Are Sympathetic Toward Simpson, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1994, at A16
("African Americans [are] almost twice as likely as whites to sympathize with the black sports star.");
Kimberle Crenshaw, Racism Play Can Only HurtBlacks, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1994, at M5 ("In a case
that until recently mainstream pundits regarded as 'race-free,' race is now emerging as the hidden, po-
tentially explosive subtext."); Sam Fulwood I, Separating Black and White, L.A. TIMES, July 22,
1994, at Al, A16 ("As in the Simpson case, the exposure of black celebrities to seemingly harsh treat-
ment by the courts and media focuses black outrage on white institutions."); R. Lynell George, Focus
on Simpson Troublingfor Blacks, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1994, at Al ("Beyond Simpson's innocence
or guilt.. .[,] for many African Americans the Simpson saga brings up a host of thorny, unresolved
issues-about race, about class and about privilege."); Earl 0. Hutchinson, Race and Sex-The Last
Taboo Lives, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1994, at B7 ("[W]e worry that if OJ. is put on trial, so will we
[black men].").
87. See, e.g., Jeff Jacoby, Forget the Phony Arguments-Withouta Death Penalty, Innocents Will
Die, BOSTON GLOBE, June 21, 1994, at 13, available in LEXIS, News Library, BGLOBE File ("The
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describe it simply as one criminal jury trial is to ignore the extraordinary
impact the case has had on the public imagination."'
2. Peremptories Exclude Perspectives.-Juries are often called upon
to decide issues that involve public values, and a range of perspectives
assists the jury in this task.' The exclusion of prospective jurors based
death penalty debate is back in full swing."); Seth Mydans, Debating Death Penalty in Simpson Case,
N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1994, at A12 (discussing the factors involved in a decision to seek the death
penalty and asserting that ultimately it is a determination that some defendants are "beyond the pale"
and do not deserveto live); Lionel Van Deerlin, Death Penaltyfor O.J.? It's a PoliticalDecision, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 12, 1994, at B5, available in LEXIS, News Library, SDUT File
('[Slomething far more important may be tested by this case: the standard by which society invokes
ultimate justice, the way it decides which crimes are heinous enough to warrant execution."); Henry
Weinstein & Alan Abrahamson, Death Penalty Unlikely for Simpson, Experts Say, L.A. TIMEs, July
10, 1994, at Al, A30 (detailing the process the state goes through to decide whether to seek the death
penalty).
88. Alschuler and Deiss point out that criminal jury trials are becoming more rare these days. See
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 83, at 922 (reporting that nearly half of all criminal convictions result
from nonjury trials). Although they are undoubtedly right about the numbers, my point is that even
if there are only a limited number of criminal jury trials, those few trials nevertheless teach us im-
portant lessons about who we are and the values we hold. The OJ. Simpson case is only one case,
but it has been transformed into a vehicle for teaching Americans about the criminal justice system and
raising value-laden questions about how we treat domestic abuse, how we apply the death penalty, and
how the justice system treats rich and poor and black and white. Some writers have recognized that
the case has educated Americans, though not always correctly, about their legal system. See, e.g.,
David Margolick, In Trial of O.J. Simpson, Prospects of Hung Jury, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1995, at
14 (expressing concern that the public "may not realize how exceptional the Simpson case is and may
draw the wrong lessons from it" (citing criminal defense lawyer Gerald Chaleff)); Elizabeth Kolbert,
Our New Participatory Tabloid Videocracy, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,1994, § 4, at 3 (asserting that Amer-
icans find a sense of community in debating the details of an unscripted, unmediated, nationally tele-
vised trial).
James Levine, though providing numbers demonstrating that jury trials constitute only a small
percentage of all cases, LEV IN, supra note 83, at 34, also points out that the absolute number ofjury
trials (300,000 per year) is not so small nor is the dollar figure (over $200 million annually) spent on
providing jurors. Id. at 36. Furthermore, jury trials are more prevalent in cases in which the
defendant is accused of a serious crime, and in cases "involving public figures, sensational crimes, or
highly visible social conflicts." Id. He concludes: "So the jury is not a minor institution in terms of
either the amount of business they get or the importance of that business." Id. (emphasis in original).
McEldowney makes a similar argument when he explains that, when the Crown had a right to
stand-by in England, the right was not diminished by the limited number of times the Crown had an
opportunity to exercise the right. Sheer frequency of use does not determine the significance of the
event: "[Ilt may be argued that.., jury trials account for a small number of criminal trials [so the
Crown's right to stand-by] is unimportant. This argument is only partly persuasive. As jury trial
accounts for the trial of the more serious offences the Crown's right to stand-by is accordingly im-
portant." John F. McEldowney, 'Stand by for the Crown".• An Historical Analysis, 1979 CRIM. L.
REV. 272, 281. For a fuller discussion of stand-bys in England, see infra note 262.
89. See VALERiE P. HANs & NE. ViDMAR, JUDGiNo THE JuRY 50 (1986) ("[A] jury composed
of individuals with a wide range of experiences, backgrounds, and knowledge is more likely to perceive
the facts from different perspectives and thus engage in a vigorous and thorough debate."); see also
Lempert, supra note 53, at 10 ("The greater heterogeneity of the larger [jury] makes it a setting in
which individual prejudices are more likely to cancel out and in which individuals with valuable
specialized knowledge or particularly astute insights are more likely to be available.").
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on their gender, for example, means that a range of perspectives or views
may be unavailable to the jury to consider during its deliberations. Such
deliberate exclusion is detrimental to the jury because, if a range of views
is lost to the jury,' then the verdict is less likely to reflect public values,
and the parties and the public are less likely to accept the verdict as speak-
ing for the community.91
In addition, it is in cases that involve the most explicit and least settled
gender-related issues that the parties are most likely to attempt to exercise
their peremptories to exclude prospective jurors based on gender.' For
example, it is not surprising that the case in which the Court considered the
constitutionality of gender-based peremptories involved a paternity suit.'
Both sides exercised their peremptories against a gender they thought
would be least likely to sympathize with their position,' and the result
90. The Court has recognized that this potential loss of perspectives, see Ballard v. United States,
329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946) (observing that "the two sexes are not fungible" and that a jury may be
less representative of the community if women are excluded from it), is analogous to that resulting from
the systematic exclusion of African Americans from the jury, see Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493,503-04
(1972) (asserting that the exclusion of African Americans from juries "deprives the jury of a perspec-
tive on human events that may have unsuspected importance"). Even Chief Justice Burger, who was
writing in dissent in Peters, acknowledged that "juries should not be deprived of the insights of the
various segments of the community, for the 'common-sensejudgment of a jury' referred to in Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968), is surely enriched when all voices can be heard." Peters, 407
U.S. at 510-11. In Balard, the Court, relying on its supervisory powers, dismissed an indictment that
had been returned by a grand jury from which women were systematically excluded. The Court
reasoned as follows:
It is said... that an all male panel drawn from the various groups within a community
will be as truly representative as if women were included. The thought is that the factors
which tend to influence the action of women are the same as those which influence the
action of men-personality, background, economic status-and not sex. Yet it is not
enough to say that women when sitting as jurors neither act nor tend to act as a class.
Men likewise do not act as a class. But, if the shoe were on the other foot, who would
claim that a jury was truly representative of the community if all men were intentionally
and systematically excluded from the panel? The truth is that the two sexes are not
fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from a community
composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among the impon-
derables. To insulate the courtroom from either may not in a given case make an iota of
difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded. The exclusion
of one may indeed make the jury less representative of the community than would be true
if an economic or racial group were excluded.
BaUard, 329 U.S. at 194-95 (footnotes omitted).
91. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (1991) ("The verdict will not be accepted or
understood... if the jury is chosen by unlawful means at the outset.").
92. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: VoirDire, Peremptory Challenges,
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 181 n.111 (1989) ("Prosecutors (and defense
attorneys) frequently exercisetheir peremptory challenges on the basis of gender in sexual assault cases,
'battered-wife syndrome' cases, other domestic violence cases, abortion-related cases, child-victim
cases, and others.").
93. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421-22 (1994).
94. James E. Bowman, who brought the appeal, used 10 peremptory challenges to exclude 10
women from the jury, whereas the state used 9 peremptory challenges to exclude 9 men. Linda
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was a twelve-woman jury.95 It is precisely in the cases in which it is
most important (or appears most important?) to have both genders repre-
sented on the jury that both sides may try to skew the gender composition
of the jury through the use of gender-based peremptory challenges.
The harm to the jury from such exclusionary practices is not limited
to cases that have a gender component. As the Court recognized in Peters
v. Kff, a case involving grand and petit juries from which African
Americans had been excluded, assuming that racial exclusion takes place
only in cases with racial overtones "does not provide a workable guide for
decision in particular cases. " " The Court explained: "[Tihe opportunity
to appeal to race prejudice is latent in a vast range of issues, cutting across
the entire fabric of our society."" Thus, even though gender-related
cases, like race-related cases,"° might provide the starkest example of
Greenhouse, High Court to Decide If Jurors Can Be Barred on Basis of Sex, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
1993, at Al, Al, A16. The petitioner, however, did use his eleventh peremptory to remove the
remaining man on the jury, and the state used its fourth peremptory to strike a woman. Respondent's
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 4, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419
(1994) (No. 92-1239).
95. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421-22. Twenty-threewomen and ten men remained on the venire after
two men and one woman had been struck for cause. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, I.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (No. 92-1239); Linda P. Campbell, Court to Rule on
Excluding Jurors on Gender, Cm. TRIB., May 18, 1993, § 1, at 8; see Greenhouse, supra note 94, at
A16 ("[B]ecause women far outnumbered men in the jury pool, the state was ... able to create an
all-female jury by using its peremptory challenges against men.").
Thejury found Bowman to be the father of the child. David G. Savage, Justices to Review Juror
Gender Screening, L.A. TMEs, May 18, 1993, at A4. The court ordered Bowman to pay $400 to
$500 per month in child support. Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court to Rule on Exclusion from Juries by
Gender, WASH. POST, May 18, 1993, at A4.
96. The evidence supporting the paternity finding was so strong that it seems unlikely that jury
composition would have had much of an effect on the outcome. See Savage, supra note 95, at A4
(noting that a blood test established Bowman's paternity to a 99.9% certainty).
97. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
98. Id. at 503.
99. Id. Admittedly, the Court was making this observation in a case that did have a racial
component. Id. at 497 (holding that a jury selection method that systematically excludes members on
the basis of race violates a defendant's right to due process).
100. As the Court has observed,
Active discrimination by a prosecutor during this process condones violations of the
United States Constitution within the very institution entrusted with its enforcement, and
so invites cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law.
The cynicism may be aggravated if race is implicated in the trial, either in a direct way
as with an alleged racial motivation of the defendant or a victim, or in some more subtle
manner as by casting doubt upon the credibility or dignity of a witness, or even upon the
standing or due regard of an attorney who appears in the cause.
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991). The Court built upon this point in a later case:
The need for public confidence is especially high in cases involving race-related
crimes. In such cases, emotions in the affected community will inevitably be heated and
volatile. Public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system is essential for
preserving community peace in trials involving race-related crimes.
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cases in which the parties try to manipulate jury composition, such manipu-
lation and its accompanying harms are not limited to those cases alone.
Gender-based peremptory challenges, therefore, limit perspectives
available to the jury in making public value decisions. Gender-based per-
emptories, however, are not the only challenges that pose this problem.
The systematic exclusion of any group through the use of peremptories in-
creases the likelihood that the jury will not reflect the broad range of
perspectives and views found in the community. How can we expect the
community to accept jury verdicts when groups in the community are
struck through peremptories? Whether peremptories are exercised on the
basis of race, gender, religion, 101 ethnicity, 1°2 age," or some other
category,'"° the full range of views found in the community is lost to the
jury through systematic exclusions, and the public value decisions that the
jury is asked to make necessarily become less reflective of the community
and more susceptible to rejection.
B. Jury's Role in Factfinding
1. Jury as Factfnder.-Another role of the jury is to engage in fact-
finding."0 5 It is the jury's task to ascertain, as best it can, such points as
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992); see, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 92, at 195-96
(describing the Miami riots that followed a trial by an all-white jury, after every potential black juror
had been struck by defense attorneys exercising their peremptories).
101. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 768 (Minn. 1993) (allowing peremptory
challenges on the basis of religion and holding that Batson does not extend to such strikes), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Changco, 1 F.3d 837, 840 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that to
make a Batson claim, a defendant must present evidence as to the venireperson's ethnicity and cannot
rely solely on the venireperson's surname to support his challenge); United States v. Chinchilla, 874
F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that the prosecutor removed a juror and an alternate who were
Hispanic in a proceeding against two Hispanic defendants, and finding that the prosecutor's reasons for
these strikes were insufficient); Commonwealth v. Carleton, 629 N.E.2d 321 (Mass. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that the prosecutor faded to satisfy her burden of establishing that three peremptories exercised
against potential jurors with Irish surnames were not based on discriminatory intent).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Pichay, 986 F.2d 1259, 1260 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)
("Neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit has held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the
government from striking venire persons on account of youth.").
104. Although only certain groups have been recognized in other contexts as suspect classes under
the Equal Protection Clause, see infra note 333, I do not intend to limit my discussion to these groups
alone. Even when other groups that have not been afforded such protection are struck from the jury,
the harm to the jury may be equally as great. Although it would be easier to limit the discussion to
suspect classes, or at least to vulnerable or persecuted groups, the integrity of the jury and the
acceptance of the verdict can be subject to question when other groups are struck as well. In my view,
the jury can be harmed anytime a group is singled out for exclusion because of some stereotype about
members of that group and their inability to be impartial. I acknowledge that any discussion about
"groups" is further complicated by the fact that people belong to overlapping groups, see infra notes
232, 276, and may identify themselves more fully with one group than another depending on the
context.
105. See, e.g., Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L.
REV. 386, 387 (1954) ("The jury's central legal function is to resolve the factual disputes involved in
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the sequence of events or the intent of the parties. The jury must de-
termine what actually occurred and reach an accurate verdict. At one time,
juries were charged with deciding both law and facts.' Eventually,
judges assumed the function of deciding the law, thus leaving juries with
the task of deciding the facts. 7  The two tasks, however, are not so
clearly demarcated in practice. As Kalven and Zeisel observed over
twenty-five years ago, although "[tihe conventional and official role of the
jury... is that it is the trier of the facts and nothing else," it is "not clear
that anyone believes this.""°8
Although factfinding is not the jury's only function, or even its main
function,' °9 it is clearly one of its functions. It is important for juries to
a lawsuit."). Whereas Broeder questions the jury's ability to perform this task, id. at 390, others have
concluded that the jury performs its factfinding role quite competently. See, e.g., REID HASTIE ET AL.,
INSIDE THE JURY 230 (1983) ("In their task of factfinding, juries perform efficiently and accurately.");
Joe S. Cecil et al., odzn Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM.
U. L. REV. 727, 745 (1991) ("[T]he empirical evidence consistently points to the general competence
of thejury.").
106. See Diamond, supra note 36, at Cl (describing the jury in de Tocqueville's day as deciding
both facts and law rather than being instructed on the law by the judge).
107. See Stephen C. Yeazell, 7he New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 87, 92 ("[In the late seventeenth century,] the jury underwent a basic change. Jurors ceased to be
witnesses, functioning instead as factflnders .... ).
108. KALVEN & ZEISmL, supra note 11, at 116; see also id. at 494 ("Although a substantial part
of the jury's work is the finding of facts, this, as has long been suspected, is not its total function in
the real world.").
The Supreme Court has regarded the jury's factfinding function with ambivalence. In Colgrove
v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973), it highlighted the civil and criminal jury's factfinding role: the jury is
"to assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual issues." Id. at 157 (citing Gasoline Prods. Co. v.
Champlin Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931)); see also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)
("Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place
in our history and jurisprudencethat any seeming curtailment of therightto ajury trial should be scru-
tinized with the utmost care.'). In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), the Court held that a five-
person civil jury is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments, largely because of
its concerns that such a reduction injury size might contribute to "inaccurate fact-finding and incorrect
application of the common sense of the community to the facts." Id. at 232.
On the other hand, in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), the Court held that
Spanish-speakingjurors were permissibly challenged because of their hesitation to abide by the trans-
lation provided by the interpreter. Id. at 360, 372. It was more important to the Court that the jurors
be willing to accept uncritically and unconditionally the official interpretation than it was that they bring
an erroneous interpretation to the attention of the judge. See id. at 379 (Stevens, I., dissenting)
(arguing that bilingualjurors could have been instructed to inform the judge of any disagreements they
might have with the translation so that the court could resolve any disputes); Mindez, supra note 14,
at 194 ("If in fact the interpreter is wrong, Hernandez would require the bilingual juror to ignore the
error and refrain from bringing it to the attention of other jurors. Accurate fact-finding would dictate
a different rule: one that would not disfavor the selection of bilingual jurors who can bring serious
errors in interpretation to the judge's attention.").
109. Stephen Yeszell has observed:
Those who... debate the jury, ought to do so with a clear eye on the political character
of the institution under discussion. For the jury is not now and never has been a simple,
functional piece of the judicial machine, to be judged on how well it finds facts. Instead
it plays a complicated role, simultaneously functional and symbolic, checking judicial
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render accurate decisions because inaccurate decisions can have devastating
consequences. Inaccurate verdicts, in their most extreme form, can result
in the wrongful conviction of an innocent person.110
As an institution, the jury is well suited for performing its factfinding
function."' The jury consists of a group of individuals who have to
work together to reach a group solution. Studies have shown that groups
perform better than individuals in terms of solving problems and reaching
correct answers."' Each member of the jury can contribute his or her
power and strengthening judicial institutions, reshaping law as it gives a remarkable
efficacy to the legal regime.
Yeazell, supra note 107, at 88.
110. See, e.g., Accord in Wrongful Jailing, N.Y. TIMES, June22, 1986, § 1, at 26 (recounting
the story of Nathaniel Carter, who was imprisoned for two years for murdering his former wife's foster
mother but who was actually framed by his ex-wife); Peter Applebome, OverturnedMurder Conviction
SpotlightsDallas-Style Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1989, at A19 (discussing the case of Randall Dale
Adams, whose 1977 conviction for the murder of a police officer was overturned 12 years later because
the prosecutor had suppressed evidence and had allowed perjured testimony); Lee May, Study Says 25
Innocent People Were Executed in This Century, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1985, § 1, at 11 (describing
an ACLU study concluding that at least 343 innocent people have been convicted of capital crimes in
the U.S. since 1900 and that, among those, 25 were executed); Michelle Mittelstadt, When It Comes
to Freeing Inmates Unjustly Convicted, Dallas Stands Out, L.A. TIMEs, July 22, 1990, at A32 ("Five
times in a little more than a year, Dallas County has freed prisoners who were unjustly convicted
.... "); Maria Newman, Man Freed After Serving 7 Years for Rape, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1992, at
B1 (describing the case of Alberto Ramos, freed after spending seven years in jail because prosecutors
failed to give defense lawyers documents that would have aided his not-guilty plea); Iver Peterson,
Freeing the Innocentfrom Behind Bars Is Centurions' Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1992, at B6 (de-
scribing the work of Centurion Ministries, which assisted Clarence Chance to secure his release after
he had been imprisoned for committing a crime that actually occurred while he was in jail for another
crime); Terry Spencer, L.B. Appeal Ruling Upholding Award in Wrongful Conviction, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 1987, § 9, at 1 (describing the wrongful conviction of Juan Francisco Venegas and his subse-
quent $2 million award against the city of Long Beach); Ronald Sullivan, Court Allows Damage
Lawsuit Over a Disputed Imprisonment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1992, at B4 (relating how a man who
spent 19 years in prison for a crime he did not commit was able to sue New York City for damages
from the "host of misdeeds by city employees that led to his wrongful conviction").
111. Of course, juries make mistakes, and their factfinding performance could be further enhanced
if certain steps were taken, such as allowing jurors to take notes during the trial, instructing jurors at
the beginning of the trial in language that is easy to understand, permitting jurors to ask questions,
ensuring that final instructions are clearly written and understandable, and allowing jurors to take a
copy of the instructions into the jury room for consultation during deliberations. E.g., CHAkaFN A
FUTURE, supra note 39, at 18-20,23-24; see Fred H. Cate & Newton N. Minow, Communicating with
Juries, 68 IND. LJ. 1101, 1109-12 (1993); Curtis E. Von Kenn, Reinventing the Jury Trial, LEGAL
TIMES, Jan. 2, 1995, at 20, 21.
112. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233 n.15 (1978) (listing a study indicating that
individual prejudice is more easily overcome in group situations and that larger groups are more
effective in this respect than are smaller ones); Dean C. Barnilund, A Comparative Study ofIndividual,
Majority, and Group Judgment, 58 J. ABNORMAL& SOc. PSYC-OL. 55, 59-60 (1959) (concluding that
"group decisions, reached through cooperative deliberation, are significantly superior to decisions made
by individual members working alone" because group discussions "stimulate more careful thinking,
... lead to a consideration of a wider range of ideas, and ... provoke more objective and critical
testing of conclusions"), cited in Ballew, 435 U.S. at 233 n.14; see also LAWRENCE J. SMITH &
LORErrA A. MALANDRO, COURTROOM COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES § 4.39, at 409 (1985) ("Groups
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recollection of the facts and evidence. Because different people may re-
member different things, the jury has available for its consideration more
information than a single individual might recall." 3 Also, a collective
endeavor ensures that members of the jury can correct each other's mis-
taken ideas and faulty recollections." Each jury can consider how best
to organize the material presented during the trial based upon different
frameworks suggested by its members. 5 Thus, the jury is valued as a
are usually able to conduct the problem-solving process in a manner superior to individual problem-
solving.").
113. See HASTI 'T AL., supra note 105, at 236 ("The group memory advantage over the typical
or even the exceptional individual is one of the major determinants of the superiority of the juy as a
legal decision mechanism."); id. at 81 (describing the impressive collective memory of a jury and
noting that jurors remember 90% of the evidence and 80% of the judge's instructions); LEVINE, supra
note 83, at 182 ("Remembering what was said is no small part of competent fact finding, and the col-
lective memory of twelve jurors (or even six) is likely to be better than that of one individual."); Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1067 (1964) ("Different jurors re-
member, and make available to all, different items of the trial so that the jury as a group remembers
far more than most of its members could as individuals."); Daniel Goleman, Jurors Hear Evidence and
Turn It into Stories, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1992, at Cl, C11 ("[A] study of more than 700 jurors...
found that the average rate at which individual jurors remembered evidence from a trial was 60 percent;
for judge's instructions the average was 44 percent. But for the jury as a whole, the memory rates
were far better: 93 percent for facts and 82 percent for instructions.'); see also N.K. Clark et al.,
Memory for a Complex Social Discourse: The Analysis and Prediction of Individual and Group Recall,
25 1. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 295, 297 (1986) ("Generally group recall has been found to be superior
to that of individuals."); N.K. Clark et al., SocialRemembering: Quantitative Aspects ofIndividual and
Collaborative Remembering by Police Officers and Students, 81 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 73, 80 (1990)
(summarizing the results of tests of individual versus group recall that demonstrated that "collaboration
led to a consistent and significant increase in the number of accurate responses made by all subjects,
with four-person groups producing the highest levels of accuracy .... individuals the lowest ... and
dyads falling between the two").
114. See Ballew, 435 U.S. at 233 (citing studies indicating that group decisionmaking suffers when
there are fewer members in the group because critical pieces of information may. not be introduced or
recalled, and prejudices are less likely to be counterbalanced); Norman R.F. Maier & Allen R. Solem,
The Contribution of a Discussion Leader to the Quality of Group Thinking: The Effective Use of
Minority Opinions, 5 HuM. REL. 277,285 (1952) ("[F]ree discussion tends to increase the number of
correct answers to a problem for which a variety of incorrect answers seems plausible.").
115. See Nancy Pennington& Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for
JurorDecLsion Making, 62 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 189, 189 (1992) ("The Story Model is
based on the hypothesis that jurors impose a narrative story organization on trial information. .. .);
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastle, A Cognitive Theory of JurorDecision Making: The Story Model, 13
CARDozO L. REv. 519, 521 (1991) ("[O]ne central claim of the model is that the story the juror con-
structs determines the juror's decision."); id. at 525 ("Because all jurors hear the same evidence and
have the same general knowledge about the expected structure of stories, differences in story con-
struction must arise from differences in world knowledge; that is, differences in experiences and beliefs
about the social world."); Nancy Pennington& Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision
Making, 51 1. PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 242 (1986) (finding that jurors organize trial evidence
into a story framework); Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial Procedure and the Story
Model, 13 CARDOZo L. REV. 559, 570-71 (1991) ("Pennington and Hastie note that jurors construct
different stories and thatjury deliberations often consist of a contest over which story is to prevail....
A major cause of different juror stories is the different background information that jurors bring to their
deliberations."); Goleman, supra note 113, at C1 (explaining that people "process [evidence] as they
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factfinding body because its members can bring to the group deliberation
different pieces of information and different frameworks by which to or-
ganize that information.
2. Peremptories May Harm Accuracy.- To the extent that peremp-
tories eliminate groups of people who might bring to the jury different
frameworks to remember and organize the surfeit of information that has
been presented at trial, the factfinding function of the jury is impaired.116
To the extent that peremptories eliminate jurors with different perspectives
who can correct mistaken views or recollections, the risk of an inaccurate
verdict is increased.1 7 Finally, to the extent peremptories eliminate
jurors who are minorities, prejudices are more likely to go unchallenged
during the deliberation process". and thus impair the jury's factfinding
function.
One illustration of the way in which jury factfinding might be harmed
by peremptory challenges is the connection between gender-based peremp-
tories and a jury's tendency to overestimate the credibility of eyewitness
testimony. Studies have shown that juries have an inordinate degree of
confidence in the reliability of eyewitness testimony; once there has been
an eyewitness identification, it is difficult to persuade jurors to question
go along, composing a continuing story throughout the trial that makes sense of what they're hearing").
But see Elizabeth F. Loftus & Edith Greene, 74 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315, 327 (1983)
(reviewing W. LANCE BENNMTt & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RCoNSTRUCN REALTy IN THE
CouRTRooM: JuSTcE AND JUDGMENT IN AMEmicAN CULTURE (1981)) ("It is interesting to consider
witnesses in the courtroom as storytellers, and jurors as story hearers and evaluators. Nevertheless,
the storytelling analogy seems incomplete as a theoretical tool, and wanting as a guide to the
practitioner.").
116. One article, while not suggesting that peremptories led to the wrongful conviction of indi-
viduals such as Lenell Geter (a young black engineer who was freed from prison in 1984) and Randall
Dale Adams (the man who spent 12 years in a Texas prison due to prosecutorial misconduct), did sug-
gest that more diverse juries would serve as a check on prosecutors who may be overzealous in their
efforts to seek convictions. Applebome, supra note 110, at A19. According to one defense attorney:
"You can't have a prosecutor's office that is overzealous unless it has jurors who are willing to go
along with it .... It's one hand shaking the other. It's yin and yang. In other places, prosecutors
can't get away with a lot of the garbage you can throw in front of a Dallas jury." Id. (quoting Mr.
Bruder, the defense attorney who successfully represented Randall Dale Adams before the Supreme
Court).
117. HASrm HT AL., supra note 105, at 88 (finding that jurors corrected factual errors during deli-
berations almost half the time); see Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, LAW
& CONTEMP. PRoES., Autumn 1989, at 205, 218 (finding that mock jurors discussed areas of dis-
agreement and attempted to persuade each other of the correct interpretation of the facts).
118. See HANS& VIDMAR, supra note 89, at 50-51 (theorizing that the very presence of minorities
is likely to suppress the expression of racial prejudices by otherjury members); Deirdre Golash, Race,
Fairness, and Jury Selection, 10 BEHAVIORAL SmI. & L. 155, 170 (1992) ('It is plausible that the
presence of members of the defendant's or victim's racial group can be expected to inhibit the direct
expression of racial bias in the jury room and thus to mute the social reinforcement of racial reasons
for arriving at a particular verdict.").
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it.119 Although both men and women tend to overestimate eyewitnesses'
ability to identify a suspect, one study concluded that men tend to do so
more than women. 12° The use of gender-based peremptories to exclude
women would exacerbate a jury's tendency12' to overestimate the
119. See EtIZABErH F. LoFTus, EyErNEs TsTIMONY 9 (1979) ("Jurors have been known to
accept eyewitness testimony pointing to guilt even when it isfar outweighed by evidence ofinnocence."
(emphasis in original)); ELIZABETH LOFTrUS & KATHERINE KEI-HAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE:
THE ACCUSED, THE EYEWITNES, AND THE EXPERT WHO PUTS MEMORY ON TRIAL (1991) (relating
stories based on one of the author's personal experiences as an expert witness to illustrate the unreli-
ability of eyewitness testimony); John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective
Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewimess Identifications, 7 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 19, 27 (1983)
(noting that jurors find eyewitness evidence extremely persuasive); Peter Tague, Seeing Isn't Believing,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1991, § 7, at 26 ('[R]egardless of the shakiness of many eyewitness identifi-
cations, jurors tend to overvalue them, even in the absence of circumstantial evidence."); Fredric D.
Woocher, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REv. 969, 970 (1977) ("For the layperson, visual identification
of the defendant by the victim or witness often provides the most persuasive evidence, which cannot
be overcome by contrary evidence supporting the accused.").
Loftus, as well as Brigham and Bothwell, also argue that eyewitness identification should be
viewed with circumspection because there are many factors, such as stereotypes, prejudice, temporary
expectations, stress, weapon focus, cross-racial identification, and transference, that contribute to the
unreliability of eyewitness identification. LOFTuS, supra, at 33-51; Brigham & Bothwell, supra, at 27;
see also Ellen Nakashima, Seeing It with Your Own Eyes Leaves Sizable Room for Error, HARrFORD
COuRANT, Jan. 23, 1994, at B1, available in LEXIS, News Library, HTCOUR File (identifying as
factors leading to erroneous eyewitness identification stress, cross-racial identification, faulty photo line-
ups, and the witnesses' confidence); Robert Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, ScI. AM., Dec. 1974,
at 23, 24-29 (describing factors that contribute to the unreliability of eyewitness testimony).
120. Brigham & Bothwell, supra note 119, at 26-27. Another study, which also found evidence
of a gender difference, concluded that men and women tend to ba accuratein their recollections about
different items because they focus on and have interest in different things. Women were more accurate
about and less susceptible to misleading information concerning female-oriented items (such as women's
clothing), whereas men were more accurate about and less susceptible to misleading information
relating to male-oriented items (such as a male thief's appearance). Peter A. Powers et al., Eyewitness
Accounts of Females and Males, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 339, 340, 345-46 (1979); see Nancy
Mazanec & George J. McCall, Sex, Cognitive Categories, and Observational Accuracy, 37 PSYCHOL.
REP. 987, 987 (1975) (indicating that individuals tend to observe persons of the same sex more
accurately than persons of the opposite sex); Jerry I. Shaw & Paul Skolnick, Sex Differences, Weapon
Focus, and Eyewitness Reliability, 134 J. SoC. PSYCHOL. 413, 417 (1994) ("The results support our
prediction of an own-sex identification bias... ; own-sex identification was more accurate than other-
sex identification.").
For other studies suggesting a correlation between gender and memory, see A. Daniel Yarmey,
AdulsAge and GenderDifferences in Eyewitness Recall in Field Settings, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
1921, 1928 (1993) ("Women were significantly superior to men in recall of primary characteristics
[judged important for memory of a person]."); and Mazanec & McCall, supra, at 988 ("[A] small cor-
relation was observed between sex of observer and overall observational accuracy. . . , which suggests
that females were somewhat better observers than males.").
121. Another factor that may exacerbatethis tendency may be womens more limited rate of parti-
cipation during jury deliberations compared to that of men. See Nancy S. Marder, Note, Gender
Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE LJ. 593, 600 (1987) ("If women systematically choose
not to speak or men choose not to listen when women do speak, then the jury is, in effect, reduced in
size. Memory gaps in the group's collective knowledge increase."). Although researchers have noted
'some evidence of a sex effect" between males' and females' assessments of eyewitness credibility,
Brigham & Bothwell, supra note 119, at 27, they have overlooked the connection between the over-
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reliability of eyewitness testimony.1" This tendency can have serious
consequences for the factfinding capacity of the jury. Jurors'
overestimation of the reliability of eyewitness testimony can result in
mistaken convictions; such errors are well documented."z
estimation of the reliability of eyewitness identification, on the one hand, and a greater representation
of men on a given jury or a greater participation rate of men during jury deliberations, on the other.
122. Of course, gender-based peremptories could be used to exclude men from the jury as well,
see, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama "z rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994) (observing that the state had
used peremptory challenges to exclude male jurors), which might result, according to my argument,
in juries that do not overestimate eyewitness reliability. Although the argument I make might seem to
lead to the conclusion that juries should consist wholly of women, I do not take such a position. The
jury serves many purposes, and the assessment of eyewitness credibility is only one of the tasks the jury
is asked to perfoxm as part of its factfinding function. As this Article points out, the jury is also asked
to recall and organize facts and evidence, and systematically excluding groups from the jury would
impair its ability to do so. One of the advantages of having jurors with diverse backgrounds and life
experiences is that they are able to put forth different perspectives and ideas for the group's con-
sideration and to correct each other when mistakes are made or prejudices revealed. See supra notes
111-18 and accompanying text.
123. As the Supreme Court has long recognized: "The vagaries of eyewitness identification are
well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification." United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,228 (1967); see, e.g., DNA Tests Clear Man of Rape 8 Years After His
Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995, at A13 (reporting that after DNA tests established that Terry
Leon Chalmers, who had been convicted of rape based on victim identification, could not have
committed the crime, he was released from prison, where he had already spent eight years); Ben
Dobbin, Nearly 6 Years Later, DNA Test Frees Wrongly Convicted Man, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1993,
at Al (describing the release of Lennie Callace after a DNA test proved he could not have committed
the rape he was originally convicted of on the basis of an eyewitness identification); Faye Fiore, Man
Wrongly Imprisoned Walks Free, L.A. TiliES, Oct. 3, 1989, § 2, at 1, 4 (noting that Napoleon Cotton,
convicted of armed robbery after four eyewitnesses identified him, was freed after new evidence
strongly implicated three other suspects); id. (reporting the deputy public defender's statement that mis-
identification is the leading cause of wrongful convictions); Robert Hermann, The Case of the Jamaican
Accent, N.Y. TIMS, Dec. 1, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 95-96 (describing how an erroneous eyewitness
identification led to the wrongful arrest of Ted Alston); Gina Kolata, DNA Tests Provide Key to Cell
Doorsfor Some Wrongly Convicted Inmates, N.Y. TMES, Aug. 5, 1994, at A20 (reporting on a project
that has used DNA testing to overturn the convictions of at least eight men who had been convicted
based on eyewitness testimony and flawed forensic data); Look-Alike Named a Suspect, and a Woman
Leaves Prison, N.Y. TIMs, Apr. 17, 1995, at A12 (describing the case of Melissa Gammill, who was
kept in prison for 10 months after being mistakenly identified as a burglar); Andrew Martin, For Some
in Prison Cells, DNA Can Spell Freedom, Cm. TRIB., June 26, 1994, § 2, at 1, 2 (noting that
"[e]yewitness identification has been the source of more erroneous convictions than any other source
of evidence"); Nakashima, supra note 119, at B1 (describing the cases of Chad Johnson, who was
erroneously identified in a line-up as the man who shot into a crowded DMV hallway, and Randall Lyn
Ayers, who was mistakenly identified as a rapist and served nine years in prison); Larry Oakes, A
Miscarriage of Justice, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis/St. Paul), Oct. 17, 1993, at IA, available in LEXIS,
News Library, STRIB File (describing the case of Shaun Deckinga who was convicted of bank robbery
as a result of a mistaken identity and noting one juror's observation that "[h]e was identified; that's
what made the biggest impression on most of us"); Jonathan Rabinovitz, Rape Conviction Overturned
on DNA Tests, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1992, at B6 (discussing Kerry Kotler, who, after having been
convicted of rape based on eyewitness identification and serving 11 years in prison, had his conviction
overturned after DNA tests revealed that the semen found could not have been his); Robert W. Shomer,
Eyewitness Identification, L.A. TMES, July 10, 1993, at B7 (noting that a jury awarded Gordon Robert
Hall $4.4 million after he was wrongfully convicted of murder based on an eyewitness identification);
Mark Arax, A Long, Bitter Waitfor Freedom Ends, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, at Al, A27 (reporting
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Although further studies are needed to support a connection between
gender and an overestimation of eyewitness credibility, my suggestion is
simply that the jury may lose some of the benefits of "group" factfinding
when peremptories are used to limit the jury's diversity. Reducing diver-
sity may also decrease the points of view contributed and limit the frame-
works provided for analyzing the facts and evidence. These differences in
perception do not result from any natural differences, but simply from an
alternative way of viewing a situation that might arise from occupying a
different place in society."t
As an illustration, the men and women in Susan Glaspell's short story
A Jury of Her Peers2S explored the murder of John Wright in different
ways, not because men and women have different ways of thinking, but be-
cause they occupied different roles in society at the time and viewed the
facts and evidence through the prisms of their separate spheres."2 The
women were relegated to the kitchen, where their task was to gather a few
household items for Minnie Wright, John Wright's wife, to use in jail."2
The men, on the other hand, carried on the official investigation in the
barn and the bedroom."~ While the women focused on "the insignifi-
cance of kitchen things,"'29 such as the broken bird cage, the dead ca-
nary, and the uneven stitching in a patchwork quilt, the men looked for,
but failed to find, signs of an outside intruder." The women pieced
that Charles Tomlin, convicted of first-degree murder and imprisoned for 16 years, was released after
an eyewitness confessed error in identification). See generally MbfcHAEL L. RADELHT Fr AL., IN SprrE
OF INNOENtC 17, 18 (1992) (identifying 416 cases in which the wrong person was convicted of
murder, or of capital rape, and then sentenced to death and noting that the two most frequent causes
of error "are perjury by prosecution witnesses and mistaken eyewitness testimony"); Warren E. Leary,
Novel Methwds Unlock Witnesses'Memory, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1988, at Cl, C15 ("Faulty eye-
witness testimony ... is the major cause of wrongful conviction in this country ..... (quoting
Elizabeth Loftus)); EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INOCENT (1932) (detailing 65 cases of
wrongful convictions, 29 of which involved some form of mistaken identity).
124. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts,
and Feminism, 7 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 175, 175 (1982) (attributing the difference in men's and
women's perceptions to the difference in their respective life experiences); cf. ABRAMSON, supra note
83, at 167 ("[Wlhites and blacks occupy different places in American society and... these differences
affect attitudes toward the death penalty, police officers, and the criminal justice system." (footnote
omitted)).
125. Susan Glaspell, A Jury ofHer Peers, reprinted in THE BEST SHORT STORIES OF 1917, at 256-
82 (Edward 1. O'Brien ed., 1918).
126. It is important to note that not all women occupied a separate sphere, and that the relegation
of white women to a separate sphere, for example, "offers little insight into the domination of Black
women" who have "traditionally worked outside the home in numbers far exceeding the labor
participation rate of white women." Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection ofRace and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory andAntiracist Politics,
1989 U. Cmi. LOCAL F. 139, 155, 156 (emphasis in original).
127. Glaspell, supra note 125, at 256-66.
128. Id. at 263.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 277.
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together a motive for the murder from the evidence they observed, while
the men had a theory, but failed to find any evidence to support it. The
different approaches to factfinding suggested by this story, however, are
not immutable and are likely to change as men's and women's roles in so-
ciety change.
C. The Jury's Role in Appearing as a Fair Decisionmaker
The use of peremptories to exciude groups from the jury can have a
deleterious effect on public perception of the system's fairness because the
exclusion takes place under the gaze of the public and with the imprimatur
of the state and because when the peremptory is unmasked,131 it often re-
veals stereotypes and perpetuates discrimination. Although these claims are
not empirical ones, they are claims about public symbolism and about what
those in the courtroom see and what the public is taught. These messages,
moreover, have already begun to reach a larger audience through such tele-
vision programs as Court TV, and are likely to reach an even broader
spectrum of the population once cameras are allowed in federal court-
rooms.
132
131. The need to "unmask" the peremptory is contrary to Barbara Babcock's original approach,
which was to celebrateperemptories because they enabled us to "avoidfl trafficking in the core of truth
in most common stereotypes.... [W]e have evolved in the peremptory challenge a system that allows
the covert expression of what we dare not say but know is true more often than not." Babcock, supra
note 12, at 553, 554. She has since reconsidered that position in a more recent article at least insofar
as race- and gender-based peremptory challenges are concerned. See Barbara A. Babcock,A Place in
the Palladiwn: Women'sRights andJury Service, 61 U. CiNN. L. REV. 1139,1146-51,1160-63 (1993)
[hereinafter Babcock, Women and Jury Service].
132. Forty-seven states allow cameras in the courtroom, and thirty-five of those states allow
filming of criminal trials. See Ruth A. Strickland & Richter H. Moore, Jr., Cameras in State Courts:
A Historical Perspective, 78 JUDICATURE 128 (1994); Let the People Observe Their Courts, 78
JUDICATURE 116 (1994); see also Carolyn S. Dyer & Nancy R. Hauserman, Electronic Coverage of
the Courts: Exceptions to Eposure, 75 GEo. LJ. 1633, 1646 (1987) (noting that "the great majority
of states now allow some electronic coverage of thejudicial process"); Todd Piccus, Note, Demystfying
the Least UnderstoodBranch: Opening the Supreme Court to Broadcast Media, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1053,
1064 (1993) (explaining that "forty-seven states permit broadcast coverage of at least part of their court
systemr"); Albert Scardino, Courtroom TV is a Fixture, Even as New York is Deciding, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 1989, § 4, at 7 (noting that in 1977, Florida became the first state to allow cameras in criminal
courtrooms); Kolbert, supra note 88, at 3 (reporting that, in recent years, cameras have become widely
allowed in courtroom).
In spite of the success of a three-year experiment with cameras in federal courts, the U.S.
Judicial Conference voted against extending the experiment or allowing cameras in federal court on a
permanent basis. Strickland & Moore, supra, at 128; Tony Mauro, Courtside: Camera Debate was
Sloppy and Shallow, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 26, 1994, at 10; Henry I. Reske, Rally for Court Cameras
Falls Short, A.B.A. I., Mar. 1995, at 30. At a recent meeting, however, the Judicial Conference ex-
pressed a willingness to reconsider the issue. Eva M. Rodriguez & Robert Schmidt, Judicial
Conference Tries a Little Openness, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, at 1, 24.
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1. Peremptories Take Place in the Public Eye.-The exercise of the
peremptory challenge takes place in the public forum of the courtroom,
beneath the American flag and the judicial seal, and often before a room
full of spectators.133 The courtroom is a highly formal setting in which
all of the participants have their proper place: the judge sits at a desk on
a raised platform, the parties are directly before him," the jury sits to
one side, the clerks to the other, and the public and press sit in the back.
Although there may be variations, the setting, as well as the procedures,
are typically designed to reinforce the solemnity of the occasion. All rise
when the clerk announces the court is in session, and the judge, cloaked in
his robe, enters, and is seated.135 A court stenographer transcribes the
proceedings, and the judge is supposed to choose his words with care and
precision. All who are present are expected to conduct themselves with
proper decorum. The formality of the proceedings, from the established
order in which the trial is conducted to the way in which witnesses are
sworn in and exhibits are entered into evidence, is intended to inspire
respect for the law and to impress upon those present that they are before
a powerful arm of the state136 and yet one that is committed to fairness
above all. And it is in such a setting that gender-based peremptories, for
example, 37 are introduced and displayed unabashedly before all who are
present. As woman after woman, or man after man, is dismissed from the
venire, 38 the reason for the dismissals is apparent to all who are
133. In fact, some become permanent spectators. They go to the courthouse regularly to watch
trials and, therefore, have the best information about which trials are interesting and which lawyers are
persuasive. As one article recounts, "[a]lmost every court has its watchers," but at the federal
courthouse in New York City's Foley Square, five men have become "so well known that judges often
keep them apprised of developments in cases, and newspaper reporters have been known to check with
them on a trial's progress." Catching Matinee at the Courthouse, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1993, at B1.
The trial may also be seen by those not in the courtroom now that many state courts allow
cameras in the courtroom and some federal courts have permitted them on a temporary and ex-
perimental basis. See supra note 132.
134. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (explaining my use of masculine pronouns when
referring to judges).
135. Judge Abner Mikva, who was a Congressman before becoming a judge, said that it took him
a long time to appreciate "the judicial mystique" that is part of the role: "The high bench, the black
robe, the 'oyez, oyez,' are all part of trying to Wizard of Oz-ize us. But what's the power of a judge?
It's partly mystical after all." Linda Greenhouse, Justices Guard Mystique, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
1993, at Al, A24.
136. Cf. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.. 1601, 1609 (1986) ("[Jludges
deal pain and death.").
137. I will go on to argue that all peremptories compromise the fairness that is attributed to the
proceedings; however, I think that the highly visible nature of peremptories based on gender or race
makes them a particularly good example of the public nature of the harm.
138. Alternatively, they may be dismissed all at once if a "struck-panel method" ofjury selection
is employed. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 217-18 (1965) (refusing to hold unconstitutional
Alabama's use of the struck method of jury selection). The ABA described this method as follows:
Under this practice, jurors are first examined and challenged for cause by both sides.
Excused jurors are replaced on the panel, and the examination of replacements continues
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present-the parties, the judge, the clerk, the press, the spectators, and the
jurors. And these dismissals take place under the aegis of the judge, at
least in federal court, in which the judge typically asks the questions during
voir dire39 and dismisses the prospective jurors who have been struck for
cause or peremptorily.' ° It is the judge who serves as interpreter for
those who are present, explaining what a peremptory challenge is and how
it can be used. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the Court ex-
pressed quite eloquently the public nature of the harm caused by the court's
involvement in group-based peremptories:
Finally, we note that the injury caused by the discrimination is made
more severe because the government permits it to occur within the
courthouse itself. Few places are a more real expression of the
constitutional authority of the government than a courtroom, where
the law itself unfolds. Within the courtroom, the government in-
vokes its laws to determine the rights of those who stand before it.
In full view of the public, litigants press their cases, witnesses give
testimony, juries render verdicts, and judges act with the utmost care
to ensure that justice is done.' 2
Although the Court in Edmonson was describing the harm caused by per-
emptories based on race, those based on gender are no less pernicious.
Exclusion based on gender, like exclusion based on race, taints the selec-
tion process, and with it the belief that the remainder of the proceedings
will be conducted fairly."4
until a panel of qualified jurors is presented. The size of the panel at this time is the sum
of the number of jurors to hear the case plus the number of peremptories to be allowed
all parties. The parties then proceed to exercise their peremptories, usually alternately or
in some similar way which will result in all parties exhausting their challenges at approxi-
mately the same time .... This approach is not uncommon in the federal courts.
ABA PRojECr ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 77
(Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. For a description of the struck-panel method,
see Judge Leonard B. Sand, Instructions to Counsel Concerning Jury Selection (Feb. 1, 1982) (copy
on file with author) (describing advantages of this method including: counsel will know who will re-
place the challenged panelist; the jurors will not know who challenged them or why; and the selection
can proceed quickly, particularly in multi-party cases).
139. See Gordon Bermant & John Shapard, The Voir Dire Examination, Juror Challenges, and
Adversary Advocacy, in THE TRIAL PRoCBSS 69, 79-81 (Bruce D. Sales ed., 1981) (reporting the
results of a study in which over 70% of federal judges said they conduct voir dire questioning
themselves but will often include questions suggested by counsel); SAUL KASSIN & LAWRENCE
WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL 52 (1988) ("In the federal courts [voir dire] is entirely
within the judges control. In the state courts, the procedures vary."); ABRAMSON, supra note 83, at
163 ("In federal courts, judges often do all the questioning.").
140. FED. R. Civ. P. 47(b), (c); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
141. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
142. Id. at 628.
143. It is important that jury selection takes place before the parties and in the public eye so that
the jury is accepted as fairly chosen. See, e.g., Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 406 (1894)
(explaining that, had the defendant not been present during the examination ofjurors' qualifications or
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Jury verdicts are not announced in a vacuum. The announcement is
a public act from which the community draws lessons about what is accep-
table and what is unacceptable behavior.' Such value-laden decisions
are usually embraced by communities, even in contentious cases,' be-
cause the jury is seen as representing the voice of the community, and the
process by which the decision was reached is regarded as fair.' If,
however, jurors are excluded based on gender, and their views and per-
spectives are eliminated from consideration, then it is unlikely that the
verdicts announced by such juries will be representative of the community,
and it is unlikely that the community will perceive the process as fair and
accept the verdict.
2. Peremptories Perpetuate Stereotypes and Discrimination.-The
defining characteristic of the peremptory is that no explanation need be
given for its use. The fact that no explanation is required, however, does
not mean that no explanation is apparent, and when the explanation is a
group-based stereotype (even if unspoken), then our notion of fairness is
offended.' 7 Also, while no explanation need be given by the lawyer ex-
ercising the peremptory, opposing counsel or the press may be "providing"
an explanation, albeit informally. The O.J. Simpson trial provides an
example. When Simpson's counsel, Robert Shapiro and Johnnie Cochran,
worried that the prosecution was questioning African Americans differently
and would attempt to use its peremptories to strike African Americans from
the assertion of peremptory challenges, the Court would have reversed his conviction); Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370, 375-76, 379-80 (1892) (reversing the judgment because the trial court allowed
challenges to be made without the prisoner having been brought face to face with the jurors).
144. See supra section H1(A)(1).
145. See supra notes 72, 80-82 and accompanying text (explaining that Hasidic Jews in Crown
Heights accepted a verdict with which they disagreed and attempted to challenge it, not by attacking
the process, but by turning to the legal system).
146. In the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on jury selection, Judge Irving R. Kaufman
explained that the process must be fair in order for the verdict to be accepted:
If the law is to reflect the moral sense of the community, the whole community-and not
just a special part-must help to shape it. If the jury's verdict is to reflect the
community's judgment-the whole community's judgment-jurors must be fairly selected
from a cross-section of the whole community, not merely a segment of it.
Federal Jury Selection: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 256 (1967) (statement of Irving R. Kaufinan,
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and Chairman, Committee on Operation of the
Jury System of the U.S. Judicial Conference).
147. In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), the Court noted that 'the exclusion from jury
service of large groups of individuals not on the basis of their inability to serve as jurors, but on the
basis of some immutable characteristic such as race, gender, or ethnic background, undeniably gave
rise to an 'appearance of unfairness.'" Id. at 175. The Court held, however, that a "death-qualified
jury'-in which those potential jurors who say they could not vote for the death penalty are excluded
from the jury-does not violate the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment because
groups based on shared attitudes are not distinctive groups for purposes of the fair cross-section
requirement. Id. at 173-74.
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the jury, all they had to do was explain this strategy to the press to make
the public aware of it."'
Although gender- and race-based peremptories may be more visible,
peremptories exercised on the basis of other group identities are no less
offensive. Peremptory challenges permit discrimination in a setting that
should be free from all discrimination."" It is unclear why discrimi-
nation should be permitted against members of any group, whether they are
women, men, Jews, Catholics, Muslims, African Americans, Asian Ameri-
cans, Italian Americans, the elderly, homosexuals, lesbians, the rich, or the
poor. It is particularly unclear why such discrimination should be per-
mitted in cases that involve members of these various communities and,
therefore, involve verdicts that will have to be accepted by these same
communities. Furthermore, it is unclear why the state should sanction such
discrimination, which it necessarily does because it provides the setting and
the procedures.
The use of the peremptory to exclude members of any particular group
starts from the premise that jurors will vote according to a group affili-
ation. A peremptory is often based on a stereotype, such as the idea that
women jurors will favor a handsome man."M As one judge, who advoca-
ted the abolition of peremptories, explained: "Attorneys use peremptories
to eliminate groups of people because of preconceived notions of how cer-
tain groups will judge a case."15' Jury selection should not perpetuate
stereotypes, but peremptory challenges exercised on the basis of group
membership necessarily do so. Typically, lawyers have limited
148. See, e.g., David Margolick, Issues of Race are Raised in Simpson Jury Selection, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1994, at A29 (quoting Cochran as criticizing the prosecution's conduct: "We are very
concerned about the tenor of questions and that they go after certainjurors.... In order for this jury
to have credibility, it must have people from all walks of life and from all over the community");
Christine Spolar, Majority-Black Jury Selected in O.J. Sympson Murder Trial, WAsH. PosT, Nov. 4,
1994, at A2 ("Defense attorney Robert L. Shapiro said, outside the courtroom, that the defense was
crying foul on racial grounds because the prosecution seemed to have a strategy to 'exclude black
females and blacks in general [through peremptories].'").
149. In the context ofjury selection, the exclusion of any juror based on immutable characteristics
is, in my view, a form of discrimination and is harmful to the jury. The reason that such discrimi-
nation should not be permitted during jury selection, even though it may be permitted in other contexts,
such as the military, is that jury service, like voting, is an exercise of the people's sovereignty, and no
segment of the eligible citizenry should be excluded.
150. F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATT, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CRIMINAL TRIALS
§ 104 (1971); see, e.g., United States v. Omoruyi, 7 F.3d 880, 881 (9th Cir. 1993) (recounting the
prosecutor's assertion that he exercised peremptories against two unmarried, female prospectivejurors
because he was afraid they would be attracted to the defendant's good looks). For other trial manuals
offering advice about jury selection based on gender stereotypes, see HARRY S. BODIN, SELECrING A
JURY 53 (1954) ("It is almost inevitable that women will be influenced by the experience of their hus-
bands."); and Ronmr A. WEN K, THE ART OF SELECriNG A JURY 88 (2d ed. 1988) ("Women react
more to pain and suffering than men and are generally more emotional and sympathetic.").
151. Judge Phyllis Bamburger, The Critmira Jury Selection Process: Should New YorkStateAdopt
the Federal System ofJury Selection and Should the Use ofPeremptory ChallengesBe Eliminated, N.Y.
COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION (June 3, 1993) [hereinafter The Criminal Jury Selection Process].
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information available on which to base their peremptories. 152 Lawyers
often know little more than jurors' names and the locality in which they
reside, their occupations and those of their spouses and children, whether
they are acquainted with anyone involved in the case, and whether they
have ever served before on a jury and whether their past service was in
civil or criminal court. This paucity of information is particularly
pronounced in federal courts where the judge usually conducts voir
dire.53 On the basis of the prospective juror's responses to these
questions, the lawyer must exercise her peremptory challenges. In the face
of limited information, the lawyer may rely on stereotypes handed down
from trial manuals and fellow litigators. For example, one 1992 trial
manual unabashedly perpetuates stereotypes when it advises practitioners:
152. For example, the lawyer in I.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. made this argument before the
trial judgewhen he challenged the state's exercise of its peremptory challenges to strike nine men from
the jury:
Judge, before the jury is impaneled, I propose to the court that... we would challenge
the state's strikes on the Batson decision and other decisions that have followed that I have
heard and understand that gender based strikes based upon gender are just as [in]valid as
race strikes based on the race-the state's strikes with the exception of one were males.
Virtually none of them answered any questions whatsoever which would show prejudice
or bias in any way, and I submit to the court that they were basically struck solely upon
gender.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 95, at A-2 to A-3 (emphasis added) (quoting Reporter's
Official Transcript on Appeal).
153. See Babcock, supra note 12, at 548, 549 ("Increasingly, judges are conducting voir dire ex-
aminations rather than allowing counsel to propound questions.... [T]he limited questions put by
thejudge to the panel as a group greatly reduce the information produced by the voir dire."). As Hans
and Vidmar explain,
False stereotypes can easily develop and even flourish under typical voir dire and chal-
lenge procedures. Attorneys are usually forced to exercise their peremptories on the basis
of only limited information about prospective jurors. They never receive feedback on
their choices, since those chalengedjurors are eliminated. On the other side of the coin,
thejury renders its verdict as a group. Attorneys thus seldom learn whether their hunches
are correct.
HANS & VDMAR, supra note 89, at 76.
154. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the Court acknowledged that lawyers have
limited information on which to exercise their peremptories and that the basis may well be group affil-
iation:
[The peremptory] is no less frequently exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant
to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation
or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty.... Hence veniremen are not always
judged solely as individuals for the purpose of exercising peremptory challenges. Rather
they are challenged in light of the limited knowledge counsel has of them, which may
include their group affiliations, in the context of the case to be tried.
Id. at 220-21 (footnotes omitted). In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), Chief Justice Burger
noted that, "in making peremptory challenges, both the prosecutor and defense attorney necessarily act
on only limited information and hunch." Id. at 123 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Alan Dershowitz has
noted the difficulty of relying on hunches: "Lawyers' instincts are often the least trustworthy basis on
which to pickjurors. All those neat rules of thumb, but no feedback. Ten years of accumulated ex-
periences may be 10 years of being wrong." Morton Hunt, Putting Juries on the Couch, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 70, 82 (emphasis in original) (quoting Alan Dershowitz).
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Housewives in the suburbs are thought to be conservative on
damages and not particularly sympathetic .... Women's liberation-
ist women may feel antagonism toward male plaintiffs or male law-
yers. Such jurors may appear strident, self-assertive, or hostile. If
a female juror demands to be addressed as Ms. and not Miss, you
probably should take heed.' 55
Why should we care that peremptories may be based on stereotypes?
As a practical matter, lawyers' reliance on stereotypes to predict how
jurors will vote is misplaced, even though many lawyers might believe
otherwise.156 Most efforts to predict how jurors will vote based on cer-
tain characteristics, such as race, gender, or ethnicity, have met with little
success; study after study attests to this fact.' 57 Such efforts at prediction
155. WARD WAGNER, JR., ART OF ADVOCACY: JURY SELECION § 1.04[9], at 1-24 (1988).
156. Lawyers' attempts to use peremptories to select jurors who they think will be sympathetic
to their clients have yielded mixed results at best. In one of the few empirical studies on the effec-
tiveness of peremptory challenges, Hans Zeisel and Shari Diamond made use of "shadow juries," con-
sisting of those who had been dismissed peremptorily. Hans Zeisel & Shari S. Diamond, The Effect
of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN.
L. REV. 491, 498-99 (1978). They attempted to reconstruct the original juries as they would have
existed if peremptory challenges had not been allowed. On that basis, they found that 7 of the 12 cases
were only minimally affected by the use of peremptory challenges. Id. at 507. The study showed that
prosecutors, and to a slightly lesser degree defense attorneys, were usually unable to use their peremp-
tories to any advantage. Id. at 517. Zeisel and Diamond concluded that the "collective performance
of the attorneys [was] not impressive." Id.
In another study, mock jurors were videotaped as they responded to voir dire questions in a high-
profile case. Geoffrey P. Kramer et al., Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 409 (1990). As a follow up, the tapes were sent to prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and trial judges, who were given additional information that would have been available at the time of
voir dire. They were then asked to indicate which prospective jurors they would have excused. The
researchers found that "[t]he judges' causal challenges and the defense attorneys' peremptory challenges
were unrelated to jurors' verdicts. That is, those excused were no more or no less likely to convict
than those who were acceptable to judges and defense attorneys." Norbert L. Kerr, The Effects of
Pretrial Publicity on Jurors, 78 JunICATURE 120, 126 (1994) (citing Geoffrey P. Kramer et al., On
the Effectiveness of VoirDire in Criminal Cases with Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study,
40 AM. U. L. REV. 665 (1991)). In the Kramer et al. study, researchers found that attorneys thought
that their predictions abouthow prospectivejurors would vote were correct 71.9 % of the time; in fact,
they were correct only 45.4% of the time. Id. Thus, they did "about as well as one might do by
flipping a coin." Id.
In three experiments, Olczak, Kaplan, and Penrod learned that trial lawyers tended to rely on
two or three juror characteristics in deciding whether a juror will be sympathetic to a particular side;
that trial lawyers relied on stereotypes and did not use more sophisticated reasoning than college sopho-
mores in selecting jurors; and most importantly, that both trial lawyers and law students did not
accurately select jurors favoring their side. Paul V. Olczak et al., Attorneys' Lay Psychology and Its
Effectiveness in Selecting Jurors: Three Empirical Studies, 6 1. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 431
(1991).
In an Australian study, researchers discovered that barristers used different characteristics than
those often relied upon by American trial lawyers, suggesting that stereotypes used for jury selection
may be culturally bound. Glenn F. Ross, The Selection of Jurors in the Higher Courts of Queensland,
15 AuSTRAIAN PsYCHOLOaIsT 351, 357 (1980).
157. With the exception of death penalty and rape, social scientists have failed to find a correlation
between individual characteristics and verdict preferences. See generally HANS & VIDMAR, supra note
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fail to take into account that most jurors take their role quite seriously and,
consistent with their oath, try to put aside personal predilections," much
as judges do;"59 that people cannot be reduced to one characteristic, and
89, at 76-77 (observing that lawyers are only minimally effective in securing favorable juries when they
must rely on the obvious personal characteristics of jury members); James H. Davis et al., The
Empirical Study of Decision Processes in Juries: A Critical Review, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE
INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PsYCHoLooICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 326, 341-51 (June L. Tapp & Felice J.
Levine eds., 1977) (reviewing empirical studies on jury deliberations); KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra
note 139, at 45 ("Time and again, efforts to corroborate the assumption that juries' verdicts are pre-
dictable from their demographic composition have produced modest, inconsistent, and highly qualified
results.... Personality variables fare little better in the predictive equation."); Steven Penrod et al.,
The Implications of Social Psychological Researchfor Trial Practice Attorneys, in PSYCHOLOGY & LAw
439 (DJ. Miller et al. eds, 1984) ("Th[e] traditional lore on jury selection consists largely of ethnic,
occupational, sexual, and other stereotypes presumably adduced from the expert practitioner's own
experiences. In fact, there is virtually no empirical support for these strategies.") (citations omitted);
ABRAMSON, supra note 83, at 171 ("The most recent reviewers of empirical research on jury selection
agree that demographic profiles fail to provide specific enough information to a lawyer faced with
sizing up a prospective juror."); A.P. Sealy, What Can Be Learned from the Analysis of Sinulated
Jurors, in THE BRITISH JURY SYSTEM 20 (Nigel Walker ed., 1975) ("We were most disappointed to
find so few correlations between social background, personality, and attitudinal variables on the one
hand and the verdict on the other. Most factors of personal background (e.g. sex, age, socio-economic
status, educational level, etc.) were unrelated to verdicts. Personality of the jurors also seems a
relatively poor correlate of verdict. . . ." (footnote omitted)).
In one study, social psychologist Steven Penrod collected demographic material on 367 members
of a Boston jury pool and asked them to reach verdicts in 4 different hypothetical cases. His analyses
suggested that information about a juror's age, race, and gender were almost useless in predicting how
that person would decide a case. Steven D. Penrod, Study of Attorney and "Scientific" Jury Selection
Methods 121-51, 174 (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University).
Similarly, in a 21-month study of jury trials in Birmingham, England, researchers John Baldwin
and Michael McConville collected background data on 3912 members of 326 juries in Birmingham.
After comparing verdicts reached by juries that varied according to age, gender, and occupation,
Baldwin and McConvillenoted few correspondencesbetween demographic characteristics and verdicts.
BALDWIN & McCoNvII.LE, supra note 83, at 100-04; see John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Does
the Composition of an English Jury Affect Its Verdict?, 64 JuDIcATURE 133, 134 (1980) [hereinafter
Baldwin & McConville, English Jury] (noting that the empirical evidence of links betweenjurors' back-
grounds and behavior is "slender and sometimes contradictory").
158. See, e.g., CHARING A FuTURE, supra note 39, at 8 ("The evidence indicates the jurors take
their responsibilities very seriously and attempt to reach fair and just results."); Cecil et al., supra note
105, at 751 (discussing a study which "showed that jurors in both long and short trials took their task
extremely seriously"); Kalven, supra note 113, at 1062 ("[T]here is much evidence that most people,
once actually serving in a trial, become highly serious and responsible toward their task and toward the
joint effort to deliberate through to a verdict. Whether they are good at the job may be open to
question, but that they are serious about it and give it a real try is abundantly documentable."); Sealy,
supra note 157, at 20 ("Jurors take their roles very seriously, at least in simulated trials. They not only
try hard to understand the case, they also surrender prejudice and bias."); Edward Clarke, Q.C., The
Selection of Juries, Qualification for Service and the Right of Challenge, in THE BRITISH JURY SYSTEM,
supra note 157, at 48 (noting that the "vast majority [of jurors] do their work with a proper sense of
responsibility"); see also WAIIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JuRY 356 (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2d ed. 1875) (observing that jurors must "promise, under the awful sanction of an
oath, to lay aside anger, and hate, and fear; nor allow themselves to be swayed by love or friendship
while they address themselves to their solemn duties").
159. Judges, in spite of their training, are not immune from drawing inferences about parties based
on past criminal records and other information. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 89, at 127; see Neil J.
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from that one characteristic have their verdict derived; that lawyers are not
trained in any way that makes them expert at interpreting body language
or uncovering deep-seated prejudices or biases that even the individual
might not recognize;"ro and that, in any event, the deliberation process
is a complex one, and its dynamics cannot be predicted.16' The group
endeavor allows for the airing of a variety of points of view,,6 provides
an opportunity for collective memory,"es and exposes prejudices and
weaknesses in an argument that the individual might not have been aware
of beforehand.'"
Vidmar, Social Psychology and the Law, in SOcIAL PSYCHOLOGY 388, 397-98 (Arnold S. Kahn et al.
ads., 1984) (reviewing research that details judges' susceptibility to drawing inferences); see also
Catharine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727, 1745 (1990) ("[Judges']
judgments are relative to a perspective; they are situated in prior experience and affected by normative
attitudes.").
160. See Olczak et al., supra note 156, at 443 ("Attorneys used the same stereotypes that civilians
used, and in as cognitively simple a manner.").
161. Some lawyers, recognizing the importance of group deliberations, have engaged social
scientists or jury specialists who conduct mock juries to learn how jurors might respond to their
arguments and their case. BALDWIN & MCCONVILLE, supra note 83, at 87; KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN,
supra note 139, at 57 ("It is almost unusual now to come across an important case, criminal or civil,
in which the jury is selected without the help of an expert." (emphasis in origina); Jeffrey Toobin,
Juries on Trial, NEW YORKER, Oct. 31, 1994, at 42, 43 (observing that "deep-pocketed parties to civil
and criminal litigation routinely use polls and focus groups to shape their efforts at picking juries").
Even if such cases result in acquittals or favorable awards, however, it is unclear that the jury selection
techniques are responsible for the outcomes. It may be that other aspects of the case, such as strong
evidence, were responsible instead. BALDWIN & MCCONVILLE, supra note 83, at 90.
Another problem with mock juries is that it is difficult to know if the mock jurors will act in the
same way as actual jurors, who know that their efforts will result in an outcome that will affect others.
Yet another problem is that mock juries often consist of students "so that the resulting panels do not
in any way represent the social mix which would characterize virtually any real jury." Id. at 13.
162. See, e.g., Maier & Solem, supra note 114, at 285 (arguing that "free discussion tends to
increase the number of correct answers to a problem for which a variety of incorrect answers seems
plausible.").
163. See Kalven, supra note 113, at 1067 ("Differentjurors remember, and make available to all,
different items of the trial so that the jury as a group remembers far more than most of its members
could as individuals."); see supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
164. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233 (1978) ("When individual and group decision-
making were compared, it was seen that groups performed better because prejudices of individuals were
frequently counterbalanced, and objectivity resulted." (citations omitted)); HANS & VIDMAR, supra note
89, at 50 ("The jury's heterogeneous makeup may also lessen the power of prejudice. Biases for and
against the defendant, if evenly distributed on the jury, may cancel each other out."). The presence
of minorities on a jury may also suppress the expression of racial, ethnic, and other prejudices. Id.
at 50-51. Although the suppression of ideas suggests the dangers of "groupthink," in which group
members conform to the prevalent view and effectively limit the range of ideas expressed and con-
sidered, IRVING L. JANis, GROUPrHIN 9 (2d ed. 1982), not all ideas are worthy of the group's con-
sideration. Certainly ideas that are based on prejudice and stereotype fit into this category.
Earlier research efforts ignored or undervalued the group deliberation process, see, e.g., Jay
Schulman et al., Recipe for a Jury, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May 1973, at 37, 83 (stating that "the psy-
chological and interpersonal processes involved in reaching a verdict were much more complex than
anything we could have predicted"), perhaps because it takes place behind closed doors and is therefore
difficult to study. BALDWIN & McCoNVLLE, supra note 83, at 5 ("[A]II researchers have been denied
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Even if stereotypes could serve as a means for predicting individual
voting patterns, however, peremptories still should not be exercised on the
basis of stereotypes. The reason lies in the role of the jury in a democratic
society. The subtext of peremptories-that discrimination is permissible
and stereotypes are a legitimate basis for their exercise-teaches negative
lessons about citizenship. Such prejudging of individuals based on a
stereotype about group identity is inconsistent with democratic ideals such
as equality and fairness.
D. The Jury's Role in Educating the Citizenry
1. Peremptories Deny Access to Civic Duty.-The jury plays an im-
portant role as educator of the citizenry in the lessons of democracy. As
de Tocqueville suggested over 150 years ago,1 as Francis Lieber, a stu-
dent of Justice Story, reinforced not long after," and as the Supreme
Court reiterated four terms ago, the jury teaches citizens important lessons
about democracy. 67
The jury is premised upon the notion that individuals will be able to
serve. They are officially summoned from the citizenry and asked to
access to the very subject-matter under examination-the jury and its deliberations. It has not been
possible for researchers to observe juy deliberations at first hand, or even, in England, to interview
jurors after their service has been completed."); GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, JuDICIAL POuCY-MAKING
81 (1974) ("Research in jury decisionmaking is difficult to carry out because the secrecy of the pro-
ceedings precludes direct observation of how real juries make decisions. Most work has been done
either with simulated jury groups or with anecdotal materials provided by the reminiscences of ex-
jurors." (footnote omitted)). For example, Kalven and Zeisel concluded that mostjurors made up their
minds before beginning deliberations, but that conclusion was also necessary to their research efforts
because they did not have access to jury deliberations. Compare KALVEN & ZImsEL, supra note 11,
at 488 w&h Recording of Jury Deliberations: Hearings on S. Res. 58 Before the Subcomm. to
Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Lans of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Seas. 43 (1955) (testimony of Professor Harry
Kalven). Kalven and Zeisel's efforts to record jury deliberations served as a catalyst for the passage
of a statute forbidding such recordings. 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1982).
More recent jury research, however, has focused on the importance of deliberations and group
dynamics. See, e.g., HASrIE ET AL., supra note 105, at 99-120; Marder, supra note 121, at 593 (both
analyzing the effects of gender on the process of jury deliberation). As one writer pointed out: "In
Brazil, federal juries do not deliberate. At the close of evidence, jurors are individually polled in
writing, a secret ballot is taken, and the majority prevails. Such a procedure stands in stark contrast
to our own, where deliberation is the essence of a juror's duty." ABRAMSON, supra note 83, at 205
(footnote omitted).
165. 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 34, at 252 (arguing that the jury "should be regarded as a
free school which is always open and in which each juror learns his rights... and is given practical
lessons in the law"). The jury's role as educator of the citizenry was one that guided the framers of
the Bill of Rights as well. According to Professor Amar, the jury, along with the militia and the
church, was understood at the time of the Bill of Rights as "a device for educating ordinary Citizens
about their rights and duties." Amar, supra note 15, at 1210.
166. See FRANcIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBEDaY AND SELF-GOvERNmENT 239 (Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippincott& Co. 1859) ("[Thejury] teaches law and liberty, order and rights, justice and government,
and carries this knowledge over the land; it is the greatest practical school of free citizenship.").
167. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1991).
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provide temporary service. Jury service provides citizens with the only op-
portunity, other than voting, to participate directly in their own gover-
nance." That a stereotype about group identity should preclude an indi-
vidual from serving on a jury should be anathema in a democratic society.
The individual thus singled out not only is declared unfit based on a stereo-
type, but also is excluded from performing a public duty.1" Thus, there
is the symbolism of equality that service entails and there is the stigma that
exclusion casts. Moreover, discrimination may follow from branding such
individuals as unfit for jury service. By relying on stereotypes that
perpetuate differences about who can serve and who cannot-who can ful-
fill the obligations of a citizen and who cannot-the peremptory undercuts
notions of equality that are fundamental to a democracy."ro Thus, even
if one recognizes that people may have different perspectives based on
different life experiences, these differences should not be permitted to serve
as a basis for exclusion. For purposes of fulfilling the civic function of
jury duty, which is a unique opportunity for self-governance, all eligible
citizens must be regarded as equally able to serve. If citizens are impro-
perly excluded from the jury, then they leave the experience with negative
views about the fairness of their justice system; they may conclude that a
system that engages in such exclusion is not a system that can be fair to
them.
2. Peremptories Convey a Harmful Message to Those Who Do
Serve.-Those who witness the improper exclusion of prospective jurors
based on peremptories are also taught harmful lessons. They learn that
exclusion based on stereotype and discrimination, which is unacceptable in
other walks of public life, is acceptable in the courtroom.' They may
168. One commentator has observed that jury duty is the only governmental function in which
citizens still play a direct role. Tom C. Clark, The American Jury: A Justification, in SELECTED
READINGS: THE JURY 1, 7 (Glenn R. Winters ed., 1971).
169. Of course, one could argue that the for-cause challenge, which also denies an individual the
opportunity to serve on the jury, should also be eliminated for the reasons delineated in this section.
While that may be true, the counterargument is that the for-cause challenge eliminates only those who
say they cannot be impartial or who claim a relationship to the parties or the case, which would
interfere with their ability to be impartial. Although I acknowledge that these exceptions undermine
my claim about jury service as a badge of citizenship, I am willing to maintain these exceptions as
necessary to preservethe appearance of fairness. For further discussion of the for-cause challenge, see
infra text accompanying notes 284-85.
170. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Note, Women's Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or
Privilege of Difference?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1141-43, 1160 (1994) (arguing that women's jury
service conveys an important message about citizenship, which debate about differences should not
obscure).
171. Other forms of government-sanctioned, or at least government-countenanced, discrimination
may still persist in the courtroom even if peremptories are eliminated. See, e.g., NINTH CIRcuIT
GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, supra note 51, at 49-76 (describing instances of gender discrimination in
the courtroom by lawyers, judges, and others). For other studies that have examined and documented
gender bias in the courts, see id. at E2-E5 (selected bibliography).
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also conclude that there is hierarchy, rather than equality, among citizens,
with those who are permitted to serve on juries being more highly valued
citizens than those who are denied the opportunity.'
If, however, all who are competent to serve are permitted to
serve, then they are likely to leave the experience with positive views about
the functioning of the jury and the justice system.'14 Thus, the jury can
effectively serve, as de Tocqueville and Lieber presciently noted, as a
public school enabling citizens to participate in their government in an
official, albeit temporary, capacity. At the same time, jury service teaches
citizens important lessons about issues of public concern.'75
The jury plays an aspirational role in our collective psyche. We have
imbued the jury with several ideals. By drawing its members from the citi-
zenry, the jury embodies the conscience of the community; by relying on
citizens rather than professionals, it represents democracy at work; and by
adhering to procedures that are fair, the jury is seen as above manipulation,
and thus able to make difficult decisions-decisions for which there are
often no clear-cut, simple answers. Although the community's sense of the
right answer might change over time, the fairness with which the jury's
172. See Jennifer K. Brown, Note, The ineteenth Amendment and Women's Equality, 102 YALE
LJ. 2175,2183 (1993) ("[W]hen certain members of society are barred from jury service, not because
of their duties to the community but because of who they are, they are denied the full measure of trust
and respect accorded to equal citizens.").
173. To be considered competent for jury service, one must meet several criteria: residence in the
judicial district for at least one year, eighteen years or older, citizenship; an ability to read, write,
speak, and understand English; no physical or mental impairment that would interfere with jury service;
and no charges pending or convictionfor a crime punishableby imprisonment for more than one year.
28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (1988). For the full text of the statute, see infra note 250.
174. See LEVINM, supra note 83, at 16 ("[Most ex-jurors report having positive feelings about
their experience ...." (footnote omitted)); Arthur Austin, Another Viewpoint on Juries, NAT'L LJ.,
Mar. 22, 1993, at 15, 16 (relating that most of the jurors interviewed in the author's survey "agreed
* . .that jury service was a positive experience").
175. Such lessons, however, do not always come without costs. For example, Mark Bassett, a
juror in the much-publicized McMartin preschool child molestation case--a trial that spanned two and
one-half years, cost taxpayers $15 million, and earned the distinction of being "the longest and most
expensive criminal trial in history"-found himself without a job at the trial's close and without the
requisite knowledge of technological developments in his field of computers. Beverly Beyette, A
Juror's Triabr, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1990, at El. He described the trial as "very draining. You're
dealing with extremely emotional issues. And there's no one in the whole world you can talk to and
say, 'This is rough,' and why." Id. On the whole, he considered the experience a positive one, but
one that he could not fully appreciate until he "repair[ed] the damage" and was able to "get [his] life
back to normal." Id. at E2. Jurors in the trial of Jeffrey L. Dabmer found the emotional toll so great
in a trial replete with descriptions of cannibalism and sex with corpses that two psychiatrists were made
available to them so that they would have an opportunity "to talk, cry or vent rage." Dirk Johnson,
Dahmer Jurors Tell of Emotional Impact, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1992, at All. Several of the jurors
in the first Rodney King trial described a panoply of feelings they experienced after their verdict: guilt
about the riots, fear for their physical safety, and anguish that their verdict was greeted with such
opprobrium. Seth Mydans, Haunted Still, Jurors in Beating Wal Give Warning to Possible Successors,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 15, 1993, at AS. Onejuror, though acknowledging that "[j]ury service is a respon-
sibility," believed that no juror or his family should be subjected to the threats of violence that he and
his family had experienced. Id.
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proceedings are conducted ensures the stability of the institution and the
acceptance of its verdict. Thus, the procedures by which the jury is selec-
ted and the trial is conducted are inextricably linked to the high esteem in
which the jury is held as an institution that embodies some of our noblest
ideals.'7
IV. Possible Arguments for Retaining Peremptory Challenges
A. The Parties' "Right" to Control the Jury
The elimination of peremptory challenges would require parties to give
up a tool from the adversarial arsenal. They would no longer be able to
remove from the jury those prospective jurors who cause them general un-
easiness.' A defendant in a criminal case, for example, would not be
able to remove a prospective juror whom she disliked for whatever reason
or who she thought disliked her. These reasons may be difficult to ar-
ticulate because they are based on the prospective juror's "habits and
associations, " " or upon "grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal
proceedings or official action, namely ... race, religion, nationality,
occupation or affiliations."' Blackstone defended the peremptory chal-
lenge on two grounds. His first defense is:
As every one must be sensible, what sudden impressions and unac-
countable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and
gestures of another; and how necessary it is, that a prisoner (when
put to defend his life) should have a good opinion of his jury, the
want of which might totally disconcert him; the law wills not that he
should be tried by any one man against whom he has conceived a
prejudice, even without being able to assign a reason for such his
dislike.}'
His second defense is that the defendant should be able to remove a pro-
spective juror who appears to resent the questions during voir dire and thus
forms a dislike of the defendant. 181
176. There is historical evidence that the jury has played this role before. At the time of the
debates over the Bill of Rights, for example, "[tihe jury summed up-indeed embodied-the ideals of
populism, federalism, and civil virtue that were the essence of the original Bill of Rights." Amar,
supra note 15, at 1190. The jury, however, may not have always played this role. For example,
during Reconstruction, Professor Amar notes that Article 111 judges with life tenure may have been in
a better position to protect the First Amendment rights of politically weak groups, such as African
Americans, than local juries of 12 white men susceptible to prevailing prejudices. Akhil R. Amar, The
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE LJ. 1193, 1280-81 (1992).
177. It is important to keep in mind that jurors could still be removed for cause. See infra text
accompanying notes 281-93 (discussing for-cause challenges and the ways in which they would be
revised under a regime that eliminated peremptory challenges).
178. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
179. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
180. 4 WnLIM BLAcKsToNu, CoMMmNARiss *353.
181. Id.
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Both of these reasons are based on the view that the parties need to
believe that they have been tried by a fair jury. Whether the defendant
believes that the juror dislikes her initially or has formed an unfavorable
opinion of her after her attorney has questioned the prospective juror
during voir dire, seating such a juror may cause the defendant to believe
that she will not receive a fair trial.
A related point is that the peremptory protects the challenge for cause
because it permits the attorney to engage in questioning that might alienate
the prospective juror."l This point is more relevant in state court than
in federal court because in the former, the lawyer might conduct the voir
dire, whereas in the latter, the judge typically undertakes the ques-
tioning.1" The availability of peremptories means that a lawyer can en-
gage in careful, and perhaps even intrusive, questioning without fearing the
wrath of the prospective juror. As a result, a lawyer may persist in her
questioning, with the goal of uncovering sufficient bias to justify a for-
cause challenge and, in so doing, use her limited number of peremptories
carefully.
Many practitioners also believe the peremptory allows them to remove
prospective jurors whom they are convinced are biased but who do not
meet a judge's standard for a for-cause challenge.1 Their belief in the
prospective juror's bias may be based on a stereotype ("[hiomosexual
jurors are generally thought to be sympathetic and thus, pro-plaintiff""s),
or it may arise from a response that the prospective juror has given during
voir dire. In the latter case, the response may not be so strong as to
indicate that the prospective juror cannot serve impartially. However, it
may be suggestive enough to allow the lawyer to conclude that another
juror would be preferable and that a peremptory is in order. For example,
the lawyer may decide that the person is marginally qualified and that
another prospective juror would be more qualified.
182. See, e.g., Swain, 380 U.S. at 219-20 ("[T]he very availability of peremptories allows
counsel to ascertain the possibility of bias through probing questions on voir dire and facilitates the
exercise of challenges for cause by removing the fear of incurring a juror's hostility through
examination and challenge for cause."); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) ("Because,
upon challenges for cause shown, if the reason assigned prove insufficient to set aside the juror,
perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment."(quoting 4
BLACKSXUNE, supra note 180, at *353)); see also Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination
in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 771 (1992) ("[T]he
peremptory challenge provides a margin of protection for challenges for cause.").
183. See supra note 139.
184. See WANER, supra note 155, § 2.06[1], at 2-20 to 2-21 ("[A] party should notbe compelled
to use a peremptory challenge on a juror who is subject to challenge for cause. Remember as well,
that the challenge of a juror for cause which fails, calls for exercising the right of peremptory
challenge.").
185. Id. § 1.04[13], at 1-25.
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Another possibility is that, without peremptories, prospective jurors
who hold more extreme views than the average citizen would nonetheless
be permitted to serve on the jury. Certainly, the Court accepted this
argument when it observed in Swain that one of the functions of the per-
emptory is "to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides." 1 One
effect of increasing the number of jurors with extreme views could be to
increase the number of hung juries."
Another practical consideration is that the absence of the peremptory
challenge might lead to either an extended, or a shortened, voir dire. The
former might result if lawyers, left with only for-cause challenges, feel the
need to persist in their questioning, or to request that the judge do so, so
that they can uncover bias sufficient to persuade the court that a for-cause
challenge is in order. Voir dire might be shortened, on the other hand, if
lawyers feel that there is little they can do to elicit information that would
meet the high threshold of a for-cause dismissal. Critics of the jury system
might lament an extended voir dire as yet another expensive feature that
will lead to further court backlog. Lawyers are likely to lament a curtailed
voir dire as yet another example of the movement towards truncating par-
ties' rights and denying lawyers the information required to use their per-
emptories intelligently.
B. The Correction of Judicial Error
Perhaps the most significant effect of eliminating the peremptory chal-
lenge would be a structural one: a more limited role for the adversarial
process during jury selection and a more prominent role for the judge.
Currently, peremptory challenges are exercised by each party's respective
lawyers. Whether justified or not, the belief is that, in striking potential
jurors, lawyers function in their adversarial capacity to protect the interests
of their clients and to secure the jury most sympathetic to the clients'
interests. 8 Even if they engage in discrimination in pursuing their
186. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965); see Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484
(1990) (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 219, with approval).
187. This argument assumes that lawyers can identify from the voir dire those jurors who hold
more extreme views and that these jurors would prevent the jury from reaching a decision by holding
fast to their views and refusing to be influenced by what they hear during deliberations. But see
KALvEN & Zmsm., supra note 11, at 462 (concluding from a survey ofjuries and verdicts that "juries
which begin with an overwhelming majority in either direction are not likely to hang"). Another
assumption is that more hungjuries are a bad thing. Hans Zeisel has called the hung jury a "treasured,
paradoxical phenomenon." Hans Zeisel, . . .And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the
Federal Jury, 38 U. CH. L. REv. 710, 719 (1971). The hung jury is "treasured because it represents
the legal system's respect for the minority viewpoint that is held strongly enough to thwart the will of
the majority," and it is paradoxical because the hung jury can only be tolerated in "moderation"- "too
many hung juries would impede the effective functioning of the courts." Id. at 719 n.42.
188. There is little dispute that lawyers strive to obtain for their clients a "sympathetic" jury, one
that is "partial" to the client rather than "impartial." See COVER ET AL., supra note 41, at 1188
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"hunches" about juror sympathy, lawyers believe that doing so is part of
their zealous representation. The understanding is that if both sides act in
the same way (even if they are acting in a discriminatory way), then justice
is served because the adversarial process is at work.' 9 Without the per-
emptory challenge, therefore, lawyers cede some of their power to the
judge during jury selection.
Lawyers fear that judges are unlikely to pursue vigorous questioning
of prospective jurors."9 Judges have an institutional bias in seeing that
jury selection moves forward as quickly as possible.1 91 Even under the
("While the theoretical purpose of the voir dire is to search for impartial jurors, in practice each side
is looking for sympathetic decisionmakers."); LEVINE, supra note 83, at 51 ("The use of peremptory
challenges is supposed to eliminate people who are biased and leave a batch of open-minded jurors.
But lawyers use their prerogatives to try to accomplish just the opposite-a jury packed with sym-
pathizers or at least devoid of antagonists."); KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 139, at 50 ("[It is
no secret that [trial lawyers] strive to obtain not an impartial panel, but a sympathetic one."); Babcock,
supra note 12, at 551 ("Of course, neither litigant is trying to choose 'impartial' jurors, but rather to
eliminate those who are sympathetic to the other side, hopefully leaving only those biased for
him."(emphasis in original)); Herald P. Fahringer, "In the Valley of the Blind'--Jury Selection in a
Criminal Case, 3 TRIAL DIL. 1. 34, 34 (1980) (stating that lawyers desire favorability rather than im-
partiality in a jury); McEldowney, supra note 88, at 274 (noting that through peremptories "defence
counsel can rid the jury panel of any juror likely to be unsympathetic to the accused"); Ralph
Blumenthal, Pool of Jurors Is WhittledDown in World Trade Center Bombing Trial, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
23, 1993, at B4 (quoting one defense lawyer as saying that "[t]he truth is no lawyer wants a fair jury.
He wants a jury biased in favor of his client."); Steve McGonigle & Ed Timms, Race Bias Pervades
Jury Selection, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Mar. 9, 1986, at Al, A29 ("Both prosecutors and defense
attorneys attempt to guess how the other will use the 10 peremptory challenges to sculpt a jury of
people most inclined to favor one side of the case."); cf. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220-21 ("For the question
a prosecutor or defense counsel must decide is not whether a juror of a particular race or nationality
is in fact partial, but whether one from a different group is less likely to be.").
As a result, in some high-profile cases, lawyers will turn to investigators, jury specialists, or
social scientists and activists to develop a profile of the juror that is most likely to be sympathetic to
the case, so that the lawyer can search for such jurors during jury selection. See, e.g., Schulman et
al., supra note 164, at 39-41 (noting that defense attorneys relied on a team of social scientists and
activists that analyzed background characteristics to try to predict which jurors were most likely to be
sympathetic to the defendants). See generally supra note 161.
189. Clearly, the adversarial process does not eliminate discrimination. The case of African
Americans provides the starkest example. As cases from Swain, 380 U.S. at 202, through Georgia v.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), demonstrate, African Americans have been eliminated from the
petit jury by virtue of the peremptory for decades, in spite of (or perhaps because of) the adversarial
process.
The view that the adversarial processyields a panel of neutral citizens has been described by one
researcher as "more a myth than a reality." GORDON BERMANT, CONDUCT OF THE VOIR DIRE
EXAMINATION: PRACTICES AND OPINIONS OF FEDERAL DISrCT JUDGES 23 (1977). Others have
noted that the resulting panel "is probably more skewed in a particular direction than was the full panel
that preceded the voir dire." KASSIN & WRIGHTsMAN, supra note 139, at 56.
190. See KASSiN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 139, at 52 (asserting that lawyers "argue that only
they are familiar enough with their cases, skilled enough in the art of asking questions, and motivated
enough by the demands of their role as advocates, to conduct an effective examination"); Babcock,
supra note 12, at 549 ("[E]ven if the judge is willing to probe deeply into some issue, he will seldom
go as far as counsel would.").
191. See Babcock, supra note 12, at 546 ("[I1n the name of efficiency, many courts curtail the
number and kinds of questions that can be asked.").
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current system, judges try to rehabilitate prospective jurors by asking if
they can be impartial, and if they answer affirmatively, they are deemed
acceptable from the court's point of view."9 Judges also assume an insti-
tutional role of neutral arbiter; they might find it unseemly to ask probing,
and potentially intrusive, questions of prospective jurors during voir dire.
Finally, lawyers worry that they would be turning over their power to se-
lect jurors to a decisionmaker who has his own biases, and those biases
may be difficult for lawyers to challenge and for appellate courts to review.
For all these reasons, lawyers are unlikely to want to give up any control
over jury selection, and judges are unlikely to want to assume additional
duties and make additional decisions that carry the potential for reversal.
C. The Loss of Tradition
The peremptory has always been part of our jury tradition, and some
may feel reluctant to abandon that tradition because they believe it has
served us well. The peremptory was imported from England along with
the jury. In the American colonies, as in the English courts, the sheriff
often chose jurors who were sympathetic to the Crown." A defendant
could challenge peremptorily or for cause." A for-cause challenge
could be exercised on the grounds of specific bias-for example a familial
tie or economic relation to one of the parties-but not on the grounds of
general bias, such as attitudes or political views. 9 The English courts
and, consequently, the early American courts held the view that jurors
should not be questioned about their political beliefs and biases because
they, after all, were not the ones on trial." s
The Court's reluctance to abandon the peremptory serves as a good il-
lustration of our adherence to tradition. The Court, while recognizing that
the peremptory is not mandated by the Constitution1" and has been used
in detrimental ways in the past, has nevertheless long supported the
192. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, No. 77 Cr. 680 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1980) (Transcript
of jury selection). Even though Judge Knapp bent over backwards during jury selection in the Torres
case (as a result of the defendant's refusal to be assisted by counsel and to bepresent in the courtroom)
and seemed to excuse any juror who gave any type of reason why he or she could not serve, id. at 55-
68, Judge Knapp still asked prospective jurors if they could be impartial, and upon receiving an
affirmative response, he allowed them to serve. Id. at 70-71, 74, 77, 79, 83, 89, 91, 96, 98.
193. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 89, at 35 (describing the Crown's use of "every means
possible to secure convictions" once trials with increasing political significance began to appear in the
colonial courts).
194. Id.
195. See id. (discussing how in the 1696 trial of Peter Cook, the court disallowed the defense's
questioning of potentialjurors about their political beliefs and general biases against Catholic supporters
like Cook).
196. Id.
197. See infra note 380.
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peremptory. In Swain, the peremptory was lauded as "a necessary part of
trial by jury""' and "one of the most important of the rights secured to
the accused."" It was praised both for its "very old credentials" and
for "its actual use and operation in this country." The Court did
acknowledge, albeit haltingly, that if prosecutors were using peremptories
to exclude African American men from the petit jury in case after case,
then "it would appear that the purposes of the peremptory challenge are
being perverted";2"' however, the Court was not convinced that prose-
cutors were acting in such a manner, and accordingly, the evidentiary
burden required of a defendant was a difficult one to meet. Twenty years
later, as the exclusion of African Americans through the exercise of the
peremptory continued to be a problem, the Batson Court revised the evi-
dentiary burden required to establish an impermissible use of the peremp-
tory challenge. At that point, the Court recognized the peremptory as a
"historical privilege" and one that "traditionally" had been viewed as a
"means of assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury." '
However, it also recognized that the harm from the discriminatory per-
emptory threatened not merely the defendant or the excluded juror, but the
entire community.' Indeed, such procedures "undermine public confi-
dence in the fairness of our system of justice. " I
The Court's diminution of the peremptory and its elevation of the jury
can be seen most clearly in Powers v. Ohio, 5 Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.,' and Georgia v. McCollum.' In all of these opinions
the Court maintained a role for the peremptory, but reserved its highest
praise for the jury and recognized that the latter can no longer be com-
promised by the former. In his opinion in Powers, Justice Kennedy crafted
an elegant paean to the jury, beginning with quotations from Chief Justice
Taft and Alexis de Tocqueville and continuing through the Court's jury
jurisprudence. He described jury service as "preserv[ing] the democratic
element of the law" 8 and as "a valuable opportunity to participate in a
process of government, an experience fostering, one hopes, a respect for
law." He also fully delineated the manifold harms resulting from
discriminatory peremptories: including the harm to the excluded juror, who
198. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
199. Id. (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
200. Id. at 212.
201. Id. at 224.
202. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).
203. Id. at 87.
204. Id.
205. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
206. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
207. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
208. Powers, 499 U.S. at 407.
209. Id. (quoting Duncanv. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187 (1968) (Harlan, I., dissenting)).
1995] 1091
Texas Law Review [Vol. 73:1041
is denied "a significant opportunity to participate in civil life"; the harm
to the defendant, who is to be tried in a proceeding in which the "fairness"
is "in doubt"; and the harm to the jury and the justice system because the
integrity of both have been called into question.21° In these opinions, the
Court moved away from extolling the virtues of the peremptory and fo-
cused instead on the harms of discriminatory selection and the importance
of the jury.' Although the Court did not abandon the peremptory,21
its defense of the peremptory became more restrained and its recognition
of competing concerns became more pronounced. As the Court concluded
in Edmonson, "if race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury
panel as fair, the price is too high to meet the standard of the Consti-
tution. "213
V. What Is at Stake
A. Competing Visions
Although the Court is still trying to preserve some role for the per-
emptory,214 it will eventually have to confront whether the peremptory
210. Id. at 409, 411-12. The same emphases can be found in Edmonson and McCollum as well.
For example, in Edmonson, the Court acknowledged that it had recognized, in the past, the "value of
peremptory challenges..., particularly in the criminal context," but that "there is no constitutional
obligation to allow them." Edronson, 500 U.S. at 620. It then described the harms that would ensue
if race-based peremptories were permitted, including the harm to the excluded juror, the harm to the
court proceedings ("where the law itself unfolds") and the harm to "the integrity of the judicial
system." Id. at 628. The Court explained that the harms it identified in Powers were not limited to
the criminal sphere and that "[riacial discrimination has no place in the courtroom, whether the pro-
ceeding is civil or criminal." Id. at 630.
Similarly, in McCollum, the Court paid obeisance to the peremptory, McCoUwn, 112 S. Ct. at
2358 ("We do not believethat this decisionwill undermine the contribution of the peremptory challenge
to the administration ofjustice."), but clearly emphasized the harms that the discriminatory peremptory
can have on the excluded juror, the defendant, and the judicial system at large. Id. at 2353 (lamenting
"the harm done to the 'dignity of persons' and to the 'integrity of the courts'" (quoting Powers, 499
U.S. at 402)).
211. The structure of the opinions reflects this shift as well. In Swain, for example, the Court
commenced its opinion with an extended discussion of the history of the peremptory in an effort to
ground this procedure in tradition if not in the Constitution. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-22
(1965). In contrast, Powers begins with an extended discussion of the history of the jury and the
fundamental role it has played in the sustenance of a democracy. Powers, 499 U.S. at 406-08.
Chief Justice Burger made a similar observation about the majority's opinion in Batson: "Instead
of even considering the history or function of the peremptory challenge, the bulk of the Court's opinion
is spent recounting the well-established principle that intentional exclusion of racial groups from jury
venires is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 121-22
(1986) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
212. Even as the Court further diminished the scope of the peremptory in J.E.B., it still took care
to try to preserve the peremptory: "Our conclusion that litigants may not strike potential jurors solely
on the basis of gender does not imply the elimination of all peremptory challenges." I.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994).
213. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630.
214. See supra note 212.
1092
Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury
should be abandoned. For each of the main arguments offered by those
who want to retain peremptories, there is a counterargument; however, a
disputation is unlikely to persuade when what is at stake are competing
visions of the roles of the jury.
Without question, if peremptories are eliminated, parties will have lost
some means of controlling who is on their jury. Without peremptories,
parties might experience greater unease about who is sitting in judgment
of them and might believe that some jurors cannot be fair, even though the
jurors claim they can be. Sometimes parties' unease may be attributed to
benign reasons, but sometimes their unease may be the result of distrust,
simply because the juror's background differs from their own. One re-
sponse to parties is that these misgivings might become less pronounced
over time as parties become more accustomed to jury selection without per-
emptories. Another response is to recognize that while party satisfaction
is important, it has not always prevailed. For example, when parties have
reservations about a prospective juror simply because they believe that that
juror, based on race or gender, will be unable to decide their case fairly,
they are not able to assuage their misgivings by striking such a juror for
those reasons. When parties were permitted to strike prospective jurors
based on race or gender, there were costs to the jurors and the jury system;
these same costs are at issue when other groups are excluded as well.
Without peremptories, the decision about which prospective jurors can
serve would be left entirely in the hands of the judge. Undeniably, lawyers
would lose the check they now exercise on a judge's discretion. One jus-
tification for this structural shift, however, is that lawyers have already
created a structural shift on their own; they have transformed jury selection
from an exercise in selecting an impartial jury to an exercise in selecting
a favorable jury, all in the name of the adversarial system.215 They have
used peremptories to strike prospective jurors based on reasons legitimate
and illegitimate simply because their goal is to win. Institutionally, they
are given little information during voir dire on which to base their decision
about juror impartiality, and even when they are given guidance about
reasons that are permissible and reasons that are not, they have often at-
tempted to circumvent the courts by casting illegitimate reasons in the guise
of legitimate ones.
Finally, the abandonment of the peremptory would inevitably mark a
break with tradition, and those who support the peremptory argue that this
is a tradition that has served us well. Those who argue adherence to
215. See, e.g., KASSiN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 139, at 52 ([O]ne cannot help but be struck
by the degree to which lawyers use the voir dire to subvert the impartial juror ideal."); Dale Broeder,
Voir Dire Exam intons: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (1965) (concluding that abuse
of voir dire by attorneys is prevalent); see supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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tradition, however, fail to acknowledge that both the peremptory and the
-jury have changed over time and that adherence to tradition may not
provide an adequate response to those changes." 6 The peremptory,
which was once a device to exclude loyalists to the Crown, has been
transformed into a mechanism for excluding prospective jurors based upon
stereotypes. The jury, once a preserve of white, male property
owners,217 now has the potential to reflect more closely than ever before
our heterogeneous society.218 The heterogeneous jury is a worthy goal
in a heterogeneous society such as ours, and the perversion of the
peremptory to exclude people from the jury based on their race, gender,
etlnicity, religion, or any other category, is inconsistent with that vision,
as well as with the purpose once served by the peremptory.
At heart, however, are competing visions of the jury. Proponents of
the peremptory see the jury as a means of safeguarding the parties' rights,
particularly in the criminal context. Under a parties' rights' view of the
jury, any curtailment of the peremptory would be cutting back on the pro-
tections afforded to a party. The elimination of the peremptory would
mean that the parties would lose control over selecting jurors to sit on the
jury, and as a corollary, they might be judged by those whom they are
convinced, however irrationally, would be unable to judge them with an
open mind. Nor would they have a check on the judge's discretion; rather,
216. What William Forsyth said about English law over 100 years ago is equally applicable to the
peremptory in this country today:
It has too long been the disgrace of the English law that it pertinaciously adheres to forms
which are inconsistent with truth. Nor can any reason be assigned for doing so, except
the unsatisfactory one, that the falsehood deceives nobody. But surely it is better to make
the form correspond with the reality, and not accustom ourselves to the use of language
which is either unmeaning or untrue, and in some cases both.
FoRsYTH, supra note 158, at 141.
217. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 83, at 877-78. The jury in England has also become more
heterogeneous with the abolition of the property requirement and the lowering of the age of eligibility
for jury duty. BALDWIN & McCoNviLLE, supra note 83, at 96; see also McEldowney, supra note 88,
at 281 ("The property qualification has been abolished and jurors are chosen from the electoral roll.
Jury service has now become a citizen's right as well as his duty."). John Baldwin and Michael
McConville, writing in 1979, noted the change: Jurors were more likely to be younger and from the
working class than in the past; thus, Lord Devlin's description of the British jury as "predominantly
male, middle-aged, middle-minded and middle-class" was no longer as apt. BALDWIN & McCoNVILLE,
supra note 83, at 94 (quoting SIR PATRICK DEVIvN, TRIAL BY JURY 20 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1988)
(1956)).
218. BALDWIN & McCoNviL E, supra note 83, at 94 (remarking that juries are more
heterogeneous today than in the past). On the jury's capacity to evolve over time, see Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85-86 (1942) ("Our notions of what a proper jury is have developed in
harmony with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government."); HANS
& VIDMAiR, supra note 89, at 32 ("Even today, the jury is not a static institution but one which
continues the process of gradual evolution."); and id. at 43 ("[Tlhe jury is in a process of continual
evolution.").
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they would have to accept random jury selection. The only exception
would be provided by the for-cause challenge exercised by the judge.219
In contrast, I focus on the public roles that a jury performs. Under
this view, the peremptory threatens the jury on several levels: First, it
undercuts the jury's capacity to make public value decisions, particularly
in difficult cases in which a range of perspectives is required; second, it
undermines citizens' belief in the fairness of the justice system and their
willingness to accept its verdicts, particularly in emotionally charged, high-
profile cases; and third, it teaches negative lessons about citizenship, such
as the acceptability of stereotypes as the basis for the performance of a
civic duty. For the jury to be perceived as fair, I place a high value on
having a selection process that is free from discrimination, exclusion based
on stereotyping, and other indicia of unfairness. To allow any peremp-
tories is to compromise the integrity of the jury, to limit its capacity to
articulate public values, and to diminish the public's willingness to accept
its verdicts.
Admittedly, the parties may feel less comfortable with the jury, but
the parties have a right to an impartial jury,2' which the elimination of
the peremptory will not compromise. They do not, however, have a right
to a sympathetic jury of their own creation, which the peremptory currently
provides for them.
B. Why the Balance Should Shift
Why should the balance shift from a view of the jury as the protector
of parties' rights to a view of the jury as a public institution that plays a
unique role in shaping the attitudes and views of citizens toward each other
and toward their justice system? In part, this shift has already begun, as
witnessed by the Court's recent Fourteenth Amendment jury cases-Batson,
Powers, Edmonson, McCollum, and J.E.B. And in part, this shift should
continue to occur because of who can now serve on the jury and what that
service signifies for all citizens. As the Court explained in Taylor v.
Louisiana,'2 "[c]ommunities differ at different times and places. What
is a fair cross section at one time or place is not necessarily a fair cross
section at another time or a different place."' We need to continue to
acknowledge the shift, just as the Court had begun to do in 1975.
219. For a discussion of ways in which the for-cause challenge might need to be revised slightly
in a regime without peremptories, see infra subpart VI(c).
220. For these reasons, even a limitation on the number of peremptories exercised by each side
would be unacceptable. Although such a proposal would limit the extent to which peremptories may
skew the composition of the jury, it would still permit exclusion based on stereotype and deny access
to a civic function that is supposed to be available to all citizens.
221. See infra text accompanying notes 376-97.
222. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
223. Id. at 537.
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1. Who Can Now Serve on Juries.-In 1880, the Court struck down
a West Virginia law that barred African American men from serving on
juries.' Even after Strauder v. West Virginia, however, African Amer-
ican men were precluded from jury service by virtue of the peremptory.
More than eighty years after Strauder, the issue of discriminatory peremp-
tories was brought before the Court. In Swain v. Alabama,' Robert
Swain was tried and convicted of rape by an all-white male jury.' He
argued that he had a right to be tried by a jury from which African Amer-
ican men had not been systematically excluded by the prosecutor's exercise
of peremptories. The Court agreed that peremptories could not be used in
a discriminatory manner, but declined to conclude that the prosecutor had
acted in such a manner in Swain's case.' The Court fashioned a test
that would prove to be difficult for any defendant to meet: It was not
enough for the defendant to show that the prosecutor had exercised race-
based peremptories in his case; rather, he had to show that the prosecutor
had done so in a number of cases over time.' Twenty years later, the
Court returned to the issue in Batson v. Kentucky' 9 and revised the test
so that it no longer required such a "crippling burden of proof."' After
Batson, the defendant could establish that the prosecutor had used discrim-
inatory peremptories by focusing on the evidence in his case alone."
What is significant about Batson is not simply that the evidentiary burden
required by Swain was held to be too severe, but more importantly, that
the exclusion of African Americans from the jury still persisted.
The story of the exclusion of all women from the jury has much in
common with the exclusion of African American men. 32 As one com-
mentator observed, "[a]lthough jury duty has long been viewed as an
important aspect of citizenship, for most of American history, jury service
224. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
225. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
226. Id. at 203.
227. Id. at 222-26.
228. Id. at 227.
229. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
230. Id. at 92.
231. Id. at 95.
232. I am using the categories of "African American men" and "all women" as separate categories
because the law did so for purposes ofjury service. Too often, we use these categories as if all African
Americans are men and all women are white. See Crenshaw, supra note 126, at 139 n.3 ("Although
it may be true that some people mean to include Black women in either 'Blacks' or 'Women,' the
context in which the term is used actually suggests that often Black women are not considered.").
Here, however, African American women were excluded from jury service by virtue of their gender.
Once women were permitted to serve and once Batson had been decided, then African American
women could challenge their exclusion through peremptories based upon their race, but not their
gender.
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was restricted to men." 3 Women were excluded from service on
federal juries if the state in which the federal court was located excluded
women from serving on juries in state court.' The Nineteenth Amend-
ment, 5 though it conferred on women the right to vote, was silent on
the other badge of citizenship, the right to serve as a juror.' In 1946,
in Ballard v. United States," the Court, relying on its supervisory
powers, dismissed an indictment returned by a grand jury from which
women had been systematically excludedY 8 The Court recognized the
potential loss of perspectives if women were systematically excluded from
the jury.2 9  In the Civil Rights Act of 1957,'1 Congress created fed-
eral jury service qualifications independent of state jury qualifications, thus
making women eligible for federal jury service even in states that still
barred women from serving on state juries. In the 1960s, however, at ap-
proximately the same time that Swain was decided, women, though offic-
ially permitted to serve on juries, were still being excluded by means such
as affirmative registration. In Hoyt v. Florida,2" for example, the Court
rejected Gwendolyn Hoyt's Fourteenth Amendment claim that she had a
right to be tried by a jury from which women had not been systematically
excluded by virtue of affirmative registration. 2 It was not until 1975
that the Court overturned its earlier ruling and agreed that the fair-cross-
section requirement of the Sixth Amendment required that women, along
with men, be included in the jury lists from which the venire was
drawn.2 3 Until J.E.B., gender-based peremptories were available as
another means to exclude women from jury service.
233. Carol Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 59, 59-60 (1986).
234. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 60 n.2 (1961) ("From the First Judiciary Act of 1789 to the
Civil Rights Act of 1957-a period of 168 years-the inclusion or exclusion of women on federal juries
depended upon whether they were eligible for jury service under the law of the State where the federal
tribunal sat." (citations omitted)). Section 29 of the First Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that "jurors
shall have the same qualifications as are requisite for jurors by the laws of the state of which they are
citizens, to serve in the highest courts of law of such state .... " 1 Stat. 88; see Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 535-37 (1975) (recounting the history of womeifs exclusion from federal jury service).
235. The Nineteenth Amendmentprovides: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX.
236. See Brown, supra note 172, at 2182-204 (discussing cases in which some state courts took
an "emancipatory" view of suffrage, which included jury service for women, and other state courts
took an "incremental" view of suffrage, which limited women to the right to vote only).
237. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
238. Id. at 189-90.
239. Id. at 193-95.
240. Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 152, 71 Stat. 634, 638 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1861
(1988)).
241. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
242. See id. at 58 (noting that Florida required women, but not men, to register with the court
clerk to qualify for jury service).
243. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975).
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With legal impediments removed and other barriers at least revealed,
African American men and all women can serve on juries. As each history
of exclusion reveals, this right was hardly a given, and even when given,
there were still obstacles to its exercise. The point is simply that the story
of who can serve on an American jury has changed, and this change has
been fairly recent. For the first time in our history, the jury can truly
reflect our heterogeneous society. The problem is that the transformation
is still incomplete; the peremptory stands in the way. As Batson and
J.E.B. signal, both African American men and all women are still being
excluded from jury service by means of the peremptory. Although they
were excluded from jury service by law and then by other means such as
peremptories, they are not the only groups who have been the subject of
such exclusions. Peremptories have been directed against those who under-
stand Spanish,'" those with a particular religious affiliation, 5 and
those with Irish last names,' to name just a few.
2. Political Symbolism of Jury Serice.-In view of our history of
excluding groups from the jury, jury service takes on added meanings.
Jury service represents not simply acts of deliberation and judgment, but
also participation in one's governance as part of what it means to be a
citizen in a democracy. u7 One African American, a sanitation worker
named Mr. Cox, was called to serve on a jury in federal court sometime
between 1954 and 1955. He recalled it as being
one of the proudest moments of my life. Ever since I was a little kid
• . . I've had a desire to serve .... Of course, [black] people
[we]re not permitted to serve .... I've read many books on the
jury and when I was first called to serve I went to the library and
read up on the jury system and what a fine institution it is....
244. E.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363-70 (1991); see Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19
F.3d 857, 862 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that peremptories exercised against Spanish-speaking
prospectivejurors were not exercised on the basis of ethnicity); Recent Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 769
(1995) (criticizing Pemberthy).
245. See, e.g., Statev. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 768 (Minn. 1993) (permitting religion-basedper-
emptories), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994); Casarez v. State, No. 1114-93, 1994 VWL 695868,
at *22 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994) (holding that peremptories may not be exercised on the basis
of religion); see infra note 332.
246. See Ethnic Peremptories Reverse Conviction, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 28, 1994, at A10 (reporting
cases in which prosecutors impermissibly exercised peremptories when they struck prospectivejurors
with Irish-sounding names); Jury and Jurors; Peremptory Challenges-Ethnicity, MAss. LAW.
WEEKLY, Nov. 21, 1994, at 18, available in LEXIS, Mass Library, MALAWR File (affirming the
appellate court's decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the prosecution,
in exercising peremptories against jurors with Irish-sounding surnames, "failed to satisfy its burden of
demonstrating that the challenges were not based on the jurors' membership in a discrete ethnic
group").
247. See supra subpart m(D).
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When I got my summons... I got a sense of really belonging to
the American community.'
Just as voting does not simply describe the act of casting a ballot, but is
also an exercise of one's right and responsibility as a citizen, jury service
also has both practical and symbolic implications. The political symbolism
is particularly striking for those who have been denied the right for so
long, but the significance of jury service is not limited to only those who
have been denied.' 9 Those who have always been able to serve as jurors
must now share the responsibility and power and recognize as equals those
who have been previously excluded.
VI. Re-Imagining Jury Selection
A. Assumptions
What would jury selection look like without the peremptory challenge?
The answer starts with the assumption that the individual is competent to
serve if he or she meets the criteria established by statute.' This pro-
position has long been accepted in theory, but not in practice. In Thiel v.
Southern Pacific Co. , the Court explained:
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection
with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an
impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. This
does not mean, of course, that every jury must contain representa-
tives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and
geographical groups of the community; frequently such complete rep-
resentation would be impossible. But it does mean that prospective
248. Dale W. Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DuKE LJ. 19, 26.
249. Some commentators would limit Batson only to those groups that have suffered from ex-
clusion or discrimination in the past. See, e.g., Babcock, supra note 131, at 1161-62 & n.78 (sug-
gesting that Batson be extended to peremptories exercised against women); Tanya E. Coke, Note, Lady
Justice May be Blind, But Is She a Soul Sister?: Race Neutrality and the Ideal ofRepresentative Juries,
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 327, 365-68 (1994) (proposing that Batson be limited to minority jurors).
250. Current federal law establishes that an individual is "qualified to serve on grand and petit
juries in the district court unless" that individual:
(1) is not a citizen of the United States eighteen years old who has resided for a period
of one year within the judicial district;
(2) is unable to read, write, and understand the English language with a degree of pro-
ficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification form;
(3) is unable to speak the English language;
(4) is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury
service; or
(5) has a charge pending against him for the commission of, or has been convicted in a
State or Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year and his civil rights have not been restored.
28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (1988).
251. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
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jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and
intentional exclusion of any of these groups. Recognition must be
given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be found
in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather
than a group or class atter .... To disregard it is to open the
door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to
the democratic ideals of trial byjury. 2'
Although Thiel involved the deliberate and intentional exclusion of daily
laborers from the jury list by the clerk of the court and the jury commis-
sioner, rather than their exclusion from the petit jury by lawyers through
the exercise of peremptory challenges, the effect is the same: the systematic
and deliberate exclusion of jurors based upon group identity. Wage
earners, like women, Catholics, Hispanics, or the elderly,
constitute a very substantial portion of the community, a portion that
cannot be intentionally and systematically excluded in whole or in
part without doing violence to the democratic nature of the jury sys-
tem. Were we to sanction an exclusion of this nature we would en-
courage whatever desires those responsible for the selection of jury
panels may have to discriminate ....
Despite the Court's admonition almost fifty years ago that group-based ex-
clusion is not to be condoned,' such exclusion persists today with use
of the peremptory.
Today, jury selection seems to begin with the assumption that pro-
spective jurors are biased in some way or another, and it is up to the jurors
to prove themselves unbiased in order to be selected as jurors. 5 It is
252. Id. at 220 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187,
192-93 (1946) (citing Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220, with approval). In Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60 (1942), the Court noted that federal jurors could not be selected from lists designed by private or-
ganizations, no matter how benign their purposes, because such actions would compromise the
representativeness of thejury. Id. at 86. The Court identified the jury's representativeness as fund-
amental to thejury system: "[T]he proper functioning of the jury system, and, indeed, our democracy
itself, requires that thejury bea 'body truly representative of the community,' and notthe organ of any
special group or class." Id. The Court committed itself to safeguarding thejury's representativeness:
Tendencies, no matter how slight, toward the selection ofjurors by any method other than
a process which will insure a trial by a representative group are undermining processes
weakening the institution of jury trial, and should be sturdily resisted. That the motives
influencing such tendencies may be of the best must not blind us to the dangers of al-
lowing any encroachment whatsoever on this essential right. Steps innocently taken may,
one by one, lead to the irretrievable impairment of substantial liberties.
Id. Although Glasser involved the compilation ofjury lists, and not the use of peremptories, the char-
acteristics of the jury that are to be safeguarded should be applicable at either stage.
253. Miel, 328 U.S. at 223 (footnote omitted).
254. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 (1950) (plurality opinion) ("Jurymen should be
selected as individuals .... and not as members of a race.").
255. Jury selection in the OJ. Simpson case provides an extreme example of this assumption.
Prospectivejurors who received summons for jury duty had to complete a questionnairethat consisted
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also up to the lawyers to discover and disclose jurors' biases and pre-
judices. In my view, jury service should begin with the assumption that
the individual who satisfies the statutory criteria is competent to serve and
should not be excluded from jury service unless there is an individual basis
for disqualification. 6  Certainly, this is the presumption in England, 7
where jury selection is virtually random. Barristers do not question jurors
about their biases during voir dire. 8 According to a Practice Direction
issued by the Lord Chief Justice in 1973,
[a] juror should be excused if he is personally concerned in the facts
of the particular case, or closely connected with a party to the pro-
ceedings or with a prospective witness.... It is contrary to
of 294 questions. DAILY JOURNAL COURT RULES SEV., THE O.J. SIMPSON JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE
(1994). Prospectivejurors underwent intense scrutiny in order to prove themselves unbiased enough
to serve. See id. at 44, 46, 52 (asking questions such as "How important would you say religion is
in your ife?"; "Have you ever provided a urine sample to be analyzed for any purpose?"; "Do you
believe it is immoral or wrong to do an amniocentesis to determine whether a fetus has a genetic
defect?"; and "Have you ever written a letter to the editor of a newspaper or magazine?").
256. For a discussion of revised for-cause challenges under the post-peremptory-chaliengeregime,
see infra subpart VI(C).
257. England still has jury trials in criminal cases, but the number of defendants exercising their
right to a jury trial is decreasing:
[T]hejury system remains the comer-stone of the criminal trial both in England and in
the United States.... [E]ven though only a small minority of defendants in criminal
trials opt for trial by jury, the right to jury trial is still regarded as fundamental in all
cases involving major criminal charges.
BALDWIN & MCCoNVILLE, supra note 83, at 1 (footnotes omitted).
The civil jury trial in England became less prevalent after World War II, see Edson L. Haines,
The Disappearance of Civil Juries in England, Canada and Australia, 4 DEF. LJ. 118, 119 (1958)
(noting that World War H contributed to an already rapid decline in the popularity of civil jury trials),
and was abolished for all intents and purposes by the Court of Appeal in 1966, see Ward v. James, 1
Q.B. 273, 295 (1966) ("[]n personal injury cases trial by jury has given place of late to trial by judge
alone, the reason being simply this, that in these cases trial by a judge alone is more acceptable to the
great majority of people."); SIR JACK I.H. JACOB, THE FABRIc OF ENGUSH CIVIL JUSTICE 157 (1987)
(concluding that Ward v. James delivered the "final fatal blow" to civil jury trials). There is still a
statutory right to jury trial in a few types of civil cases, including actions for libel, slander, malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment, or in cases in which a charge of fraud is made against a party.
Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 69(1) (Eng.). But according to one writer, "even in these cases
the parties forgo their right and are content with a trial by judge alone." JACOB, supra, at 158. The
loss of the civil jury trial has been lamented as "a serious impairment of the fabric of English civil
justice." Id. at 159.
258. As Baldwin and McConville observed, "there is no English equivalent of the voir dire."
Baldwin & McConville, English Jury, supra note 157, at 135; see also Samuel J. Cohen, The
Regulation of Peremptory Cullenges in the United States and England, 6 B.U. INT'L LJ. 287, 306
(1988) ("English law does not permit litigants to question jurors prior to their selection." (footnote
omitted)). One reason that the British might not see a need for voir dire is that pretrial publicity is
greatly restrained under their system. This explanation, however, is adequate only for the most
notorious cases; it does not explain the typical case in which there is little press coverage. More likely,
the explanation has to do with what the British perceive as an invasion of privacy: "Many barristers
rejected the common American practice of questioning prospective jurors about their background and
attitudes, calling it not only useless but basically improper." HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 89, at 48.
Texas Law Review [Vol. 73:1041
established practice for jurors to be excused on more general grounds
such as race, religion, or political beliefs or occupation.25?
As one barrister explained,
I think if I knew what the backgrounds of the jurors were... I still
wouldn't challenge them. I don't think I would be able to handle the
American system, actually ... because I happen to take the view
that whatever one's personal prejudices, the chances are that a juror
called to jury service and knowing the weight of responsibility upon
him will do his utmost to discard prejudice.' °
As a result of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, 21 which took effect on
January 5, 1989, criminal defendants in England no longer exercise per-
emptory challenges and the Crown does not generally exercise stand-
bys, 2 except in limited circumstances. The British have abolished per-
emptories and limited standbys so that the jury will reflect more closely the
heterogeneity of British society.' But even when the British had
259. 1 All E.R. 240 (1973); see BALDWIN & McCONVILLE, supra note 83, at 98 (noting that
although jurors may be excused for cause, "the circumstances under which excusals may be granted
are circumscribed").
260. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 89, at 49 (quoting Valerie P. Hans, unpublished data (1983)).
261. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33, § 118(l) (Eng.); see Judith Heinz, Note, Peremptory
Challenges in Criminal Cases: A Comparison ofRegulation in the United States, England, and Canada,
16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 201,217 (1993).
262. 'Standing by" is a procedure by which the Crown can reserve judgment on a prospective
juror until all other prospective jurors are considered. See McEldowney, supra note 88, at 276
("Crown was not obliged to state the grounds of challenge until the whole panel was gone through.").
"In effect the practice of standing by a juror gives the Crown a far wider right of peremptory challenge
than that accorded by statute to the defendant." RJ. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 509 (6th
ed. 1985).
263. See McEldowney, supra note 88, at 282. The British have recognized the need for the jury
to reflect the growing heterogeneity of British society. See, e.g., id. ("As English society becomes
more heterogeneous, the power of selecting jurors becomes all the more crucial.").
The U.S. Supreme Court, in comparing the British and American jury systems, has explained
that the American system may have a need for peremptory challenges because our 'juries here are
drawn from a greater cross-section ofa heterogeneous society." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,218
(1965). That explanation, however, is far from persuasive, and in fact, the opposite seems more likely
to be true-we should not permit the peremptory to interfere with the heterogeneity of the jury so that
the jury more closely reflects the heterogeneous nature of our society. Moreover, if peremptory chal-
lenges can be used to cut back on the heterogeneous character of thejury, then it puts peremptory chal-
lenges on a collision course with the requirement that juries represent a fair cross section of the com-
munity.
Canada, like the United States, still permits the peremptory challenge, Heinz, supra note 261,
at 227, but like England (and unlike the United States), it does not allow for an extended voir dire that
includes questions about personal biases, id. at 206; HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 89, at 31. The use
of the peremptory and the stand-aside (the Canadian equivalent of the British standby) may explain why
aboriginal people and members of other minorities are underrepresented on Canadian juries.
ABORIGINAL JUSTICE INQUIRY OF MANITOBA, PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
AND ABORIGINAL PEOPLE 380, 384 (1991) ('Both the Crown and defence counsel have too many
opportunities, through the use of peremptory challenges and stand-asides, to make decisions on the
basis of racist or sexist stereotypes.").
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peremptories and standbys, the barristers could not question prospective
jurors about their views or attitudes and did not view it as their job to look
for and expose biases or prejudices. '
Just as federal judges are presumed to be competent to hear a case and
must recuse themselves only in a limited set of circumstances,'
prospective jurors who satisfy the statutory criteria also should be pre-
sumed eligible to serve and should be disqualified only in a limited set of
circumstances.' Federal judges are presumed to be competent to pre-
side over a case regardless of their race, gender, ethnicity, religion, or
other group characteristics, even though parties have, from time to time,
tried to use these factors as a basis for recusal.1 7 On the one hand,
federal judges receive legal training and go through a confirmation process
that attests to their qualifications and judicial temperament, which might
suggest that a comparison between judges and jurors is inappropriate. On
the other hand, although the task of putting aside one's personal feelings
is a difficult one, whether for judge or juror, it is a task that people
from all walks of life are expected to perform in their daily jobs.
B. A Range of Solutions
If peremptories are eliminated, then how should jury selection be
modified, if at all, to accommodate that change? The elimination of per-
emptories could be a catalyst for rethinking jury selection methods. For
example, we could adopt a "quota system," in which people in a com-
munity are divided according to group identification, and each group is
represented proportionally on the jury. If the community contained a cer-
tain number of Catholics, Jews, or Muslims, or Irish Americans, Native
Americans, or Asian Americans, then they would be represented propor-
tionally on the jury. Or, we could have "strictly random selection," in
which names are drawn randomly from the community, but everyone who
is selected has to serve because there would be no mechanisms, such as
264. Likewise, even when defendants were able to exercise peremptories, they were not permitted
"to questionjurors, for example, as to their occupations or political views." McEldowney, supra note
88, at 508.
265. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988); id. § 455 (1988).
266. For a discussion of a revised for-cause challenge, see nfra subpart VI(C).
267. See, e.g., Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Baker
Motley, DJ.) ("Mf background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition, sufficient grounds
for removal, no judge on this court could hear this case, or many others, by virtue of the fact that all
of them were attorneys, of a sex, often with distinguished law firm or public service backgrounds.");
Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 155, 156-57 (E.D.
Pa. 1974) (-iggenbotham, DJ.) (concluding that African American judges should not disqualify
themselves from presiding over cases involving racial issues just as white judges are not asked to
disqualify themselves on matters of race relations).
268. See supra note 159.
1995] 1103
Texas Law Review
challenges for cause or peremptories, for avoiding service. Another pos-
sibility would be a "revised for-cause," in which additional reasons for for-
cause challenges are made available, but these reasons would still have to
be articulated, as they do for all for-cause challenges, and the judge would
still remain the final arbiter.
There are at least three criteria by which we should evaluate any
method of jury selection based on the assumptions that the jury makes pub-
lic value decisions, that decisions are most likely to be accepted when the
jury is seen as fairly constituted, and that jury duty must be accessible to
citizens both because it provides a rare opportunity for direct participation
in governance and because it teaches critical lessons about democracy.'
First, jury selection should be conducted without discrimination so that no
group is intentionally excluded; second, it should be conducted in a manner
that appears to be fair and beyond manipulation; and third, the method
chosen should be a practical one.
Among the proposed solutions, the strictly random selection and the
quota system fail to satisfy all three of these criteria. The strictly random
method does not appear fair because even those jurors who are related to
the parties, who are connected to the case, or who say they cannot be
impartial, would still be required to serve. A strictly random method does
not allow any mechanism for the exclusion of jurors, including the for-
cause challenge.
The quota method fails to satisfy the "practical" criterion. '  It is
an unworkable solution on several levels. First, dividing people according
to distinctive groups is a difficult task and one that is likely to seem unfair
to, and be divisive within, the community. It would be difficult to agree
on which groups are distinctive, how many people belong to them,z' and
269. See supra Part II.
270. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 500 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]his
Court's refusal to read the fair-cross-section requirement as mandating a petit jury representing all of
the community's distinctive groups is born not of principle, but of necessity, of the recognition that no
such requirement could as a practical matter be enforced."); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-
74 (1986) ("The limited scope of the fair-cross-section requirement is a direct and inevitable
consequence of the practical impossibility of providing each criminal defendant with a truly
'representative? petit jury ... ."); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 n.6 (1986) ("[I]t would be
impossible to apply a concept of proportional representation to the petitjury .... ."); Akins v. Texas,
325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945) ("The number of our races and nationalities stands in the way of evolution
of such a conception .... ).
271. The Court has noted this problem as well: "Indeed, it would be impossible to apply a concept
of proportional representation to the petit jury in view of the heterogeneous nature of our society."
Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 n.6. Two scholars, Professors Albert W. Alschuler and Fred L. Morrison,
have noted that the Supreme Court has been reluctant to approve laws or regulations based on racial
quotas, particularly when past discrimination has not been established. See David Margolick, Idea of
Jury of Peers Is Questioned: Must a Jury Reflect the Population?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1992, at All.
Moreover, such classifications would be difficult in "a polyglot culture: Would a grand jury including
a native American and a Vietnamese satisfy the standard? How about Chinese-Americans, Filipinos,
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how to account for people who see themselves as members of several
groups. 2n Second, it would require the involvement of the state in a way
that is likely to undermine people's faith in the jury system. The state
would be placed in the untenable position of deciding how to cate-
gorize and count people, and both these processes are easily open to
disagreement and manipulation. 4  As one writer recently asked in res-
ponse to the Census Bureau's efforts to categorize his daughter: Is she, as
the product of an English father and a Chinese mother, "white" or
"Asian," and why must the government decide? She was born in the Uni-
ted States; therefore, it should suffice to call her a "citizen."' Third,
the process of categorizing people would be destructive to our notions of
or people with one black grandparent? And what if others, like homosexuals, women, Italo-Americans
or the handicapped, demand similar representation?" Id.
272. See infra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing ways in which people identify
themselves as belonging to multiple groups).
273. The difficulty the federal government has in categorizing people is already apparent when it
conducts the census. For example, one man who was listed as white on his birth certificate found
himself newly categorized as Hispanic when a Census Bureau worker observed his name, olive-toned
skin, and dark hair. Steven A. Holmes, U.S. Urged to Reflect Wider Diversity in Racial and Ethnic
Classifications, N.Y. TMES, July 8, 1994, at A18. According to one administrator at the Office of
Management and Budget, as the number of ethnic groups in the United States continues to grow, "the
current terms are less useful in expressing and depicting the diversity of our nation's population." Id.
The growing number of interracial marriages will only add to the problem of classification. Id. Nor
is the process free from political considerations; one change under consideration is to move native
Hawaiians from the Asian-Pacific Islander classification to the American Indian category so that they
can be eligible for some minority scholarships; however, changes made to satisfy one group "could
create problems for others." Id. As the assistant division chief for special population statistics at the
Census Bureau aptly summed up the problem: "This can be a can of worms." Id.
State agencies can also be faulted for the way in which they engage in racial classification. One
writer criticizes the policy by which children can be adopted only by parents who share the same race
as the child. Julie C. Lytheott-Haims, Note, Where Do Mixed Babies Belong? Racial Classification
in America and Its Implications for Transracial Adoption, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1994).
She argues that such a policy is harmful because it allows the state to decide how to classify a person
by race rather than leaving that decision up to the individual, id. at 542; the state tends to limit its clas-
sifications to certain races, failing to recognize that people may be multiracial and should not be
compelled to abandon part of their racial heritage, id. at 541; and it leaves children without parents
while the state waits to make a racial match, id. at 554-58.
274. See, e.g., New York City v. Department of Commerce, 34 F.3d 1114, 1129 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that the Secretary's decision not to adjust the 1990 census for undercounting of minorities
violates the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee unless the government can show that under-
counting is essential to achieve a legitimate governmental objective).
275. See John Derbyshire, Which Box to Check? White, Asian or None of the Above?, N.Y.
TIMs, July 17, 1994, at 16 (letter to the editor) ("Perhaps [the United States] should consider
following the example of South Africa and get out of the racial classification business altogether.").
As the federal government prepares for the year 2000 census, several issues are being debated. One
issue is whether existing racial categories should be modified, and another more fundamental issue is
whether "it is proper for the government to classify people according to arbitrary distinctions of skin
color and ancestry." Lawrence Wright, One Drop of Blood, NEW YORKER, July 25, 1994, at 46.
There are some who argue that there should be a new category called "multiracial" to reflect a
combination of heritages, id. at 47-48, while others argue that such a category would diminish all
existing categories, id. at 54-55. Still others claim that a government agency should not be in the
business of defining racial and ethnic categories at all. Id. at 55.
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the full equality of all citizens and jury service based on individual
competence and would involve the jury in teaching lessons that undermine
democratic ideals. As a related matter, such a process would necessarily
be reductionist because we are not defined only by our gender or ethnicity
or class or race, but by a multiplicity of attributes,276 and any attempt to
have a representative jury according to some factors may distort others.
And finally, a quota system may politicize the process of jury deliberations
as each juror is faced with the quandary of whether to vote as her con-
science dictates or as a member of some group she is supposed to "repre-
sent" in some undefined sense.'
One commentator has proposed a modified quota system as a way of
ensuring that minorities are represented on the jury.' However, even
276. African American women, for example, have argued that they should not have to choose
whether they are African Americans first or women first, but should be able to recognize themselves
as "multiplicitous." Angela P. Harris, Race andEssentiaism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 581, 608 (1990); see BELL HOOKS, FEMINmST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 15 (1984)
(arguing that black women have a "special vantage point" on the problems of sexism and racism
because they experience both); EuZABBTH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIsr THOUGHT 122-23 (1988) (arguing that the history of black women is not
simply the intersection of women's history and black history, but must be understood as distinct from
both); Crenshaw, supra note 126, at 139 (contrasting the "multidimensionality of Black women's
experience with the single-axis analysis that distorts these experiences" and that perpetuates "the
tendency to treat race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis"); Harris,
supra, at 601 ("Black women are not white women with color." (quoting Barbara Omolade, Black
Women and Feminism, in THE FUTURE OF D5FERENCE 247, 248 (Hester Eisenstein & Alice Jardine
eds., 1980))); Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 115,
121 (1989) (recognizing that women of color "find it difficult, if not impossible, to separate experiences
they attribute to their gender from experiences they attribute to their race, class or other char-
acteristics"). Similarly, Margaret Montoya describes the experience of having to assume a mask so
that she would fit into the dominant culture and not be exposed as an "Outsider": "I do not have
separate masks for my female-ness and Latina-ness. The construction of my public persona involves
all that I am. My public face is an adjustment to the present and a response to the past." Margaret
E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y Grefias: Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and
Legal Discourse, 15 CHICrANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 13 (1994).
Race and ethnicity are not the only characteristics that influence how one sees the world and how
one is, in turn, seen by it. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4
BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 191,213 (198911990) (faulting feminism for focusing on white heterosexual
women); Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future ofFeminist Legal
Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25, 39-40 (1990) ("[lnn addition to race, class, and sexual preference,
... age, physical characteristics..., religion, marital status, the level of male identification....
birth order, motherhood, grandmotherhood, intelligence, rural or urban existence, . .. sources of
income (self, spouse, or state), degreeofpoverty or wealth, and substance dependency ... shapehow
individual women experience the world.").
277. VAN DYKE, supra note 12, at 18 ("[A] juror selected under this [quota] system might feel
that she or he is filling some predetermined 'slot' and might attempt to give the view generally
associated with those demographic characteristics rather than the juror's personal feelings about the
case."). Ion Van Dyke identified an additional problem as well: "The jurors might find it harder to
work together as a group because they may be more conscious of their identified differences than the
much stronger common bonds that unite them as people." Id.
278. See Nancy 1. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707 (1993) (suggesting that "courts analyze
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a modified quota system would raise problems similar to those raised by
the quota system. For example, if we insist that racial minorities be
represented proportionally on every jury, then why not other groups as
well? Should not their perspectives and views be represented and con-
sidered by the jury? Moreover, a focus on race alone "would likely distort
the jury's reflection of other groups in society, characterized by age, sex,
ethnicity, religion, education level, or economic class."' By differen-
tiating among groups, the modified quota system appears to favor some
groups over others, thus undermining our view of the jury as a fairly
selected body.'
Only the revised for-cause system satisfies all three criteria. Under
such a system, jurors are still chosen by random selection, but unlike strict
random selection, there is a mechanism for excusing jurors who could not
be impartial, and thus, it would satisfy the criterion of fairness. Such a
system would also be nondiscriminatory because it eliminates peremptories.
This method would lead to more representative juries than we currently
have, but would avoid the practical difficulties of the quota method. The
revised for-cause method presents a middle ground: On the one hand, it is
not as ambitious as the quota system, which would be fully inclusive but
unworkable; on the other hand, it is not as laissez-faire as the current
system, which allows discrimination to flourish under the guise of the
peremptory. The revised for-cause system presents a middle ground in
another way-it does not guarantee any particular result as to the compo-
sition of each and every jury as does the quota method, but it does provide
a fair and open process by which jurors are selected, unlike the current
peremptory challenge method.
C. The Revised For-Cause Challenge as the Preferred Method
Without the peremptory, it seems appropriate to revise the for-cause
challenge slightly. Of course, eliminating the peremptory does not require
any adjustments to the for-cause challenge; it is simply that one change to
the system makes it likely that other slight adjustments might be needed as
well. The revision I propose does not mean expanding the for-cause chal-
lenge so much that it essentially becomes a peremptory, but it does mean
revising the for-cause challenge in at least two ways: first, by granting for-
cause challenges more often, and second, by adding an additional ground
for dismissal, which might be described as individual conduct or behavior.
which race-conscious reforms are reasonably necessary to maintain public confidencein the impartiality
of jury proceedings by considering [six circumstances]").
279. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 512 (1990) (Stevens, I., dissenting).
280. See supra subpart reI(C).
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As to the first point, federal judges are typically quite sparing in
granting a for-cause challenge because they know that peremptories are
available. Without peremptories, however, judges will have to recognize
that they might have to grant for-cause challenges more frequently than
they currently do. Even if revised for-cause challenges become a more
common occurrence, however, the essential nature of the for-cause chal-
lenge would not change: a reason must always be given; the judge must
either accept or reject the reason, and the reasons that are deemed accep-
table will still be narrowly drawn.
Jury selection without the peremptory and with the revised for-cause
challenge would proceed as follows. Names of prospective jurors would
still be randomly drawn from as many diverse lists as possible.2" The
assumption would be that all prospective jurors who meet the statutory
requirements for jury service should be permitted to serve.' Counsel
may move to strike a prospective juror for cause, but would have to give
a reason, as is the current practice, and the judge would decide based on
counsel's reason, after asking additional questions, or after conducting a
hearing.'
In the past, the Court has provided the following guidance for deter-
mining when a for-cause challenge is appropriately granted:
1. Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the
person alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose
complaint the prosecution was instituted, or to the defendant;
2. Standing in the relation of guardian or ward, attorney and
client, master and servant, or landlord and tenant, or being a member
of the family of the defendant, or of the person alleged to be injured
by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was
instituted, or in his employment on wages;
281. As I suggest later, see infra note 396, my discussion assumes that the venire is drawn from
as many diverse lists as possible so that it will bring together as broad a cross section of the community
as possible. See, e.g., Junda Woo, Arizona Panel Suggests Package of Reforms to Empower Jurors,
WALL ST. I., Oct. 25, 1994, at B5 (recognizing the need to increase the jury pool's diversity and re-
commending that the jury pool include people on welfare rolls); Frances A. McMorris, New York State
to Call Neediest for Jury Duty, WALL ST. I., Oct. 13, 1994, at BI (explaining that New York will
draw its jury pool from welfare and unemployment rolls, in addition to lists of registered voters,
licensed drivers, and state taxpayers). Obviously, if the venire is skewed, then even my proposal to
eliminate the peremptory will not make the jury as representative as it should be. There have been
relatively few recent studies on the way in which the venire is drawn, and this is an area ripe for
further study.
282. See supra notes 250-68 and accompanying text.
283. This method would be no more cumbersome than the current practice of Batson hearings,
and in fact, it should be less cumbersome because the judge would not have to make the same kind of
credibility finding that the judge now does in determining whether peremptories are being exercised for
neutral or for race- or gender-based reasons. See infra notes 288, 301, 344-49 and accompanyingtext.
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8. Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or
belief that the prisoner is guilty or not guilty of the offense
charged.3
Some statutes provide additional grounds, such as
that he has served as a juror within the preceding year.. . ; that he
is or has been engaged in carrying on a business in violation of the
law, where the defendant is indicted for a like offefise; that he has
been indicted within 12 months for a felony or an offense of the
same character as that with which the defendant is charged; that he
is a party to a suit pending in that court at that term.285
Under the "revised" for cause, these conditions would still pertain.
As to the second point, the addition that I propose is that individual
behavior or action might constitute a legitimate excuse for cause. This
may be the current practice among some federal judges, but it would need
to be put into practice in a more formal and widespread way. One's status
or other immutable characteristics, however, would never be acceptable
for-cause excuses; thus, the peremptory would not be permitted to enter
through the back door of the revised for-cause challenge.
The distinction that I want to make is one between status and conduct.
Several hypotheticals might best illustrate the revised for cause. Religion
or ethnicity could not be the basis of a for-cause challenge. For example,
a juror who is Jewish could not be eliminated for cause even though the
defendant is an Arab; nor could a juror whose family was from India even
though the defendant's family was from Pakistan. Similarly, a juror who
is a woman or a man could not be eliminated for cause even though the
case involves the crime of rape, and each side might be trying to eliminate
one gender or the other. Nor could the juror who was raised in a poor
part of town where drug use is prevalent be eliminated for cause even
though the crime involves the sale of drugs. Nor could the juror who does
not look directly in the eyes of a criminal defendant be eliminated for cause
even though the defendant says he feels uneasy about the juror. However,
a juror who is a member of the Ku Klux Klan may be eliminated for cause
in a case involving racial bias because this juror has taken an individual
action that suggests bias. This juror has joined an organization that is
committed to the superiority of the white race and to the denigration of the
African American. 6 Her bias is not assumed because of some
284. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 433 (1887).
285. ABA STANDARS, supra note 138, at 69.
286. What about an example of a woman who is a member of a feminist organization? Should
she be excluded for cause in a case involving wife battering? The first point is that feminism is not
committed to the denigration of any group, and the second point is that there is no one "feminist"
position. Feminists embrace a wide range of views, just as Republicans and Democrats do, and thus,
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immutable characteristic or unchosen status, such as religion, ethnicity, or
economic class, but is imputed to her on the ground that she made an
individual choice. Thus, she is still judged as an individual who has taken
a deliberate action.' Of course, as with the traditional for-cause chal-
lenge, any of these jurors could still be eliminated for cause if they said
that they. could not be impartial.
Although the revised for-cause gives more control to the judge, the
judge's decisions would be reviewable, just as for-cause challenges and
modified peremptories under Batson are currently reviewable. Although
one objection might be that this would burden the review process, it would
be no more burdensome than the modified peremptory, particularly now
that the modified peremptory has been expanded to include gender.
This revision of the for-cause challenge would ensure that the jurors
who serve can be impartial. Impartiality is a requisite for jurors so that the
trial can be a fair one, and one that is in compliance with the constitutional
command of the Sixth Amendment that the party be tried by an "impartial
jury." Impartial in this context does not mean without any perspective or
viewpoint, but it does mean a willingness to approach the case without
prejudging the party. By providing a little more leeway for the for-cause
challenge, we can eliminate, without reservation, the peremptory, which
serves as the last bastion of state-sanctioned discrimination in the
the decision would need to be made on a case-by-case basis. Of course, the problem with this approach
is that it requires the judge to make inquiries about the nature of the organization and the beliefs that
the member adheres to, and this seems to leave too much discretion to the judge. However, one point
to keep in mind is that this category is to be used quite sparingly-only when it becomes quite clear
that the prospectivejuror holds such extreme views that her impartiality is in question, or at the very
least, that the appearance of her impartiality is in question. A third point is that the determination
depends upon the context, much the same way that the decision aboutwhether a judge can be impartial,
though outlined by statute, depends on the particular context of a case. Just as a judge who happens
to be a woman should not recuse herself in a case involving sex discrimination, see Blank v. Sullivan
& Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), because everybody has a gender, so too a juror
should not be excused for cause in the case of wife battering simply because she belongs to a feminist
organization; further inquiry would need to be made.
287. Granted, I am willing to make a generalization about a step an individual has taken, and this
generalization may appear to be inconsistent with my earlier discussion about the need not to stereo-
type. But I think there is a difference between an inference that is based on an unchangeable charac-
teristic, such as one's race or gender, and one that is based on an individual decision to join a group
or activity. The latter indicates a deliberate, individual choice and expresses certain values or beliefs,
whereas the former reveals very little about that particular individual's actual values or beliefs. More-
over, we should minimize the instances in which it is acceptable for inferences based on stereotypes
to be the basis for excluding people from a governmental benefit such as jury duty. Although some
commentators have argued that there is no way to eliminate stereotyping because it is part of the human
condition, see, e.g., Barbara Underwood, Panelist, The Criminal Jury Selection Process, supra note
151 (discussion with author following panel), it does not follow that stereotypes should provide a legiti-
mate basis for determining access to a government function, such as jury duty. We do not allow
stereotypes to serve as a basis for voting or for other government services, such as housing, employ-
ment, or benefits; similarly, it should not be the basis for determining participation on the petit jury.
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courtroom and impedes the proper functioning of the jury in its various
roles.
1. How the Revised For-Cause Challenge Differs from the Modified
Peremptory.-The revised for-cause challenge differs from the current
modified peremptory" in at least three significant ways. First, the
revised for-cause requires that the lawyer always give reasons to explain
why the prospective juror should not be permitted to serve. 9 The law-
yer must always give reasons and the judge must always either accept or
reject those reasons and say why. Although the revised for cause always
requires such explanations, a modified peremptory regime does not. Under
the modified peremptory, a lawyer has to give a reason for the peremptory
only when opposing counsel has established a prima facie case that the
peremptory is being exercised based on an impermissible reason, such as
race or gender. When a lawyer suspects that an impermissible reason is
the basis, but is unable to establish a prima facie case, no reason need be
given. When a lawyer suspects that an impermissible reason is the basis,
but chooses not to challenge the peremptory, the discriminatory peremptory
proceeds without challenge and without a reason. When a lawyer suspects
that a juror is being struck for a discriminatory reason other than race or
gender and challenges the exercise of the peremptory, the lawyer exercising
the discriminatory peremptory will not have to give reasons.
Second, and as a related matter, a revised for-cause system requires
that the judge always pass judgment on the reason proffered by the lawyer
seeking to challenge a prospective juror. The reason is either accepted or
rejected by the judge, and the judge must explain. In contrast, under a
288. The Court created the so-called "modified peremptory" in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986). See infra note 320 and accompanying text. Batson permits a prosecutor to exercise peremp-
tories without any explanation except when defendant's counsel can establish a prima facie case that
the prosecutor used the peremptory based on race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. To establish this,
defendant's counsel has to show the following: defendant was a member of a cognizable racial group;
the prosecutorhad exercised peremptories to remove from the venire members of defendant's race; per-
emptories permit discrimination by those "who are of a mind to discriminate," and these and other cir-
cumstances raise an inference of discrimination. Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559,
562 (1953)). After defendanthas made a prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the prosecution
to come forward with a race-neutral reason for its peremptory challenges. Id. at 97. The trial judge
then determines if the prosecutions reason is race-neutral; if it is, then the peremptory is permitted.
Id. at 98. In Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), the Court held this procedure to be
applicable to the criminal defendant as well as to the prosecutor. Id. at 2359.
289. See supra note 131. Although some argue that it is less offensive to allow such reasons to
remain unspoken, see, e.g., Babcock, supra note 12, at 553-54 ("The peremptory, made without giving
any reason, avoids trafficking in the core of truth in most common stereotypes.... [I]t allows the
covert expression of what we dare not say but know is true more often than not."); Batson, 476 U.S.
at 121 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (citing this view with approval). But see Babcock, Women and Jury
Service, supra note 131, at 1146-47 (re-examining and rejecting her earlier view). I believe that if
lawyers are permitted to act on stereotypes but do not have to admit them, much damage is done
because there is no mechanism for challenging and correcting these ideas.
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modified peremptory scheme, there are several scenarios in which a judge
can decline to pass judgment on whether the peremptory is discriminatory.
One situation is if he decides that the lawyer challenging the peremptory
has failed to meet the threshold of a prima facie case. Another is if the
judge decides that the reason put forth by the lawyer is ostensibly race- or
gender-neutral (such as, "the prospective juror lives in a bad neighbor-
hood"), the judge need look no further to see if the lawyer's reason is truly
non-pretextual (such as "does the neighborhood consist only of African
Americans?"). Also, a judge need not consider whether the peremptory is
discriminatory on some basis other than race or gender; at the moment,
that is all the Court has said that a judge must consider.2' Finally, a
judge need not consider sua sponte whether the peremptory is discrimi-
natory if opposing counsel has declined to challenge the peremptory.29'
Third, a system of revised for-cause challenges operates under a dif-
ferent presumption than a system of modified peremptories. Under a sys-
tem of revised for-cause challenges, all prospective jurors are presumed
eligible to serve unless they meet a limited number of enumerated excep-
tions.' In contrast, under a modified peremptory regime, prospective
jurors can be struck for any reason as long as the reason is not based on
race or gender. Thus, there is a shift in presumptions between the two
systems. The presumption under the revised for-cause system is that any
prospective juror can serve, except in a limited number of circumstances;
the presumption under the modified peremptory system is that any prospec-
tive juror can be struck, except for reasons of race or gender.
2. Revised For-Cause Challenge Is Not Without Its Shortcomings.-
The revised for-cause challenge is not without its limitations, though some
of these might prove unfounded once the system were put in place. One
problem may be that this system fails to constrain ajudge's biases. Having
only a for-cause system may mean that a judge's biases go unchecked; law-
yers would no longer have peremptories to compensate for a judge's bias
in deciding whether to grant a for-cause challenge. Having a revised for-
cause system may exacerbate this problem by increasing the categories (but
only by one) for which the judge is permitted to consider a for-cause
290. Once the Court extended Batson to gender in J.E.B., Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia, urged the Court to consider whether other classifications receiving intermediate scrutiny under
equal protection analysis, such as religious affiliation, would also be subject to Batson: "Once the scope
of the logic in J.E.B. is honestly acknowledged, it cannot be glibly asserted that the decision has no
implications for peremptory strikes based on classifications other than sex, or that it does not imply
further restrictions on the exercise of the peremptory strike outside the context of race and sex." Davis
v. Minnesota, 62 U.S.L.W. 3771, 3772 (May 24, 1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). The Court, however, declined to take such action. Id.
291. But see infra note 341.
292. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
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challenge. A response to this concern is that judges must give their
reasons for granting the revised for-cause challenge, and that the judges'
reasons are subject to public scrutiny, as well as to appellate review.
Another problem with the revised for-cause challenge may be that the
proposed ground for dismissal does not truly capture what is decisive for
people about how they see the world. It may be that the groups people
join voluntarily, such as the Jaycees or the 4-H Club, do not reflect their
world views, and thus basing a for-cause challenge on such individual ac-
tions may not be legitimate. One answer to this problem is to recognize
that the revised for-cause challenge is a compromise; it is an effort to allow
as many people as possible to serve on the jury without seating someone
who has actually prejudged the case. The revised for-cause challenge as-
sumes that an individual's action is a better proxy for that person's strongly
held beliefs (which might interfere with their ability to serve impartially)
than any other proxy available.2'e
3. Revised For-Cause Challenge Will Foster Public Dialogue.--In
spite of the limitations of the revised for-cause challenge, its chief virtues
are that it creates a public process and structures a public dialogue about
jury selection, and these benefits are consistent with the view of a jury as
a public institution. The revised for-cause system creates an open, public
process for selecting a jury: It requires that lawyers give reasons for a for-
cause challenge, that the reasons be given in public, that the judge either
reject or accept the reasons and explain why, and that the judge's reasons
be subject to public and appellate review. Secrecy is a large part of the
problem with the peremptory. Secrecy allows stereotypes to flourish, and
the stereotypes inflict a serious harm-they serve as the basis for exclusion
from a civic duty. As long as secrecy prevails, there is no means for ex-
posing and challenging these stereotypes and broadening the base of those
who can serve on a jury.
The revised for-cause system also establishes a public dialogue each
and every time a prospective juror is about to be excluded from jury ser-
vice. The system creates an ongoing public dialogue, by which lawyers
and judges can negotiate the contours of the for-cause challenge. Whether
293. There is a need to rely on such a proxy when the person has not admitted that he or she can-
not be impartial. With such an admission, of course, there would be no reason to rely on a proxy.
At this point, I do not have any empirical work to back up my claim that individual action is a good
proxy for strongly held beliefs. I am not the first to lament the lack of empirical studies on the
workings of the jury. See, e.g., Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research
Tells Us AboutDecisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDicr: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSrEM 137,
167 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (describing methods available for empirical research and arguing that
"systematic empirical research is needed ifpolicymakers are to draw sound conclusions aboutproposals
for modifying the civil jury system"); Letter from Neil Vidmar, Professor of Social Science and Law,
Duke University School of Law, to Nancy Marder, Assistant Professor, University of Southern
California Law Center 2, 3 (Nov. 16, 1994) (on file with author).
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individual action will ultimately prove to be a viable category in the revised
for-cause system is less important than establishing a public dialogue by
which that decision is reached. Whatever the precise contours of the re-
vised for-cause challenge that may be settled upon, the goal should be to
make jury service accessible to as much of the citizenry as possible and to
move toward the British view that almost all who are summoned can
serve.
2M
VII. A Legal Basis for the Elimination of the Peremptory
Batson and J.E.B. provide a legal basis for prohibiting peremptories
exercised on the basis of race and gender respectively; they do not, how-
ever, provide a legal prescription for the wholesale elimination of the
peremptory.' 5  It is true that the Equal Protection Clause framework
adopted in these cases will allow each new group that is subject to dis-
criminatory peremptories to come forward and make its claim, but such a
process is destined to be a slow one and will come at a cost to the jury.
As long as discriminatory peremptories are permitted against any group,
the jury's roles in reflecting public values and reaching accurate verdicts
will be impeded, the fairness of the jury will be open to question, and the
lessons the jury teaches will be ones that undermine, rather than under-
score, messages of equality and fairness.
A. Current Legal Approach to Peremptory Challenges
In Batson v. Kentucky,29 the Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmentel prohibited a prosecutor from
using peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of
race.29 Batson establishes that the defendant could raise such a claim by
showing that in his case the prosecutor used peremptories to exclude mem-
bers of defendant's race.2' No longer would a defendant have to look
to prosecutorial practice over an extended period of time as the Court had
suggested in Swain v. Alabama.' Rather, based on the way in which
the prosecutor exercised peremptories in the defendant's case only, a defen-
dant could attempt to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimi-
nation in jury selection.?' After the defendant has made a prima facie
294. See supra notes 256-64 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 212.
296. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
297. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that no state shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
298. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 97-98.
299. Id. at 96.
300. 380 U.S. 202,223-24(1965).
301. See supra note 288 for the elements the defendant must establish under Batson.
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showing, the burden then shifts to the State to come forward with a race-
neutral explanation for its peremptory challenges. The task is then left to
the trial judge to determine if the State's reason is race-neutral; if it is, then
the peremptory is permitted. The Batson progeny have simply built upon
this framework. Powers v. Ohio' establishes that white defendants can
challenge a prosecutor's use of a race-based peremptory; Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co.' makes clear that a private litigant in a civil suit
cannot use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of their
race,' and Georgia v. McCollunr 5 holds that defendants are bound
by the same rules as prosecutors with respect to race-based peremp-
tories.? Most recently, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.' extends
Batson to gender-based peremptories. 0
1. The Strengths of Batson and the Fourteenth Amendment.-The
vision that animates Batson and its progeny is one that is consonant with
a view of the jury as a public institution. In Batson, the Court recognized
the harms that race-based peremptories could cause, not only to the de-
fendant, but also to the excluded juror and the community at large.'
The Court explained that purposeful race discrimination in the selection of
the petit jury violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it
denies him or her the right to a jury that is indifferently chosen and is free
from governmental control."' 0 However, the harm caused by race-based
peremptories is not limited to the accused, but also encompasses the
excluded juror who has been singled out and told, in effect, that he or she
cannot be an impartial juror by virtue of race. Finally, the discriminatory
peremptory harms the community at large because the purposeful exclusion
302. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
303. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
304. Id. at 616.
305. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
306. Id. at 2359.
307. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
308. Id. at 1421, 1429-30. I do not include Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991)
(holding that the exercise of a peremptory against Spanish-speakingprospectivejurors who were unsure
whether they would abide by the interpreter's version of court proceedings did not violate Batson),
because in Hernandez the Court relied heavily on the prospective jurors' hesitation, id. at 356, 360,
362, and thus the case was more fact-specific and limited in its reach.
309. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. The Court laid the groundwork for this approach in Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493 (1972), in which it recognized that the harm from the systematic exclusion of African
Americans from the grand and petit juries extended beyond the harm to the defendant and included
harm to the excluded jurors and to other defendants as well. Id. at 499-500; see Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) ("The injury [caused by systematically excluding women from the
venire] is not limited to the defendant-there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution,
to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.").
310. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
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of "black persons from juries undermine[s] public confidence in the fair-
ness of our system of justice."31
The multiple public harms that the Court identified in Batson were
also present in Powers. In Powers, a white defendant challenged the
prosecution's removal of African American jurors through the exercise of
its peremptory challenges. The Court reiterated that a defendant has "the
right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected by nondiscrimina-
tory criteria."3 To allow anything less would be to invite "cynicism
respecting the jury's neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law.'313
As the Court explained, nondiscriminatory jury selection is essential;
without such a practice, stigma attaches to those who are excluded for
discriminatory reasons; we lose the opportunity to educate the citizenry
through jury service; 5 and the institution of the jury suffers because
both the defendant and the community may no longer believe that the trial
process is fair.3"6 The difficulty in Powers was that the Court had to
establish that Powers, a white man, had standing to challenge the prose-
cution's exclusion of African Americans from his petit jury. The Court
held that the defendant had third-party standing because the defendant
suffered a cognizable injury, because the defendant shared with the ex-
cluded juror an interest in eliminating race discrimination from the court-
room, and because the excluded juror, as a practical matter, was unlikely
to be able to pursue the claim on his own.317
Gender-based peremptories cause the same types of harms as race-
based peremptories. Just as the exclusion of jurors based on race adversely
affects the way in which the jury is perceived by the larger community, so
too the exclusion of jurors based on gender compromises the integrity of
the jury as an institution." 8  Similarly, the use of gender-based
311. Id.
312. Powers, 499 U.S. at 404.
313. Id. at 412.
314. The Powers Court acknowledged a lesson learned over a century ago:
The very fact that [members of a particular race] are singled out and expressly denied...
all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color,
though they are citizens, and may be in other respects flly qualified, is practically a
brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to
that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal
justice which the law aims to secure to all others.
Id. at 408 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)).
315. See id. at 406 ("The opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of
justice has long been recognized as one of the principal justifications for retaining the jury system.').
316. The wrongful exclusion of a juror, "often apparent to the entirejury panel, casts doubt over
the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial of
the cause." Id. at 412.
317. Id. at 413-14.
318. J.E.B. v. Alabama t= rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1427 (1994).
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peremptories harms the individuals who are excluded as well as the
litigants who may begin to suspect that the entire proceedings are marked
by the same prejudice manifested during jury selection. 19 From Batson
to Powers to J.E.B., the Court has expressed concern about the harms
caused not only to the parties, but also to the excluded jurors and the
community. These concerns have to do with how jurors and the
community will perceive the jury if jury selection is marred by
discrimination. The jury, as depicted by this line of cases, becomes an
institution owned by the public, and the peremptory is the vehicle by which
prospective jurors are introduced to that institution.
2. The Limitations of Batson and the Fourteenth Amendment.-The
problem with Batson, and its progeny, is not its vision of the jury, but the
limit of its reach. Batson reflects a compromise. The Court tried to
reconcile competing concerns; it wanted both to preserve the peremptory
challenge and to stamp out race as a basis for jury selection by the govern-
ment. The compromise it devised was what became known as a "modified
peremptory. " " According to the compromise, the prosecution would
have to give a reason for its peremptory challenge only if the defendant had
made a prima facie showing that the peremptory had been exercised in a
racially discriminatory manner. The fact that the prosecution had to
explain its peremptory meant that it was, in effect, no longer a peremptory
because a peremptory is a challenge for which no explanation is re-
quired.32' The Court in Batson attempted to strike a balance that main-
tained the peremptory except for a narrowly drawn category of peremp-
tories for which there had been a prima facie showing of racial discrimi-
nation.
The broader question that Batson, and more recently J.E.B., avoids
is how far the concept of discrimination should reach during jury selection.
Should discriminatory peremptories be permitted against any group other
than those based on race and gender? And implicitly, which "groups"
should qualify as groups? The Batson Court did not confront these
319. Id.
320. Babcock, Women and Jury Service, supra note 131, at 1179; Undervod, supra note 182,
at 761. The Batson Court appeared to take seriously Justice Goldberg's advice to devise "practical
accommodations" to preserve the peremptory and yet to protect racial minorities from exclusion from
thejury. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 246 (1965) (Goldberg, I., dissenting).
321. Babcock, supra note 12, at 550 ("Peremptory challenges-totally unlike the narrowness of
those for cause--are exercised 'without a reason stated, without inquiry, without being subject to the
court's control. ' " (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 220)); McEldowney, supra note 88, at 274 ("A per-
emptory challenge was one where no cause need be shown.'); Underwood, supra note 182, at 762




questions,3' nor did the J.E.B. Court. Batson and its progeny decide
only that race cannot be a basis for the exercise of peremptory challenges
because of the harm to the litigants, the excluded juror, and the community
at large. In J.E.B., the Court merely added gender to the list; it did not
choose to consider whether there is any principled stopping point when
nondiscriminatory jury selection is.the goal.'
Discriminatory peremptories directed against other groups, however,
would also result in harm to the litigants, the community, and the excluded
juror. The fears that the Court voiced about discrimination during jury
selection are fears that are not limited to discrimination against any one
group. The use of discriminatory peremptories, which necessarily takes
place in open court, is an "overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury
panel" and "casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and
indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial of the cause. " '
The verdict "will not be accepted or understood" by the litigants or com-
munity "if the jury is chosen by unlawful means at the outset.'- The
venireperson who is excluded because that person is African American or
wears a yarmulke or walks with a cane nevertheless "suffers a profound
personal humiliation heightened by its public character" and "may lose
confidence in the court and its verdicts.-326 The Court, which noted that
to condone race discrimination injury selection is to "condone the arbitrary
exclusion of citizens from the duty, honor, and privilege of jury ser-
vice,"" should be no less willing to protect other groups, whether based
on ethnicity, religion, or age, from discrimination as well. The Court
should be unwilling to do any less because nondiscriminatory jury selection
is a "measure of the judicial system's own commitment to the commands
of the Constitution."'2
Equal protection analysis often raises a line-drawing problem. Some
commentators are prepared to say that gender discrimination, like race
322. But see Batson, 476 U.S. at 124 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("But if conventional equal
protection principles apply, then presumably defendants could object to exclusions on the basis of not
only race, but also sex, age, religious or political affiliation, number of children, living arrangements,
and employment in a particular industry, or profession." (citations omitted) (footnote omitted)).
323. One commentator has recognized:
[1I]frace-basedperemptories are impermissible, so should begender-basedones. Andwhy
draw the line at gender? While sexual orientation and age do not receive special scrutiny
under equal protection doctrine, thus the argument goes, our system should be no more
tolerant of discrimination based on those characteristics than discrimination based on race
or gender in jury selection.
Deborah L. Forman, WhatDifference Does It Make? Gender and Juiy Selection, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S
L.L 35, 65 (1992) (footnote omitted).
324. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991).
325. Id. at 413.
326. Id. at 413-14.
327. Id. at 415.
328. Id. at 416.
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discrimination, should not be permitted as part of jury selection, but they
are unprepared to go further and protect other groups from discrimination
as well. Rationales for such an approach have varied from "the unequal
treatment or political powerlessness suffered by minorities and fe-
males"119 to "their reinvocation of a shared history of exclusion from
political participation."3" Admittedly, African American men and all
women have had a history of exclusion from the jury," and discrimi-
nation based on race and gender has been particularly pronounced in ways
that other groups may not have experienced. However, although undoing
the effects of discrimination directed against African Americans and women
during jury selection is necessary, it is not sufficient. The modified
peremptory created by Batson does not address the harms to jurors and the
community when groups beyond those defined by race and gender are the
subject of discrimination during jury selection.
Thus, the Court's equal protection approach is too limited in several
respects. First, if the goal is nondiscriminatory jury selection, then the
approach fails insofar as it allows discrimination to continue against groups
whose protection the Court has not yet secured332 (even though some of
these groups might ultimately receive such protection because they have
been recognized as eligible in other contexts).333 Although this approach
329. S. Alexandria Jo, Comment, Reconstruction of the Peremptory Challenge System: A Look at
Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 22 PAC. LJ. 1305, 1329 (1991).
330. Note, BeyondBatson:Eliminating Gender-BasedPeremptory Challenges, 105 HARV. L. Rsv.
1920, 1935 (1992).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 224-46.
332. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (declining to extend Batson
to peremptory strikes based on religious affiliation), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994); see also
Recent Cases, 107 HARV. L. Rnv. 1164, 1166 (1994) (contending that courts, in considering religion-
based peremptories, should look to jurors' rights under the First Amendments Free Exercise Clause);
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Rule Repeat Offenders Can't Challenge 'Career-Criminal"Sentences, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 24, 1994, at A15 (noting that Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented from the Court's denial
of certiorari in Davis by arguing that the case should have been reconsidered in light of J.E.B.). But
see Casarez v. State, No. 1114-93, 1995 WL 695868, at *22 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994)
(holding that peremptories may not be exercised based on religion).
Since J.E.B., at least one lower court has had the opportunity to consider peremptories exercised
on the basis of ethnicity and has held that such peremptories are impermissible. See supra note 246.
333. In other contexts, the Court has accorded strict or intermediate scrutiny to classifications
based on race, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967), gender, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), ethnicity, e.g., Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948), illegitimacy, e.g., Clarkv. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988), and alienage,
e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). However, other groups that represent vul-
nerable populations have not been given the same protection. These include groups based on age, see,
e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976) (per curiam) (holding
that old age does not constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal protection), sexual orientation, see,
e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, I., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (urging the Court to consider whether state action against homosexuals should
be subject to strict or heightened scrutiny), and disabilities, see, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (refusing to regard mentally retarded persons as a quasi-
suspect class).
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to equal protection is acceptable in other contexts, in the context of the jury
it inflicts ongoing harms that go to the heart of our justice system. As the
Court explained in Powers, discriminatory jury selection, which occurs in
full view of the public,3 '" "casts doubt"33 upon the legitimacy of the
rest of the trial proceedings and may raise questions about the verdict
itself. Both the parties and the community may not accept or understand
the verdict if the jury is chosen by illegitimate means.336 By allowing
discrimination against some groups to persist in the selection of jurors, we
put at risk the integrity of the judicial system.
Second, there is little gained by requiring each group to come forward
and ask the question: Should discrimination be permitted against us in the
context of jury selection? If we truly aspire to nondiscrimination in jury
selection, then the answer ought to be a resounding "no" in every case.
Why do we require the question to be asked? Moreover, the way it is
asked makes race discrimination the benchmark against which all other dis-
crimination must be measured. In J.E.B., the Court considered the prose-
cution's argument that past discrimination based on gender had not been as
virulent as past discrimination based on race.337 The Court, after al-
luding to women's long history of discrimination in this country, declared
that it need not decide that question because African Americans and women
have a shared history of exclusion when it comes to jury service in this
country.338 But why should that comparison be required? Why require
those who are disabled or who are homosexual339 to argue that their treat-
ment has been worse than another group's and that their history shows
greater persecution than another's? By statute, jury service is available to
all citizens who are competent to serve; one group should not be required
to show that its mistreatment in the past equals or surpasses another
group's in order to avoid discriminatory peremptories in the present.
Third, the equal protection framework, as applied in Batson, both
demands too much and too little: it demands too much of groups by re-
quiring them to appear, one at a time, and to ask whether discrimination
334. See supra text accompanying notes 133-43.
335. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991).
336. See, e.g., Nathaniel R. Jones, Introduction to Colloquy, supra note 70, at 195, 196 ("When
[the legal] system breaks down and no redress is afforded, the likely result is an unleashing of collective
rage.... Simply put, this is what occurred in Los Angeles."); Alschuler, supra note 92, at 195-96
(recounting the 1980 Miami riots resulting from an all-white jury's acquittal of four white police
officers accused of beating an African American to death).
337. I.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994).
338. Id.
339. I realize that these groups have not yet been accorded full protection under the Equal
Protection Clause, see supra note 333, but it is unclear to me why discrimination during jury selection
against such groups would be any less harmful than discrimination against groups that are already
recognized under the Equal Protection Clause.
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against them should be permitted, and it demands too little of parties
insofar as they can pursue discriminatory behavior if they so choose.
Under current law, one party must object to the other party's peremptory.
If, however, both sides decide that they would prefer the exclusion of the
juror even if it is based on an impermissible challenge, then the discrimi-
nation goes unchecked.' One possibility is that the judge might step in
sua sponte,Ml but Batson does not explicitly provide for such interven-
tion. Thus, the judge, potential jurors, and the public may witness the
exercise of a discriminatory peremptory, or a plethora of them, but if both
sides have decided to close their eyes to the discrimination for whatever
reasons, it is allowed to persist. Discrimination that occurs because one
side chooses to engage in it and the other chooses not to object to it
compromises the integrity of the court proceeding:
[T]he injury caused by the discrimination is made more severe be-
cause the government permits it to occur within the courthouse itself.
Few places are a more real expression of the constitutional authority
of the government than a courtroom, where the law itself unfolds.
Within the courtroom, the government invokes its laws to determine
the rights of those who stand before it. In full view of the public,
litigants press their cases, witnesses give testimony, juries render
verdicts, and judges act with the utmost care to ensure that justice is
done." 2
Although the Court in Edmonson was confined to a discussion of race dis-
crimination, it seems fair to say that any discrimination "within the court-
340. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the Court recognized that in some cases, "the
prosecution agreed with the defense to remove Negroes." Id. at 224-25. Justice Goldberg provides
another, though perhaps extreme, exampleofthe kind ofcollusion permitted by prosecutor and defense.
Id. at 234-35 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Justice Goldberg recounted the testimony of the state
prosecuting attorney, who said:
Many times I have asked, Mr. Love for instance, I would say there are so many colored
men on this jury venire, do you want to use any of them, and he would say, my client
doesn't want them, or we don't see fit to use them. And then if I didn't see fit to use
them, then we would take them off. We would strike them first, or take them off.
If I am trying a case for the State, I will ask them what is their wish, do they want
them [Negro jurors], and they will as a rule discuss it with their client, and then they will
say, we don't want them. If we are not going to want them, if he doesn't want them, and
if I don't want them, what we do then is just take them off. Strike them first.
Id. at 234.
341. A Maryland appellate court recently upheld a trial judge's decision to consider sua sponte
whether peremptories had been exercised in a discriminatory manner against eight white prospective
jurors. Brogdenv. State, 649 A.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994). It concluded: 'A
trial judge need not sit idly by when he or she observes what he perceives to be racial discrimination
in the exercise of peremptory challenges. He is clearly entitled to intervene.' Id. at 1200.
342. Edmonsonv. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991).
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room raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings con-
ducted there. "I
Fourth, the equal protection framework as sketched out in Batson has
been implemented by lower courts in erratic ways. The Batson Court was
careful to leave implementation to the trial courts, but it offered them little
guidance.' Among the advantages to this approach are that trial judges
can develop procedures that are appropriate to the situation, and that they
are usually in the best position to know which procedures are feasible.
Among the disadvantages, however, are that procedures may vary from
court to court and trial judges differ considerably in their views as to what
constitutes a race-neutral reason. Predictability and consistency are there-
fore sacrificed. One judge may interpret a reason to be race-neutral that
another may interpret to be racially discriminatory.'
Fifth, and related to Batson's implementation, is that over time parties
learn which reasons are acceptable and which are not and simply adjust
their reasons accordingly, without necessarily abandoning the underlying
stereotypes that might actually motivate the peremptory.' Before
Batson, prosecutors did not have to give reasons for any of their peremp-
tories, but their reasons, which were racially explicit, became known
through other channels. For example, manuals and newspaper accounts re-
vealed that some prosecutors were taught to use their peremptories based
on race.4 7 With Batson, prosecutors learned to avoid explicitly race-
based reasons and began giving other reasons that might also be based on
343. Id.
344. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24 (explaining that because of the different jury selection
procedures followed by lower courts, "we make no attempt to instruct those courts how best to
implement our holding today").
345. Compare United States v. Alvarado, 951 F.2d 22, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a per-
emptory exercised against a minority juror with children the same age as the defendant was non-
discriminatory) with Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 973 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a peremptory
exercised against a minority juror with children the same age as the defendant was pretextual in light
of Batson, particularly when white jurors with children of the same age were permitted to serve).
346. According to one attorney:
Judges have to take a closer look at these challenges and make prosecutors and other
attorneys give real reasons for excluding Blacks. Once you start getting the same
explanations over and over and you start seeing a pattern of exclusion, then judges have
to invoke Batson and deny these strikes.
Charles Whitaker, Is There a Conspiracy to Keep Blacks Off Juries?, EBONY, Sept. 1992, at 54, 58
(quoting Dennis Sweet, a Mississippi attorney).
347. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 104 & n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that a pro-
secutor's office manual used in Dallas County, Texas, instructs prosecutors to use peremptories to
eliminate members of minority groups from juries); Memorandum from Justice Marshall to the Con-
ference (Mar. 24, 1986) (located in the Justice Marshall Papers at the Library of Congress) (copy on
file with author) (sharing with the Court articles from Dallas newspapers that revealed that prosecutors
used their peremptories to exclude African Americans and other minorities because of a stereotypical
view that they would be more sympathetic to the defense).
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race, but were far more ambiguous.' Judges began to accept those
reasons as race-neutral because that was the only test; it often seemed not
to matter how irrational those reasons appeared to be.4 9
The same transformation is likely to occur with gender-based peremp-
tories as well; the reasons given for the exercise of a peremptory might
change, but the underlying stereotypes may not. Whereas until J.E.B. par-
ties were willing to admit to using gender stereotypes as the basis for their
peremptories,3" after J.E.B. parties will know that gender is an unaccep-
table reason and that another reason must be found. Lawyers will soon
learn from their experience which reasons are successful at evading further
court review.
Finally, the way in which Batson has been put into practice has al-
lowed race-based, and will now allow gender-based, peremptories to con-
tinue. As described above, judges may vary in their view about what con-
stitutes a discriminatory reason. An even more harmful effect may be that
by requiring parties to give reasons in order to eliminate race- and gender-
based peremptories, we, as a society, may believe that we are eliminating
race- and gender-based discrimination from the jury selection process,
when all that we are doing is limiting the form that the dialogue about
discrimination must take. After we require the party to give a reason, and
the reason meets an individual judge's criteria for neutrality, then we
348. See Toobin, supra note 161, at 42-43 ("[ilt didn't take a genius to recognizethat a prosecutor
could come up with any number of pretexts for camouflaging the selection of jurors on the basis of
race.").
349. One reason that is often given by prosecutors to exclude African Americans from the jury
is that the prospective juror and the defendant live near each other. That reasoning, according to
attorneys, "defies all logic," 'Whitaker, supra note 346, at 58, and is likely a subterfuge simply to
remove minorities from the jury. As one lawyer reasoned:
Who is going to be more concerned about crime in a given area than someonewho's from
the same neighborhood .... If the person is guilty, I would want him prosecuted and
off the streets where I live. If he's innocent, I'd want to see the right person found, so
the reasoning just doesnt make sense.
Id.; see ABRAMSON, supra note 83, at 136 (recounting an example of a judge who accepted a pro-
secutor's strike of the only African American on the jury panel because she reminded the prosecutor
of the defendant's mother); Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection:
Denying That Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 514, 594-96 (providing examples of when "the
so-called acceptable race-neutral explanations approach the absurd").
350. For example, in one case in which the defendant was charged with incest and sexual battery,
his defense attorney attempted to strike all female prospectivejurors. The attorney explained, quite
candidly, that he was doing so because he wanted an all-male jury, which he believed would be more
sympathetic to his client's case. State v. Turner, 879 S.W.2d 819, 820 (Tenn. 1994). In another case,
the prosecutor, when asked to explain why he had exercised his peremptory against one woman,
responded: "Because she was a single female and my concern, frankly, is that she, like the other
[female] juror I struck, is single and given defendant's good looks would be attracted to the defendant."
United States v. Omoruyi, 7 F.3d 880, 881 (9th Cir. 1993). In another pre-J.E.B trial, theprosecutor,
when asked to explain his 15 peremptories exercised against women, said that he thought that the
women would feel sympathy for the defendant's mother. People v. Blackwell, No. 73240, 1995 WL
19281, at *5 (M11. Jan. 19, 1995).
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permit ourselves to believe that discrimination has been eliminated from the
process. If the reason is not explicitly based on race or gender, the party
will have satisfied its burden, and that will be the end of the discussion
even though the reason may have a disproportionate effect on a particular
race or gender. Discrimination may still serve as the underlying basis for
the exercise of the peremptory, but the discussion may never reach that
level. A trial court may, but need not, look below the surface of any
reason given 5.3 1 As a result, we believe that we have "solved" the prob-
lem of race and gender discrimination during jury selection even though all
we have done is to limit the way in which it can be discussed. The irony
is that while gender was added to race as another group to be protected
from discrimination during jury selection, all that may have happened is
that we have simply limited the ways we will talk about gender discrimi-
nation during jury selection.
Although the Court's extension of Batson and the equal protection
framework to gender was logical and necessary, it was also inadequate.
The Batson Court tried to reconcile our commitment to nondiscrimination
during jury selection with our tradition of the peremptory challenge.
Batson was a compromise, and its limitations are highlighted by the ad-
dition of gender to the list of forbidden peremptories. Batson permits
discrimination to persist-it permits discrimination against other groups not
singled out for court protection and pits one persecuted group against
another; it permits discrimination if both parties agree to overlook the
discrimination; and it permits discrimination because trial judges are free
to fashion their own criteria as to neutral reasons, and parties may adjust
their reasons to satisfy those criteria. If the Court is truly committed to
nondiscrimination in jury selection,352 as it claims in Powers, then it
needs to eliminate the peremptory, which can serve as a mask for discrimi-
nation. In order to eliminate the peremptory entirely, the Court should
reconsider the Sixth Amendment.
351. The only guidance that the Batson Court gave was to say that while the "prosecutor's
explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause," it would not be
sufficient for the prosecutor to rebut the defendant's prima facie case by "stating merely that he chal-
lengedjurors of the defendant's race on the assumption-orhis intuitive judgment-that they would be
partial to the defendant because of their shared race" or by "denying that he had a discriminatory
motive or 'affirmrmg] [his] good faith in making individual selections.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 98
(quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
352. Of course, the Court is not the only institution that is able to end discriminatory perenptories;
Congress is also free to act. In this Article, however, I have developed arguments that I think are best
directed to federal courts. I leave for another day arguments that Congress is likely to find persuasive.
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B. The Intersection of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
Batson and Holland v. Illinois353 mark turning points in the Court's
thinking about the appropriate legal rubric under which challenges to
discriminatory peremptories should be made. Batson was argued primarily
as a Sixth Amendment case, but was decided by the Court on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds. The question presented in the petition for writ of
certiorari was whether petitioner had been tried "in violation of constitu-
tional provisions guaranteeing the defendant an impartial jury and a jury
composed of persons representing a fair cross section of the commu-
nity."354  At the beginning of oral argument, petitioner was asked
whether his claim was "based solely on the Sixth Amendment," and he re-
sponded "Yes."3 55
The Court, however, decided Batson on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds. The Justices did not explain this preference for the Fourteenth
Amendment over the Sixth Amendment, 356 except to say that "resolution
of petitioner's claim properly turns on application of equal protection
principles."357 One possible explanation is that they thought the Four-
teenth Amendment would provide a more contained approach, whereas the
Sixth Amendment might prove to be a Pandora's Box3 58 They did, how-
ever, explicitly leave open the Sixth Amendment question for future con-
sideration. 9
353. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
354. Batson, 476 U.S. at 112 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Petition for Certiorari at i).
355. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Batson (No. 84-6263). The Court asked a follow-up
question of counsel for petitioner as well:
Question: You are not asking for a reconsideration of Swain, and you are making no
equal protection claim here. Is that correct?
Mr. Niehaus: We have not made an equal protection claim.
Id. at 5-6.
356. See Alschuler, supra note 92, at 184 ("For reasons that appeared mysterious, the Court rested
its decision on the Equal Protection Clause rather than on the Sixth Amendment and, indeed, went to
unusual lengths to do so.").
357. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 n.4.
358. Prior to Holland, the Sixth Amendment claim was interpreted to require the inclusion of a
fair cross section of the community. Thus, rather than forbidding discrimination, it was argued that
the Sixth Amendment conferred an affirmative right to a jury composed of a fair cross section. One
indication that this line of thinking was not far from at least one Justice's mind is found in a bench
memo to Justice Marshall from one of his clerks. The law clerk suggested to the Justice that 'under
a Sixth Amendment approach.., intentional exclusion by the prosecutor of any 'cognizable group'
may lead to a valid claim, and the whole area becomes somewhat messier." Memorandum from Law
Clerk to Justice Marshall 6 (Dec. 11, 1985) (located in the Justice Marshall Papers at the Library of
Congress) (copy on file with author).
Justice Kennedy, though not on the Court at the time of Baison, seems to have shared this view
that the Sixth Amendment would lead to uncontrollable results. In his concurrence in Holland, he
explained: "[W]e must reject petitioner's claim that the fair-cross-section requirement under the Sixth
Amendment was violated. The contention... admits of no limiting principle to make it workable in
practice." Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 488 (1990).
359. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 n.4 ("We agree with the State that resolution of petitioner's claim
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In Holland, the parties took up the challenge left open by footnote
four in Batson.' The case was argued on Sixth Amendment
grounds. 1 Justice Scalia, in an opinion for the Court, was quite ada-
mant that all that was at issue was the Sixth Amendment, 2 and Justice
Kennedy, in his concurrence, made it clear that his position was limited to
cases brought under the Sixth Amendment, but that his vote would be dif-
ferent in cases brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.' Other Jus-
tices, however, writing in dissent, asserted that the links between the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments in the jury context were not so easily severed
and that both Amendments were violated when the prosecutor used race-
properly turns on application of equal protection principles and express no view on the merits of any
of petitioner's Sixth Amendment arguments.").
In the meantime, Justice Stevens and ChiefJustice Burger debated in their respective concurrence
and dissent the appropriateness ofresolvingBatson on Fourteenth Amendmentgrounds. Justice Stevens
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment was raised in the case by respondent and by several amici in
their briefs, id. at 109-10 (Stevens, J., concurring), and therefore, was properly before the Court,
whereas Chief Justice Burger argued that petitioner failed to raise the Fourteenth Amendment claim
before the Kentucky Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court, and that the case should not be
decided on Fourteenth Amendment grounds in light of those omissions. Id. at 112-13 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). At the very least, according to Chief Justice Burger, the Court should have ordered
supplemental briefing or re-argument so that the question could be more fully addressed by the parties.
Id. at 118. Chief Justice Burger then went on to reject the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for
limiting the peremptory because the Court had limited equal protection analysis to race alone and it was
unclear what level of scrutiny other groups should be subject to and because the peremptory, once open
to question, was no longer a peremptory. Id. at 123-24.
360. See supra note 359.
361. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 487 n.3 ("Our grant of certiorari was limited to the Sixth Amend-
ment question, and the equal protection question has been neither briefed nor argued."); id. at 490
(Marshall, I., dissenting) ("For reasons that are not immediately apparent, petitioner expressly
disavows the argument that a white defendanthas standing to raise an equal protection challenge, based
on our decision in Batson v. Kentucky ... to a prosecutor's racially motivated peremptory strikes of
Afro-American venirepersons.').
Petitioner thought he was limited to the Sixth Amendment because that is what he had argued
before the state trial court (even though he raised Batson as an issue before the Illinois Supreme Court)
and because he thought that his standing to bring an equal protection claim would be difficult to
establish. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Holland (No. 88-5050). However, in petitioner's view,
his Sixth Amendmentargument had "elements of equal protection analysis to it because there is concern
for excludedjurors." Id. at 13. At a later point during oral argument, petitioner again sought to show
that both Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment principles might be involved: "Well, we're certainly not
precluding the equal protection argument as being persuasive in this case because in effect there's that
argument and there's more, because there are Sixth Amendment-." Id. at 19. Respondentwent even
further in noting the connections between the two:
This is why we think that even though tpetitioner] has denominated this claim as a Sixth
Amendment claim, he really is not making a Sixth Amendment claim at all, as Justice
White suggested earlier. What Petitioner Holland appears to be doing is attacking by the
back door the standing requirement of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 31.
362. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 487 ("All we hold is that [petitioner] does not have a valid
constitutional challenge based on the Sixth Amendment.. . ." (emphasis in original)); id. ("[Olnly the
Sixth Amendment claim, and not the equal protection claim, is at issue .... .") (emphasis in original)).
363. Id. at 488-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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based peremptories, regardless of whether the defendant was black or
white.2
Justice Marshall, writing for Justices Brennan and Blackmun in dis-
sent, noted that under the Fourteenth Amendment and Batson, the harms
to the defendant, the excluded juror, and the community were not affected
by the race of the defendant and that five Members of the Court agreed to
that position.3' Because petitioner Holland did not raise a Fourteenth
Amendment claim, Justice Marshall considered Holland's Sixth Amend-
ment claim, which he found persuasive because the fair-cross-section
requirement, while not mandating a quota system for the petit jury, does
require that distinctive groups not be excluded from the petit jury by means
of the peremptory.'
Justice Stevens, also writing in dissent, would have reached peti-
tioner's Fourteenth Amendment claim, just as the Court had in Batson. He
noted that in Batson, petitioner raised a Sixth Amendment claim, but the
Court decided in his favor based on the Fourteenth Amendment.3 67 In
Justice Stevens's view, the Court should have recognized Holland's Four-
teenth Amendment claim as well, particularly because the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendment "claims overlap; indeed, the requirement of impartiality
is, in a sense, the mirror image of a prohibition against discrimi-
nation."368 His view that "petitioner should have been permitted to prove
that the exclusion of black jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause" also
led him to the conclusion "that petitioner should be entitled to prove that
the State ha[d] violated the fair-cross-section principle of the Sixth
Amendment." 3" Under the Sixth Amendment, explained Justice Stevens,
a defendant is to be tried by a petit jury that has been selected by neutral
procedures; the Sixth Amendment is not "so frail" that it ends with the
drawing of the venire.' 7 Here, the prosecutor systematically eliminated
African American members of the venire not on the ground that they were
partial, but on the ground that no African American was competent to
serve; thus, petitioner had stated a claim under the Sixth Amendment.
Batson, though based on the Fourteenth Amendment, has implications for
the Sixth as well: "The operation of a facially neutral peremptory challenge
364. Id. at 492-93 (Marshall, I., dissenting); id. at 517 (Stevens, I., dissenting). In Duren v.
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), then-Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent, argued that the Court's
analysis under the Sixth Amendment was strikingly similar to its analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause, reinforcing the notion that the two are not always easy to disentangle. Id. at 370-71.
365. Holland, 493 U.S. at 491-92 (Marshall, I., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting); id. at 488-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 505-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
366. Id. at 495-500 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
367. Id. at 507 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
368. Id. at 506 n.4.
369. Id. at 508.
370. Id. at 515.
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procedure in a discriminatory manner is no less a violation of the defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury chosen from a fair cross section of
the community than it is a violation of the juror's right to equal pro-
tection." s '
After the Court's opinions in Batson and Holland, however, it became
clear that the Fourteenth Amendment is the accepted route for challenging
discriminatory peremptories. This notion has been reinforced by
Powers,' Edmonson,37  McCollum," and now J.E.B.,3  all of
which were decided on equal protection grounds. Although these cases
establish the Fourteenth Amendment as the only viable approach now, what
Batson and Holland show is the unsettled nature of the question in 1986
and 1990 respectively and the way in which the two amendments have con-
verged in the past. Although the Fourteenth Amendment may now be the
more feasible route as a matter of legal strategy, the Sixth Amendment is
a better approach as a matter of legal theory for prohibiting overt dis-
crimination during jury selection. Otherwise, the Court will have to take
a wait-and-see approach until each group that finds itself the subject of
discriminatory peremptories finally sues or has a suit brought on its behalf.
The Fourteenth Amendment could serve as the basis for eliminating per-
emptories, but only if the Court were willing to reach beyond the particular
group seeking protection. Without that step, however, the Fourteenth
Amendment will do little to protect the jury, except in a piecemeal fashion.
C. Revisiting the Sixth Amendment
1. Revising Notions of Impartiality.-The Sixth Amendment provides
in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed."376 The amend-
ment provides that the accused is entitled to an "impartial jury"; however,
371. Id. at 517.
372. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). In Powers, petitioner initially sought review based
on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 403. However, while the petition was pending, the
Court decided Holland. After Holland, the Court granted Powers's petition for a writ of certiorari,
but limited it to the question whether "a white defendant may object to the prosecutionfs peremptory
challenges of black venirepersons" based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 404.
373. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991). Edmonson was decided
on equal protection grounds based on the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. Id. at 616. The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws
has been held to apply to the federal government as a component of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
374. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
375. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
376. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (emphasis added).
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it does not provide that the accused is entitled to a "sympathetic jury."
Professor Babcock, among others, agrees that peremptories are, in fact,
exercised not to secure an impartial jury (though that might have been the
initial goal), but to secure a partial jury-namely one that the defendant
believes will be sympathetic to her case.3'
Professor Babcock, in advocating for an extensive voir dire, has
explained that the questioning of jurors is necessary so that a defendant has
sufficient information about potential jurors in order to "realize his right
to 'select' the jury by challenges for cause and by peremptory strikes."378
Although a defendant may have a statutory "right to select," she does not
have a constitutional right to select;3' nowhere in the Sixth Amendment
is she provided with such a right. A defendant has a right to an impartial
jury under the Sixth Amendment, but the Amendment does not give her a
right to select such a jury nor to use peremptories to attempt to create a
partial jury. In fact, the peremptories, even if they were being used
properly, do not have any constitutional grounding at all, as has long been
recognized by the Court.3"°
377. Babcock, supra note 12, at 551. One of the questions asked by the Court during oral
argument in Holland lends support to this view as well:
Question: If you're really-if you're really honest aboutyour principle, peremptory chal-
lenges in general-the whole notion of a peremptory challenge is contrary to having a fair
cross-section, isn't it, because the whole purpose of it is to eliminate a fair cross-section
and somehow load the jury in such a way that it's more likely to be in your favor.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Holland (No. 88-5050).
Lawyers have admitted to doing as much when questioned about the exercise of their peremp-
tories. One prosecutor who struck women from the jury conceded that he did so because "he believed
that he had a better chance to obtain guilty verdicts from a jury composed of men... than one com-
posed of women." Tyler v. State, 623 A.2d 648, 653 (Md. 1993). Another prosecutor who was asked
to explain the exercise of his peremptories said that "[w]e struck those who we believed would acquit.
Those strikes were not based on race but onjust our exercising our right to strike jurors we feel would
be most favorable to acquit." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Bui v. Alabama, cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2970 (1993) (No. 92-8280).
378. Babcock, supra note 12, at 549. But in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), the
Court, in its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, described the defendant as having "a right
to have a jury selected for the trial of his case without discrimination against all persons of his race or
color." Id. at 305 (emphasis added). Notably, the Court did not say that the defendant had "a right
to select a jury for the trial of his case."
379. Parties in a civil case have a statutory right to peremptory challenges, 28 U.S.C. § 1870
(1988), and in criminal cases, Congress has authorized peremptory challenges, 18 U.S.C. § 3442
(1988), in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b), see FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)
(providing that the number of peremptories varies according to the punishment for the offense).
380. See I.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1426 n.7 (1994) ("Although peremp-
tory challenges are valuable tools in jury trials, they 'are not constitutionally protected fundamental
rights.'" (quoting Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348,2358 (1992))); McCollu=, 112 S. Ct. at
2358 ("[I]t is important to recall that peremptory challenges are not constitutionally protected funda-
mental rights; rather, they are but one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury
and a fair trial."); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) ("While we have
recognized the value of peremptory challenges ... there is no constitutional obligation to allow
them."); Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988) ("[W]e reject the notion that loss of a peremptory
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One reason the definition of an "impartial jury" has been subject to
such corruption in practice is that we do not have a precise understanding
of the phrase."8' Black's Law Dictionary defines "impartial" as "[flavor-
ing neither; disinterested; treating all alike; unbiased; equitable, fair and
just. " It explains that an "impartial jury" is one that is "not partial,
not favoring one party more than another, unprejudiced, disinterested,
equitable, and just, and that the merits of the case shall not be pre-
judged."3" "Impartial," however, does not mean a blank slate.3"
Obviously, jurors have different experiences and perspectives that shape the
way in which they view the world.3 People with different backgrounds
and experiences can contribute their various views and interpretations. 86
challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury."); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) ("[T]he Constitution does not confer a right to peremptory challenges."); id.
at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("IT]his Court has also repeatedly stated that the right of peremptory
challenge is not of constitutional magnitude, and may be withheld altogether without impairing the
constitutional guarantee of impartial jury and fair trial."); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)
(noting that despite the significance of peremptory challenges, they are not secured by the Constitution);
id. at 243 (Goldberg, I., dissenting) ("[W]e have long recognized that the right to challenge peremp-
torily is not a fundamental right, constitutionally guaranteed, even as applied to a defendant, much less
to the State."); Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 n.1l (1948) ("[Tlhe right [to peremptory
challenges] is in the nature of a statutory privilege."); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145
(1936) ('There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress to grant
peremptory challenges to defendants in criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is secured."
(quoting Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919))).
381. I will not attempt to answer the question what is meant by an impartial jury in this Article;
it is a topic that deserves its own article, if not book. It is a fascinating, but difficult, question, and
one that I hope to be able to address in a later piece. For the purposes of this Article, however, I will
merely be scratching the surface of this larger problem.
382. BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY 752 (6th ed. 1990). The Oxford English Dictionary offers es-
sentially the same definition of "impartial": "Not partial; not favouring one party or side more than
another, unprejudiced, unbiased, fair, just, equitable." THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 700 (2d
ed. 1989).
383. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra-note 382, at 752.
384. An impartial jury "cannot mean.., that there is a possibility of drawing many jurors who
have no opinions that they will bring to bear on the evidence or on what happens in the courtroom and
jury room." Babcock, supra note 12, at 551; see Erwin Chemerinky, Pretrial Publity Isn't a
Hinderance, L.A. TIMEs, June 28, 1994, at B7 ("The Constitution does not dictate that prospective
jurors be unfamiliar with OJ. Simpson, the murders or even the purported evidence. Rather, what is
required is careful selection to find 12 individuals who can be trusted to decide solely based on the
evidence presented in the courtroom."); cf. Jeffrey Abramson, When Lawyers Play the Race Card,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1994, at A27 ("Historically, the right to an impartial jury never meant that jurors
needed to approach the case with complete ignorance.").
385. Wells, supra note 68, at 2402-04; see Wells, supra note 159, at 1741-42 ("Inevitably, what
these decisionmakers come to regard as salient and objective features of the decisional terrain will
depend upontheir own particular situation."); David Kairys et al., Jury Representativeness: A Mandate
for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CAL. L. REV. 776, 782 n.44 (1977) ("No one is without attitudes and
preferences concerning various social, political, economic, cultural and religious issues, and such
attitudes and preferences affect one's judgment and perception regarding factual and legal questions and
the credibility of witnesses.").
386. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531-33 (1975) (holding that the exclusion of women
from the venire will result in lost perspectives and will make the jury less representative); Peters v.
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (concludingthat exclusion of a segment of the community from jury
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That is one reason the Court has concluded that it is important to have a
jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community."' Regrettably,
the Court has described only the venire in this way-groups may still be
excluded from the petit jury by virtue of the peremptory under the Sixth
Amendment;38 the only exceptions thus far are for race and gender un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment.1 9
Although we may not have a precise understanding of the impartial
juror, we can say something about impartiality. At one end of the impar-
tiality continuum is the "blank slate juror," in whose existence we do not
really believe." The blank slate juror does not read the newspaper,
watch television, or listen to the radio. She knows nothing about the case,
the parties, or even the larger issues that might be involved. She might
even claim to have no thoughts on the subject whatsoever. At the other
end of the impartiality continuum is the juror who says that she cannot be
impartial (the "admitted partial juror"). This person recognizes that she
has a prejudice that will not allow for evenhanded decisionmaking in the
case. Between these two extremes are people who have different life
experiences and perspectives that they will bring to a hearing of the facts
of the case;391 while they may have general opinions, they do not have
a personal stake in the case and will be open to the arguments of both
sides.392 Perhaps one indication of our reticence in coming up with a
service deprives the jury of "a perspective on human events"); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187,
193-94 (1946) (noting that a distinct quality is lost if either gender is excluded from the jury).
387. See, e.g., Taylor, 419 U.S. at 528 (noting that selection from a representative cross section
is an "essential component" of the right to a jury trial).
388. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991) ("In Holland, the Court held that a defendant
could not rely on the Sixth Amendment to object to the exclusion of members of any distinctive group
at the peremptory challenge stage.").
389. See id. at 409 (holding that under the Fourteenth Amendment, "race-based exclusion is no
more permissible at the individual petit jury stage than at the venire stage" (quoting Holland v. Illinois,
493 U.S. 474, 479 (1990))); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994) ("[T]he
Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination injury selection on thebasis of gender.... As with
race, the 'core guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not discriminate
*. ., would be meaningless were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such
assumptions, which arise solely from the jurors' [gender].'- (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 97-98 (1986))).
390. See Chemerinsky, supra note 384, at B7 (asserting that being impartial does not mean being
ignorant or uninformed); Mickey Kaus, A Modest Proposal for Untainted Juries, L.A. TiMES, July 1,
1994, at B7 (proposing, in jest, the creation of a "jury preserve" in which we keep prospectivejurors
so that they remain blissfully unaware of cases like OJ. Simpson's until they are called to serve).
Mark Twain, conflating impartial and ignorant, described the challenge of our jury system as follows:
"We have a jury system that is superior to any in the world, and its efficiency is only marred by the
difficulty of finding twelve men everyday who don't know anything and can't read." Mark Twain,
Americans and the English, in 28 WRITINGS OF MARK TwAIN 34, 35 (Albert B. Paine ed., 1929).
391. See ABRAMSON, supra note 83, at 195 ("To acknowledge that jurors enter thejury room with
views and values shaped in part by their creed, race, or gender is not to accuse the jurors of bias in
need of silencing. It is to treasure the particularly rich conversations a democratic assembly inspires,
precisely because it brings into one communal conversation persons from different subcommunities.").
392. We also recognize that people have prejudices, but that the prejudices do not necessarily
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shared understanding of the meaning of impartiality is that we allow indi-
vidual jurors to decide for themselves if they can be impartial. During voir
dire in federal court, in which the judge typically asks the questions, there
will often be a point when the judge asks the prospective juror if she can
be impartial.3" Once the prospective juror responds in the affirmative,
there is little that counsel can do to establish a for-cause challenge. We
leave it to the individual juror to decide for herself whether she can be
impartial, in accordance with her individual, common-sense notion of im-
partiality.394
Under my reading of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant does not have
the right to a sympathetic jury, nor does she have the right to a jury of her
own choosing; she does, however, have a constitutional right to an im-
partial jury, which means a jury drawn from a venire in which groups have
not been systematically excluded through the exercise of discriminatory
peremptories. Thus, I share the dissenters' view in Holland that the
extension of the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement from the
venire to the petit jury does not mean that all groups must be present on
any particular petit jury, but it does mean that during the selection process,
no group can be systematically excluded from the petit jury.395 If we
assume that the venire is fairly drawn and truly representative of the
community,3 6 then the use of discriminatory peremptories to exclude
brand them as partial because the deliberation process can expose those prejudices. One of the values
of group deliberation is that through interaction with others, jurors can become aware of their own
prejudices and can avoid letting them dictate their vote. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233
(1978) (noting that group decisionmakingis superior to individual decisionmaking because the former
counterbalances prejudices).
393. See, e.g., Transcript of Voir Dire at 70-71, 74, 77, 79, 83, 89, 91, 96, 98, United States v.
Torres, No. 77 Cr. 680 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1980) (providing instances during voir dire when the
judge asked prospective jurors if anything in their background would prevent them from being
impartial).
Whether the inquiry should end there, however, is open to question: "A juror may not fully
understand either the meaning or the demands of impartiality; the juror may miscalculate his or her
ability to put aside knowledge that could prejudicejudgment. In addition, the simple appearance of bias
may damage the basic commitment to a fair trial process." Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a
Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L.
Rv. 1201, 1204 (1992).
394. Similarly, we allow the individualjudge to decidewhether he can be impartial. When a party
seeks to recuse a judge on the basis of partiality, we permit that judge to decide the recusal motion in
the first instance. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1988) (allowing a party to seek recusal of a judge based on
a belief that the judge has bias or prejudice); see also Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542 Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 155, 181-82 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (holding that a black judge should not
have to disqualify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 simply because he is black and the case involves
blacks); Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that a judge
who is black and female should not recuse herself from a case involving sex discrimination). Of
course, the recusal decision is subject to review by appellate courts at a later stage.
395. Holland, 493 U.S. at 494.
396. I am assuming that the venire is drawn from a fair cross section of the community and that
no group is being excluded at the venire stage. Some commentators have noted, however, that venire
lists are often limited to voter registration lists, and when jurors are drawn from only one type of list,
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members of a particular group narrows the range of perspectives of the
petit jury, and the jury may veer precipitously toward partiality. 7  This
is so because as both sides use discriminatory peremptories to eliminate the
group they think will be less sympathetic, they are likely to be eliminating
jurors that give the jury diversity, such as the few members of the venire
from a racial, religious, or ethnic minority. The jurors who remain may
well constitute a more homogeneous jury than if discriminatory peremp-
tories had not been allowed to skew the composition of the jury. Thus, the
defendant is being denied her right under the Sixth Amendment to an "im-
partial jury." The Sixth Amendment as applied to the petit jury would not
require that all groups be present on any particular petit jury, but only that
the selection process be conducted in a nondiscriminatory fashion so that
all groups have the opportunity to be fairly represented.
My understanding of "impartial" would require the Court to put into
practice what it has long expressed in case law: prospective jurors are to
be judged on an individual basis and no prospective juror should be ex-
cluded because of an immutable characteristic. From ThieP95  to
Cassel1399 to McCree4 to Batson4"" to Powers' to J.E.B.,' the
the representativeness of the venire is compromised. See, e.g., Kairys et al., supra note 385, at 803-
11. To overcome this problem, some recommend supplementing the voter registration list with multiple
lists, such as lists of those who have driver's licenses, pay utilities, or receive welfare benefits or unem-
ployment compensation. See, e.g., id. at 826; supra note 281.
397. One counterargument is that if each side is using discriminatory peremptories to exclude
groups it thinks will disfavor its cause, then each will counteract the other and the remaining jurors will
form an impartial jury. The problems with that argument are several. First, one side may have more
peremptories than the other and be able to skew the jury more successfully. Second, the lawyers may
not be evenly matched at discerning who will be more favorable to their cause, and while some may
say that that is one of the unavoidable consequences of an adversarial system, it is unclear that the ad-
versarial system should be charged with the task of producing an impartial jury. See Zeisel &
Diamond, supra note 156, at 491. Third, the discriminatory behavior of each side, whose aim is to
produce a partial jury, does not become more acceptable if by happenstance the jury created turns out
to be impartial.
398. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) ("Jury competence is an individual
rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard
it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic
ideals of trial by jury.").
399. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 (1950) (plurality opinion) ("Jurymen should be
selected as individuals, on the basis of individual qualifications, and not as members of a race.").
400. See Lockhartv. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986) ("[T]he exclusion from jury service of
large groups of individuals not on the basis of their inability to serve as jurors, but on the basis of some
immutable characteristic such as race, gender, or ethnic background, undeniably [gives] rise to an
'appearance of unfairness.'").
401. See Ratson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) ("Competenceto serve as a juror ultimately
depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider evidence
presented at a trial.").
402. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) ("A person's race simply 'is unrelated to his
fitness as a juror.'" (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (quoting Thiel, 328 U.S. at 227 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)))).
403. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1428 (1994) ("Striking individual
jurors on the assumption that they hold particular views simply because of their gender is 'practically
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Court has reiterated this point.' I would take these assertions seriously
and start with the premise, as courts do in England, that all prospective
jurors who meet the statutory criteria are competent to serve. Some may
still be excluded from the petit jury for cause either because they are
related to the parties, because they are connected to the litigation, or
because they enter with a closed mind and believe that they cannot be
impartial.' We should start, however, with the view that is deeply
embedded in our democratic society that people will be judged as indi-
viduals and will not be presumed to be unfit to serve as jurors because of
some stereotypical notion about their group identity.
2. Limitations of Returning to the Sixth Amendment.-The most
serious limitation of returning to the Sixth Amendment is that the Amend-
ment is limited to criminal cases, and I believe the peremptory should be
eliminated from civil as well as criminal trials.4 Although the Sixth
Amendment contains the phrase "impartial jury," and the Seventh Amend-
ment does not, the absence of the phrase from the Seventh Amendment
cannot mean that the jury in a civil case is permitted to be partial. My
claim that discriminatory peremptories are inconsistent with the creation of
an impartial jury should be equally applicable to the civil jury and to the
criminal jury, even if there is less textual support for the former than the
latter because in both cases we expect and require the jury to be impartial.
The Court has already begun to lay the groundwork for viewing the
jury as a public institution that performs public functions whether it is
hearing a civil or criminal case. In Edmonson, the Court held that the
prohibition of race-based peremptories extends to parties in a civil case,
just as it does to parties in a criminal case.' The Court expanded the
concept of "state actor" to embrace a private party engaged in the act of
jury selection because it views the jury, at least under the Fourteenth
Amendment, as a public institution, which should be held to the same, if
not a higher, standard as other governmental bodies when it comes to the
principle and practice of nondiscrimination.
Another limitation of returning to the Sixth Amendment is that the
Court's Sixth Amendment view of the jury has been that it serves as an
a brand upon them, affixed by law, an assertion of their inferiority.'" (quoting Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880))).
404. One striking exception is the Court's admission in Swain that prospective jurors could be
denied the opportunity to serve because of peremptories "exercised on grounds normally thought
irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or
affiliations of people summoned for jury duty." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
405. See generally Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 433 (1887) (providing guidance for determining
when a for-cause challenge should be granted); supra note 284 and accompanying text.
406. See supra text accompanying notes 8-15.
407. Edmonsonv. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991).
1134 [Vol. 73:1041
Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury
institution to protect the defendant's rights,' 8 whereas the Court's
Fourteenth Amendment view of the jury has been that it serves as a public
institution committed to fairness and nondiscrimination.
In its Sixth Amendment jury cases, the Court has understood the right
of a criminal defendant to be tried by "an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed"' to mean that the
criminal defendant was entitled to a jury in which the venire had been
drawn from a fair cross section of the population. The right was one that
attached to the defendant so that he or she could have the benefit of a wide
range of points of view. Although the defendant did not have a right to a
petit jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community, he or she did
at least have the right to a venire that would reflect such diversity.
In its Fourteenth Amendment cases, the Court has acknowledged that
while the jury affords the defendant protection, the jury also functions as
a public institution. As such, there are competing demands made on the
jury. Although the jury protects the parties, the jury itself must be
preserved as an institution that reflects the citizenry and is respected and
regarded as fair and above manipulation. Its integrity is important so that
its verdicts will be accepted by the community. Thus, in its Fourteenth
Amendment line of jury cases, the Court recognized that the jury plays an
important public function. Race- and gender-based peremptories were
prohibited because they threatened these public values. Discrimination
could not be condoned, even though it meant cutting back on the protec-
tions traditionally afforded to private parties through the peremptory in
both civil and criminal contexts.
What is gained by revisiting the Sixth Amendment and trying to intro-
duce notions of the jury as a public institution into a new reading of the
Sixth Amendment? Perhaps the most significant gain is that the meaning
of who can be a juror has changed, and the Court has struggled with these
changes over the past 100 years, from Strauder to Swain to Batson to
J.E.B. Much of this struggle about the changing nature of the community
from which the jury is drawn and what it means to be a citizen and serve
on the jury have taken place under the rubric of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. However, the jurisprudence should not be so compartmentalized that
408. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("The purposeofa jury is to guard
against the exercise of arbitrary power-to make available the common-sense judgment of the
community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the
professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge."); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (-Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him
an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased, or eccentriejudge."); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965) ("The [jury trial] clause
was clearly intended to protect the accused from oppression by the Government. . .
409. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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this evolving notion of community can be recognized only under one line
of cases. Similarly, our understanding of the jury as an institution, and
how it has changed because of who can now serve, should not be recog-
nized under only one amendment. Although there has been a long-standing
tension in the Court's jury-selection jurisprudence depending on whether
the case was decided under the Sixth or the Fourteenth Amendments, there
is no reason that ideas from one line of cases should not be introduced into
the other. I am proposing such a commingling, and I think it not only
useful but also necessary because the limitations of the equal protection
framework introduced in Batson, expanded in the Batson progeny, and arti-
culated most recently in J.E.B., have become particularly apparent. The
goal of nondiscrimination will remain elusive if the only tool available is
the framework established in Batson. The notion of the "impartial jury"
found in the Sixth Amendment is not a panacea, but it provides a way of
looking at impartiality not as a fixed concept, but as a process by which the
jury, like the venire, is truly drawn from a fair cross section of the
community.
VIII. Conclusion
Over time, the roles of the jury have changed, as have our views
about who can serve as jurors and what jury service means. We need to
assess peremptories in light of these changes and ask whether peremptories
help or hinder the jury to perform its roles and to make jury duty ac-
cessible to those who are now eligible to serve. The jury is responsible for
articulating public value decisions, and thus it must be chosen from as
broad a swath of the community as possible in order to include a range of
perspectives and viewpoints. The jury must also strive for accurate ver-
dicts, and accuracy can be enhanced if there are jurors who recollect dif-
ferent facts and are willing to correct the mistaken views of others. The
jury also must be seen as fairly constituted, and thus it must be chosen in
a way that maintains integrity and respect and increases the likelihood that
jury verdicts will be accepted. Finally, the jury performs a unique educa-
tional function in a democracy and conveys powerful messages about the
responsibilities of citizenship.
Peremptories are harmful for several reasons: they limit the perspec-
tives that the jury will have available to it, they are most likely to be
exercised in cases in which a full range of perspectives is most desperately
needed, and they teach negative lessons in a public forum about who is a
full citizen and who is worthy of serving on the jury. Although peremp-
tories based on race and gender are among the more visible, certainly there
is no place in the courtroom for discrimination against any group. Further-
more, the exercise of discriminatory peremptories runs counter to our
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notion that all individuals will be judged fit for civic duty based on their
individual competence and not on their group characteristics.
The elimination of the peremptory involves trade-offs. Without the
peremptory, parties will exercise less control over who sits on the jury, and
they may feel greater reservation about accepting the jury as fair. Without
peremptories, parties will no longer exercise any oversight about who can
be excused, thus making the correction of judicial error more difficult.
And finally, the elimination of peremptories would mark a departure from
tradition, and some would argue that the tradition should not be discarded
because it has served us well. Although there is some validity to these
arguments, what they fail to take into account is the way in which the
potential membership of the jury has changed; no longer is it a homo-
geneous body consisting of white, male property-holders. The jury should
reflect the heterogeneous nature of the citizenry now permitted to serve as
jurors. Mechanisms such as the peremptory, which serve to limit the di-
versity of the jury, do harm not only to the functioning of the jury, but
also to the symbolism of the jury, which includes a powerful political
message about equality and full citizenship.
With the elimination of the peremptory, we have an opportunity for
rethinking the process of jury selection. There are several alternatives,
such as a quota, a strictly random, or a revised for-cause selection. In my
view, it would be preferable, though not essential, to revise slightly the
for-cause challenge. If the for-cause challenge includes a category for
individual behavior (as opposed to status) and if the for-cause challenge is
granted less begrudgingly than is the current practice, then such a revised
for-cause challenge will provide a solution for the few cases in which a
juror may be partial even though she does not satisfy the traditional criteria
for a dismissal for cause. Of course, additional categories could be added
if they became necessary, but the main point is that the for-cause challenge
makes the process public and requires a public dialogue by which we
would decide which prospective jurors could be excluded. Challenges for
cause require parties to give reasons; they require judges to accept or reject
the reasons, and they require judges to explain their decision. This process
ensures that the reasons for exclusion cannot include assumptions based on
status or immutable characteristics. In this way, even if the for-cause
challenge is expanded slightly over time, it will not become a peremptory
in disguise because the process is one based on openness rather than
secrecy.
Although the elimination of the peremptory is consistent with the
vision of the jury described in Batson and its progeny, the Batson
framework, a compromise at best, falls short of its goal. Equal protection
analysis is limited in scope in the jury context; it permits the Court to
dismantle discriminatory peremptories, but only in a piecemeal fashion,
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thus allowing discrimination to continue unhampered and the integrity of
the jury to remain under threat. Revisiting the Sixth Amendment, with
insights about the jury gained from the Fourteenth Amendment, may prove
helpful. The Sixth Amendment requires that a party be tried by an "im-
partial jury." Unfortunately, peremptories have been used in practice to
create partial, or sympathetic, juries. Such a practice distorts the meaning
that the Court has given to an impartial jury as a body drawn from a fair
cross section of the community. Although the Court has applied this
understanding to the venire only and has not extended it yet to the petit
jury, such an extension is appropriate. An impartial jury should mean one
from which no group has been systematically excluded. By returning to
the Sixth Amendment and reinvigorating it with an understanding of the
jury as a public institution, we may find a legal approach that will allow
us to achieve at last the vision of the jury articulated under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
